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ABSTRACT
In this thesis we investigate decision making in complex environments using
adaptive network models.
We ﬁrst focus on the problem of consensus decision making in large animal
groups. Each individual has an internal state that models its choice among the
possible q alternatives and we assume that each individual updates its internal
state using a majority rule, if it is connected to other individuals, or using a
probabilistic rule. In this case, if the individual has no information, the choice
shall be totally random, otherwise the probabilistic rule shall have a bias toward
one of the q choices, measured by a parameter hi. The individuals shall also
update their neighbourhood adaptively, which is modelled by a link creation/
link destruction process with an eﬀective rate z. We show that the system, if there
are no informed individuals, undergoes a I order phase transition at a give value,
z∗, between a disordered phase and a phase were consensus is reached. When
the number of informed individuals increases, the ﬁrst order phase transition
remains, until one reaches a critical value of informed individuals above which
the system is no more critical. We also prove that, for z in a critical range, the
removal of knowledgeable individuals may induce a transition to a phase where
the group is no able to reach a consensual decision. We apply these results to
interpret some data on seasonal migrations of Atlantic Blueﬁn Tuna.
We, then, build amodel to describe the emergence of hierarchical structures in
societies of rational self-interested agents.Thismodel constitutes a highly stylised
model for human societies. The decision-making problem of the agents, in this
situation, is to which other agent to connect itself. We model the preference of
agents of that society for connecting to more prominent agents with a parameter
β. We show that there exists a sharp transition between a disordered equalitarian
society and an ordered hierarchical society as beta increases. Moreover, we
prove that, in a hierarchical society, social mobility is almost impossible, which
captures behaviours that have been observed in real societies.
v
R IASSUNTO
In questa tesi investighiamo i processi di decision in ambienti complessi
usando modelli di reti adattive.
Ci focalizziamo, per prima cosa, sul problema delle decisioni consensuali nei
grandi gruppi di animali. Ogni individuo ha uno stato interno che modellizza
la sua scelta fra le q possibili alternative e assumiamo che ogni individuo possa
aggiornare il suo stato interno usando una regola di maggioranza, se è connesso
ad un altro individuo, oppure con una regola probabilistica. In quest’ultimo caso,
se l’individuo non ha informazioni la sua scelta sarà completamente casuale,
altrimenti, la regola probabilistica avrà uno sbilanciamento verso una delle q
possibili scelte misurato dal parametro hi. Un individuo potrà anche aggiornare
il suo vicinato adattivamente, il che è modellizzato da un processo di creazione
e distruzione di collegamenti ad un tasso eﬀettivo z. Mostriamo che il sistema,
in assenza di individui informati, subisce, at un dato valore z∗, una trasizione
di fase del prim’ordine fra una fase disordinata e una fase in cui il gruppo
raggiunge il consenso. Quando il numero di individui informati aumenta, la
transizione del prim’ordine permane ﬁnché non si raggiunge un numero critico
di individui informati, al di sopra del quale il sistema non è più critico. Proviamo
anche che, per z in un intervallo critico, la rimozioni di individui informati
può causare una transizione in una fase in cui il gruppo non è più capace di
raggiungere il consenso. Applichiamo questi risultati all’interpretazione di dati
sulle migrazioni stagionali del tonno rosso atlantico.
Construiamo, in seguito, un modello per descrivere l’emergenza di stutture
gerarchiche in società di agenti razionali ed egoisti. Questo modello costituisce
un unmodello altamente stilizzato per le società umane. Il problema decisionale
degli agenti, in questa situazione, è a quale altro agente connettersi. Modellizia-
mo le preferenze degli agenti in questa società verso la connessione ad agenti
più prominenti con il parametro β. Mostriamo che esiste una transizione bru-
sca tra una società disordinata, equalitaria, e una società ordinata e gerarchica
all’aumentare di β. Proviamo, inoltre, che in una società gerarchica la mobilità
sociale è quasi impossibile, il che cattura comportamenti che sono stati osservati
in società reali.
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Part I
INTRODUCT ION

1
INTRODUCT ION
Decision making has been extensively studied both in social sciences and in
biology. Many fundamental questions in economics can be reduced to a decision
problem (how much to buy, when etc.); similarly in sociology and political
sciences many observed patters stems from a decision problem (why we choose
to live in a given neighbourhood, why we vote for a given politician ). In biology
as well, animals are confronted to the problem of making choices continually,
and their evolutionary success depends on how eﬀective their decision abilities
are.
Modelling of decisionmaking has a long history in social science, in particular
in economics, and a wide literature has been produced on the topic. Putting aside
the general problem of modelling complex entities such as human or animals
in a mathematically tractable way, the other main problem lies in the complex
nature of the environment in which these entities live, and, in particular, their
social environment.
This overwhelming complexity, in many cases, has been only partially ad-
dressed. In neoclassic economics, for example, the entire theory is built on
an object, the utility function, which represent the balance between costs and
beneﬁts of making an (economic) choice; all the complexity of the problem is
transferred in the choice of an adequate utility function and in a deﬁnition of a
series of pattern of interaction between the individuals (agents in the language
of economics) in the market. In these context, complex social interactions have
rarely been resolved explicitly.
Similarly in biology, traditional ecological modelling have relied on what, in
physical terms, we would call amean ﬁeld approach, typically writing phenomen-
ological equations for population of a given class (e. g. the famous Lotka-Volterra
model). In this case too, social complexity as been mainly addressed, essentially
writing a stochastic version of these models; possibly inducing some spacial,
inhomogeneity.
Only in the last twenty years, with the development of complexity science,
and in particular of network science, attempts of resolve explicitly the network
of interaction in decision making have been attempted.
In this thesis we focus on modelling decision making in complex environ-
ments using what are usually referred as adaptive network models.
We shall present two models of such kind, one which attempts to model
consensus decision making in animal groups, and in particular to oﬀer a sim-
pliﬁed setting to address migration of large group of animals (chapter ), and
another which focus on decision making in closed societies, in particular on the
processes that generate hierarchies in closed societies (chapter ).

 
.   
The deﬁnition of complex adaptive systems is still under debate, as almost any
thing in what is called complexity science.
We can however use the deﬁnition given by Holland []:
Complex Adaptive Systems are systems that have a large numbers of
components, often called agents, that interact and adapt or learn.
Animal societies—including human societies—can, clearly, be subsumed
in this general category; societies are formed of individuals, these individuals
interact with one another, and they adapt their behaviour according to changes
either internal to society itself (endogenous changes in the language of sociology)
or external inﬂuence (exogenous changes).
As it is underlined in [], complex adaptive systems, are not just complicated
systems. The fact that a system is characterised by a huge number of possibly
diﬀerent constituents, each of which might have a complicate description, is not
suﬃcient to generate complex pattern and behaviour. Interaction and interde-
pendence is the most relevant aspect: in a complex adaptive system, interaction
is such that the collective behaviour is qualitatively and substantially diﬀerent
from that of the single elements. This particular property if usually referred as
emergence in the literature of complex systems.
This emergent, seemingly ordered and organised behaviour does not requires
the existence of a centralised planning or of a decisional hierarchy, but it is
the consequence of local interaction: this property is usually referred as self-
organisation. Self-organisation and emergence are the most characteristic features
of Complex Adaptive Systems.
In many cases, as in collective animal behaviour or in human societies, the
diﬀerence between the behaviour of the group/society and that of the individual
that constitute it is so evident, that it has often been questioned whether the
usual mechanistic/reductionist approach of exact sciences can be applied. This
is particularly true in social sciences.
However, the experience of statistical physics prove that this apparent violation
of the reductionist principles of science is, indeed, only apparent. Thanks to
the work work of three generation of scientists, a set of rigorous mathematical
tools have been developed, which explain why collective properties can be so
qualitatively diﬀerent from microscopical one.
The usual approach of statistical physics is to model the microscopical in-
teraction and then infer the global behaviour. This approach can, therefore, be
extended l to modelling Complex Adaptive Systems, provided that it is possible
to give a meaningful simpliﬁed microscopic description of the components and
of their interaction
 For a general review on the topic see []; for a more up-to-date review with particular focus on
social sciences see []; for an historical recognition see []
 The study of complex systems, is by the nature of its problem, intrinsically multidisciplinary.Thus
diﬀerent scientists coming from diﬀerent backgrounds will often oﬀer a completely diﬀerent
perspective on the topic.
.     
.. Agent based models
Models of Complex Adaptive Systems that use this approach are commonly
called Agent base models.
In this framework one assumes that the system is composed of similar entities
called agentswhich interacts with one another over time: It is moreover assumed
that each agent :
. is “intelligent and purposeful” ;
. can interact with other agents using simple rules;
. can possibly interact with its environment.
The fact that each agent is intelligent and purposeful is usually modelled by the
fact that the agent has an internal state (which might simply be the velocity of
the agent ) and that it updates it according a set of simple rules
The computational complexity of such models usually increases very fast with
the number of agents simulations become rapidly inaccessible if large computer
clusters are not available.
In general, agent based models are not analytically tractable; however, in some
cases, it is possible to build simpliﬁed but reasonably descriptive agent based
models which are, to many extent, solvable.
.    
Modelling decision making in societies requires modelling the underlying social
structure. And the natural language for these studies is the one of networks.
In principle it would be possible to model social interaction using what we
could refer to as real space models: for each agent, model the location in space
at a given time and all the possible interaction which are possible in that speciﬁc
location. However social interaction, except possibly for animals in large group,
is not simply local in space or in time. This is particularly true for modern
human societies in the the global village where communication between agents,
and thus interaction, is not limited by spacial proximity.
In general, a microscopic description that explicitly embodies all the real space
details, if possible, is exceedingly complicated, and most probably will not lead
to an analytically tractable model. In this case realistic details are a distraction
and a network description can be seen as a simpliﬁed representation of these
social systems in which unnecessary details are left away [] (as Ising model is
for magnetisms in physics).
Themathematical theory underlying networkmodels is graph theory, a branch
of combinatorics and topology, with a long tradition [].
 this name was ﬁrst used in a famous article of Holland and Miller [] who borrowed this ter-
minology from economics, and was than adopted by the computer scientists doing these set of
models)
 As Marshall McLuhan vividly deﬁned the globalised world []
 
In particular in addressing real networks, the typical approach follows the
one pioneered by Erdős-Rényi [] and Gilbert []. Although the aim of those
works was to demonstrate the existence of some graphs with given properties,
their approach to this problem opened a new fruitful line of research. Erdős and
Rényi, in fact, relied on a probabilistic construction to prove their theorems:
they deﬁned a statistical ensemble of graphs, and described the typical properties
of graphs in this ensemble. This has been the main tool used in network science
since then.
In the last ﬁfteen years, the study of networks has exploded, fuelled by the
development of the Internet and the availability of large data sets. Empirical data
showed that Erdős-Rényi model is to oversimpliﬁed and triggered a global eﬀort
to ﬁnd more realistic descriptions of real networks (two famous examples of this
approach— probably cited in most of network related litterature—are Watts-
Strogarts “small world” model [] and Bárabasi-Albert model [] ). From these
studies, two substantially diﬀerent approaches emerged.
A ﬁrst approach, is essentially an approach à la Erdős-Renyi. One attempts
to describe a graph ensemble with the aim to reproduce the characteristics of
networks as obtained from empirical studies. In this sense, we could call this
approach a data driven approach.The “dynamical rules” of these systems, if
any, do not aim (necessarily) to reﬂect the true dynamics of the underlying
system but are rather chosen in such a way to lead to networks with the desired
properties.
The other approach does exactly the opposite. Networks are, in this case, a
simpliﬁed or stylised description of an underlying system, whose behaviour is
not clearly understood and one aims to elucidate with the netwrok model. The
dynamic rules are, in this case, a reasonable, albeit simpliﬁed, description of
the dynamics of the underlying system and the properties of the networks are
inferred from the dynamics.
In this thesis we shall adopt the second approach, and provide two examples
to which this approach may be fruitfully applied.
In the ﬁrst case, we tackle the problem of consensus decision making in
groups of animals (chapter ). In this context a network approach provides a
mathematically more tractable model with respect to the usual description: there
exist the possibility to use a real space model but it is not analytically tractable.
In the second example(chapter ) we focus on decision making in societies. In
this case the network description is a natural modelling framework and not just
a mathematically more tractable simpliﬁcation of a more precise but complex
description.
The reader can ﬁnd an overview of the basic deﬁnition of graph theory and
the notation used in this thesis in appendix A..
.   
Adaptivity is essentially a dynamical property of a complex adaptive systems.
Thus the model that we shall discuss will be essentially network dynamical
models. One can generally deﬁne a them as stochastic process of a dynamical
.   
system on a graph; to do so one must deﬁne a proper phase (or state) space on
which the time evolution takes place. A way to do it is to assume that each agent
i is a vertex in a graph. We model its internal state with one or more variables
that we shall denote collectively with ai. The network of interaction is given
by a graph structure. To keep the discussion simple we shall assume that this
structure can be described by and adjacency matrix 𝖦.
The phase (or state) space of this system is then given by set Ω of pairs ω =
(a, 𝖦) where a is a succinct way to denote the set of all internal states ai and 𝖦 is
the adjacency matrix of the system.
The stochastic or deterministic rule will essentially specify a sequence of states
ωt indexed by the time.
This general approach is however artiﬁcial. In fact when modelling Complex
Adaptive Systems the graph represent the network of interaction between agents
and thus it is much more natural to describe the evolution of the internal states
and that of the network separately and then infer general dynamical rules on
the phase space.
dynamics on the networks The dynamics of the internal state is often referred
as dynamics on the network. The main assumption that one makes is
that the dynamical update rule is local, i. e. that the evolution of ai may
depend only from the state of aj of the agents to which ai is connected.This
assumption in modelling Complex Adaptive System is, indeed, consistent
with the interpretation network as network of (social) interaction.
dynamics of the network Theother process thatmay occur is a change of graph.
In this case there is much more freedom in the choice of the update rule.
For example one may assume that there may be a vertex instantiated
network update which models the change of the interaction network ori-
ginated by an agent (as might be the creation or the interruption break of
a friendship), edge instantiated update such as the decay of an edge; it is
even possible to envisage processes occurring on more general motifs. In
general, it is not required that the Dynamics of the network depends on
the states of the vertices.
If the time scale of the dynamics over the network is much faster that the
dynamics of the network; such a system will behave as stochastic process on a
complex topology. On the other hand if the time scale of the network dynamics
is much faster, the system will be well mixed and thus a mean ﬁeld approach that
model these random interaction is adequate.
However, when these too time scale are comparable, one must take into
account the details of network evolution and
.  
Adaptive networks [] are network dynamical models in which the network
update rules depend on the states of vertices of the system.
An adaptive network model, thus, is essentially a agent based network dynam-
ical system in which the evolution of the properties of the vertices is determined
 
by the topology of the network whose evolution, is itself determined by the
states of the system.
Adaptive networks are a natural framework for model Complex Adaptive
Systems and in particular decision making in complex social environments. In
fact, it is reasonable to assume that the social neighbourhood of an agent is
modiﬁed by the choice he makes.
The interest in adaptive networks models is recent, Giving a general overview
of adaptivemodels is beyond the scope of this thesis(see [] for a general review);
however to give an general idea of the
Among all processes that one can consider, interacting particle systems [],
also called contact processes, , are of particular relevance.. In this processes the
state of an individual (particle, agent) can assume a discrete (and ﬁnite) number
of state. When two individuals meet one of them shall update its internal state
according to the state of the other individual: this mechanism can promote
local homogeneity and induces some form of spreading of information. Contact
processes are used in physics, biology or sociology to model—in an extremely
stylised manner—as diverse phenomena as the spread of epidemics, opinion
dynamics, the spacial competition of diﬀerent species, etc.
In particular, for contact processes, it is easy to set-up an adaptive network
generalisation since the dynamic on the network is rather simple. In fact, adaptive
versions of contact processes of ﬁxed discrete topology have been among the
ﬁrst adaptive network models to be developed (i. e. adaptive SIS model [] or
adaptive voter model [–])
To clarify some aspects of these stochastic adaptive network model, and,
mainly to illustrate some of the standard techniques used to analyse them,
we shall focus on the simplest among the state-topology co-evolving adaptive
networks: the voter model.
As we shall see in chapter , voters model, is not only a toy model, simple
enough to illustrate standard techniques, such asmoment closure approximation,
painlessly ; but it has been extensively used tomodel opinion dynamics in animal
groups. Even though we shall not directly use moment closure approximation in
chapter — we shall provided an exact solution of the model there discussed,—
the other adaptive models for decision making in animal groups do. To give a
broader perspective to the reader, we have decided to discuss here at length the
adaptive voter model as described in [] and moment closure approximation.
.. Adaptive Voter Models
The voter model [] is a prototypical model for opinion dynamics and possibly
the simplest of all contact processes. In its ﬁrst version[] it was stated as a
model for competition of species and received its name voter model in [].
Albeit being an extremely stylised description of any real process, its simplicity
and the fact that, it is solvable has made it a popular model to describe opinion
dynamics.
Since the adaptive version of this model depend much on the choice of the
network updating rule, adaptive voter models refer to an entire class of models.
.   
The voter model
In its original form, the voter model was deﬁned over a two dimensional lattice.
In all sites a there is a voter that can be in two states si = ±1; at any time
step a voter i selects one of its neighbours j and set si = sj. This systems is
exactly solvable in any dimension, since it can be mapped in a model of random
walkers [].
Let S = {si} be the set of all the spins. Clearly the consensus state deﬁned as
the state in which all the spins are either up or down is an absorbing state; all
other states are transient and this implies that the system is not ergodic. If the
lattice is ﬁnite the system will always reach in a ﬁnite time the absorbing states
and that the stationary distribution will be fully characterised by the probability
π of reaching the state the state with all spins up.
The system can be solved intuitively by writing down the transition rates for
spin ﬂips []. For a ﬁnite number of spins, the master equation can be written
in terms of the transition ratesWk for the spin ﬂips of the sk spin .
Wk =
1
τ 󰃚
1−
1
2d
sk∑
j𝒩i
sj󰃛
(.)
where𝒩i represent the neighbours of k, τ is a time scale factor and d the dimen-
sionality of the lattice.
The master equation can be solved exactly, since the rates are linear; in partic-
ular all the correlation can be calculated exactly for any dimension d. It can be
shown, in particular, that the average magnetisationm is conserved by this dy-
namics. As a consequence the probability of reaching the absorbing state where
all si = +1 is π =
m+1
2
. If the lattice is ﬁnite, that this suﬃce to characterise the
system. However for inﬁnite lattice, the time to reach consensus may diverge. It
has been shown that in fact this depends from dimensionality []. Since the
system is solvable the asymptotic behaviour of the density of interfaces n(t) can
be calculated. For d ≤ 2 n(t) → 0 which implies that consensus is reached,
whereas for d > 2 n(t) → cost. this does not happen.
There have been a lot of extensions, ranging from extending the model to a
diﬀerent dynamics, using diﬀerent internal states spins, introducing disorder,
and changing topology using various network models []. In particular in
heterogeneous topologies one can loose the conservation of magnetisation
property.
Adaptive Voter Model
Among the ﬁrst adaptive model built to generalise voter model, one can count
the work of Holme and Newman [], and with a similar model, to the work of
Gil and Zanette [, ]. We shall focus on [].
In Holme and Newman [], each node on a network has one opinion gi out of
G possible opinions (Potts spins) at when a node i is selected for update, it picks
up one of its neighbours j randomly: with a probability φ the node sets gi ∶= gj,
otherwise, with probability 1− φ the link is rewired to another node having the
same opinion of node i .. This dynamics tend to reduce the density of active
 
Figure .: An illustration of adaptive voter model dynamics of []
links deﬁned as link between node with conﬂicting opinions. When an upgrade
event occurs and an active link is selected, then that link is “inactivated”. If φ = 0
opinions do not change and the ﬁnal state of the system will be characterised
by as many homogeneous connected components as the number of diﬀerent
opinions in the initial system. If, instead, φ = 1 the network dynamics is frozen
and the system will end up in a state with as many homogeneous connected
components as the number of connected components in the initial state. More
importantly, it can be shown that there is a continuous, out of equilibrium phase
transition occurring at a critical value φc of the segregation parameter φ.
For an adaptive voter model G = 2 starting from a connected graph, this
means that aside of the traditional consensus absorbing state, there is another
absorbing state characterised by two separated homogeneous communities
(fragmentation). This phase transition concerns both the topology of the graph
(number of connected components) and the distribution of the states: this is a
common characteristic of adaptive network models.
Indeed for inﬁnite networks the consensus state might never we reached.
A mean ﬁeld approach has been attempted by [] to a similar model and it
suggests that phase transition for the density of active links exists: below a certain
threshold for φ, such density is non-zero and thus the network will never reach
a consensus state: above it the network undergoes fragmentation; however for
ﬁnite size systems due to ﬂuctuations consensus will eventually be reached in
any case.
The moment expansion
Vasquez mean ﬁeld approach [] can be seen as a special case of a general
approach, the so calledmoment expansion. In this approach, one seeks to write
down diﬀerential equations for the so called moments of the graph, i. e. the
densities of particular motifs and subgraphs [].
The understand how it works let’s apply it to the adaptive voter model used
by Vasquez.
Let us denote with V the set of agents (vertices) in the model, each of which
is identiﬁed by an integer number i and let N = |V| be the number of agents
in the system; let si denote the state of agent i, and s denote the vector whose
.   
i-th component is si. Let 𝖦 be the adjacency matrix of the interaction network.
The set ω = (s, 𝖦) deﬁne the states of the system and the stochastic rule of voter
model deﬁne a continuous Markov chain process on these states.
To solve it one should write down the master equation of the system, but
solving it is cumbersome. To obtain some hints on the system one can solve
its rate equations, i. e. solving themean ﬁeld dynamics. This approach is usually
referred, in this context, as moment expansion.
At any given time t that we shall not explicitly write in the following para-
graphs, let us denote by [s] the density of spins in state s, i. e. :
[A] =
1
N
⟨󰁈{i ∈ V ∶ si = A}󰁈⟩. (.)
this quantity is called the zeroth order moment. The ﬁrst order moments, de-
noted [AB] are the densities of links between vertices in state A and B, i. e. :
[AB] =
1
2N
⟨󰂌{(i, j) ∈ V × V ∶ (si = A) ∧ (sj = B) ∧ (gij = 1)}󰂌⟩. (.)
The second order moments [ABC] are the densities connected subgraphs with
three vertices and two links, i. e. :
[ABC] =
1
2N ⟨󰂌
{(i, j, k) ∈ V × V × V ∶ (si = A) ∧ (sj = B) ∧ (sj = C)
∧ (gij = 1) ∧ (gjk = 1)}󰂌⟩.
(.)
One can go on deﬁning a whole hierarchy of momenta in a similar way, for and
in principle describe the mean ﬁeld dynamics writing the the inﬁnite system of
ODE:
d
dt
[A1A2…An] = fA1,A2,…An([A1], [A2, ],… , [A1,A2]],…) (.)
where f are function of the momenta. In general, this system of equation cannot
be truncated and the evolution of a given moment depends of higher order
moments.
For the adaptive voter model discussed in [], if we use R (Red) to deﬁne the
vertices in state  and B (Blue) those in state −1 (as in ﬁgure .) these moment
equations for ﬁrst two moments truncated to ﬁrst three moment read:
d
dt
[R] = 0 =
d
dt
[B] (.)
d
dt
[RR] =
[RB]
2
+
φ
2
(2[RBR] − [RRB]) (.)
d
dt
[BB] =
[RB]
2
+
φ
2
(2[BRB] − [BBR]). (.)
The ﬁrst equation is trivially the consequence of the symmetry of the system.
The density of same colours link can be obtained either trough direct action
of the dynamics, i. e. with probability φ
2
an active link become an RR and with
probability 1−φ
2
and active link is rewired, thus leading to a neat contribution
 
of [RB]
2
; the other contribution comes from indirect action of the dynamics: if
a central node in a BRB sub graph upgrades to R than two RR are indirectly
created, similarly when a central node R in a RRB is upgraded to B a RR node is
destroyed, al these events occur with probability φ
2
.
The ﬁxed point of these equations states that the number of active links must
satisfy:
[RB] = φ(2[RBR] − [RRB]) = φ(2[BRB] − [BBR]) (.)
Of course such a set of equations cannot be solved analytically unless we ﬁnd a
way to estimate properly the higher order moments. This is done by moment
closure approximation.
Moment closure approximation
There are indeed several possibilities to perform moment closure for these
sets of equation []. We shall focus on the simplest one, the so called pair
approximation [].
In this framework, the second order moments are solved with respect to the
ﬁrst order models [ABC] are approximated by :
[ABC] ≃ [AB]⟨qB⟩pBC ≃ κ[AB]
[BC]
[B]
(.)
that is it is proportional to the density ofAB links multiplied the average number
edges that a node in state Bwho is already connected to another node has (excess
degree) multiplied the probability pBC that a link in state B has a BC link. This
approximation is rather crude since it completely ignore topological correlations.
In the case of adaptive voter model, we can make a slight better estimate.
Clearly we can write [BR] + 2[RR] = ⟨kR⟩[R] where ⟨kR⟩ is the average degree of
vertices in state [R]; thus the probability that a link starting from a node R is of
type BR is [BR]
⟨kR⟩[R]
; on the other, if PRk be the probability that a node in state R has
degree k, the probability that a node in state R at the end another link has l other
links attached to it is simply qRl =
(l+1)PRl
∑k kP
R
k
; thus the average number of additional
edges that a node in state R who is already connected to another node has is
⟨qR⟩ = ∑l lq
R
l ≃
⟨k2R⟩[R]+⟨k
R⟩[R]
⟨kR⟩[R]
. This implies that the moment closure equations
for the adaptive voter models take the form:
[BRB] =
⟨qR⟩
2⟨kR⟩
[BR]2
[R]
(.)
[RRB] =
2⟨qR⟩
⟨kR⟩
[BR][RR]
[R]
(.)
[RBR] =
⟨qB⟩
2⟨kB⟩
[RB]2
[B]
(.)
[BBR] =
2⟨qB⟩
⟨kB⟩
[RB][BB]
[B]
. (.)
.   
If we assume a random network approximation we have that ⟨qR⟩
⟨kR⟩
= ⟨qB⟩
⟨kB⟩
≃ 1
and thus solving the equation (.) and (.) one obtains that:
[RB] =
φ⟨k⟩ − 1
φ
[R](1− [R]). (.)
This implies that the fragmentation transition occurs at φc => ⟨k⟩
−1. Although
this description captures the qualitative behaviour of the system, in many cases
the agreement with simulations can be quite bad. In particular, if the degree
distribution is broad or there are strong topological correlation this approxima-
tion schemes may fail. In [] one can ﬁnd a review on other, more complicated
moment closure approximation schemes, involving either higher moments or
non homogeneous approaches (i. e. approaches that take into account also the
degree of vertices and not only the density of motifs). On of the bigger limitation
of this approximated approach, is the fact that the complexity of moment closure
equation and of moment expansion becomes immediately hard to dominate.
Voter model can be handled because there are essentially only two choices for
the internal state. The number of motifs to take into account when the number
of choices becomes higher increases fast and it makes particularly diﬃcult to
apply it to systems with a large number of possible choices. On the other hand,
in many cases, moment expansion is the only resource to get some analytical
insight on the behaviour of the system.
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MODELL ING COLLECT IVE DEC I S ION MAKING IN
ANIMALS
.   
Collective animal behaviour is a widespread phenomenon in animal ecology.
Under many aspects, it represents the most easily accessible (and spectacular)
example of collective phenomena in biology []; in animal groups, in fact,
the the microscopical and macroscopic level are clearly separated— even to
an uneducated eye— which is not always the case when dealing with other
collective behaviour in biology (such as protein aggregation).
Such impressing and highly complex social behaviours, can be found across
many taxa, form insects— that posse limited cognitive abilities—to mammal,
including humans— capable of extremely sophisticated social interaction; emer-
gence in this context is mainly behavioural, i.e. the fact that the whole group
can complete tasks and achieve results (e.g. nests and shelters construction,
migrations between geographically separated location, eﬃcient foraging, etc.)
that would be impossible for the individuals to achieve [–]. These emergent
behaviour are so impressive that researchers have used vivid expressions such
as swarm intelligence [], wisdom of crowds [] or collective minds [] to refer
to them.
Collective animal behaviour are studied, as many topics in biology, under
two diﬀerent perspectives: on the one hand one can concentrate on how these
collective behaviour emerge out of individual interactions, on the other hand,
one can focus on why a given behaviour evolved over another.
These two completely diﬀerent perspectives ( the former referred in [] as
mechanistic , the latter as functional ) are not conﬂicting but rather complement-
ary, and both have been applied to the study of coordination, synchronisation,
decision making, regulation and cooperation in animal groups. Indeed, collect-
ive animal behaviour oﬀer a common ground where to confront the results of
both approaches and ﬁnd a link between them.
Mechanistic approach, however, has enjoyed a lot of attention only in recent
years; partly due to the large availability of adequate computational resources,
partly as a consequence of the growth of number of scientists who apply quant-
itative methods of statistical physics and complex systems to biology. In fact the
conceptual challenges that one faces are similar: how to explain the leap between
the collective behaviour of the group and the “microscopical behaviour” of the
individuals.
 The concept of Collective intelligence has been investigated since decades and it has also been
often popularised to a general public. By example, in his famous book “Gödel, Escher, Bach: an
eternal golden braid” [], D.R. Hofstadter , discussing about ant colonies, discussed the concept
of individual in a group: should the colony, as a whole, be considered as a unitary organism and
the single individuals be considered as part of it, in the same manner as blood cells are considered

      
The class of collective behaviour that we shall study in this chapter is collective
decision making, in particular, we want to provide a simple model based on
stochastic decision making that can reasonably explain how and when consen-
sual decision across a large group animals is possible.
The relevance of these questions is not only limited to theoretical biology but
since collective decision making plays a relevant role in the ethology of many
species with high economic value— our case study is the migration of Atlantic
Blueﬁn—-it could oﬀer hints to policy-makers having to regulate such economic
activities.
.       
Decision making is a crucial aspect in any animal group. Whether we think to
bird ﬂocks having to choose the best direction to escape a predator, or a small
group of wolves having to coordinate for hunting, we are considering a decision
making problem.
With possibly the only exception of social insects, the focus on decision
making processes in animal group is recent in ethological and ecological literat-
ure []; and a lot of both theoretical and experimental work has been done in
the last ﬁfteen years.
In a decision making problem there are always variables to consider:
. information, (How information is spread in the group? Do all the indi-
viduals have the same pieces of information? How reliable is information
? )
. preferences (Are there conﬂicts in the group about the choices? How are
conﬂicts regulated?)
When it comes to decision making in group one has to distinguish the case in
which the decision is truly collective, that is, when there is a social predisposition
in the species, from the casewhen each individual decides by itself but its decision
are inﬂuenced by the choices other individuals have made. In both cases, in
fact, we may assist to the emergence of a collective response but modelling is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
Collective decisionmaking are usually referred to asConsensus decisionmaking
and are frequently found in problems such as coordinated movement, the choice
of travel destination (e.g. during migration) but also hunting or timing.
We can follow L.Conradt’s and T.J. Roper’s [], suggestions, and classify
consensus decision making problems in animal groups according to two aspects:
. communication in the group (local vs. global)
. conﬂicts of interests
part of an organism and not individuals by themselves? Or, on the contrary, the single Ants
should still keep their individuality? In discussing those aspects, Hofstadter used the term holism
to refer to the fact that the group behave so diﬀerently than the individuals by which they are
formed. The language is diﬀerent but the core of the problem is there.
.        
There are thus  possible cases:
global communication and no conﬂict of interest As an example of this situ-
ation one can consider that of a small groups of animals having to navigate
toward a chosen destination (such as group of primates of mammals); in
this case all members of the group can communicate with the others and
complex decisional strategies involving complex negotiation may occurs;
global communication and conﬂict of interest As an examplewe have synchron-
isation and choices of travel destination in small groups
local communication and no conﬂict of interest As an example we can con-
sider large navigating groups (like swarms of locusts);
local communication and conﬂict of interest As an example we can consider
the choice of travel destination in a large group like the choice ofmigration
destination in some ﬁsh schools.
This double dichotomy provides a good general framework; of course there are
additional factors to be considered:
decision makers there might be a hierarchy, thus only the leaders take decision,
or the decision is shared by all the members of the groups; or something
in between.
information for large group on the move, information is usually transferred
by alignment policies; for smaller group vocalisation might be another
possibility; in insects chemical signalling is also a relevant possibility.
Moreover a signiﬁcant process of information pooling between all the
constituents may take place, in small group a least;
function group decisionmay serve as an information pooling strategy correcting
the errors of single individuals in elaborating information, or it may
optimise the the choice, in case of conﬂicts, reducing the consensus coast.
In other cases, as in the case of ﬁsh migrations, it may be an evolutionary
strategy minimizing individual costs of information gathering.
decision mechanism in large groups self organising decision rules are more
likely; in small groups, where communication is global, diﬀerent policies
may be adopted (such as quorum decision, voting )
.. Agent based models for consensus decision making
Traditional ecological modelling relied on deterministic or stochastic processes
on subpopulations rather than on individual based models.
Individual based models, in fact, were in most of the cases not solvable analyt-
ically nor reasonable approximation scheme were available. It was not until the
eighties that the computational power needed for running simulation of agent
based models, became widely available;
      
The ﬁrst attempt to apply agent based models to the study of collective motion
has probably been C. Rynolds’ BOIDS programme [] in ; afterwards,
this approach has been widely used (the famous Vicsek model [] is only a
simpliﬁcation of Reynold model) and has now became one of the main tool in
addressing mathematical modelling of collective animal behaviour in animal
groups.
Agent based models have been thoroughly used in the last ﬁfteen years to
model consensus decision making problems. Here we shall not overview the
traditional approaches to modelling decision making in animal groups, (see []
for a review on the topic).
.   ,   
Migration is a complex topic in ecology that involves both taxon-speciﬁc aspects
and general concepts; indeed the term migration has itself diﬀerent meaning
that underlines diﬀerent perspectives, as Daingle and Drake noted []. In fact
in biology migration may refer to a periodic movement of a general popula-
tion between two or more geographically separated location (e.g. the migration
between feeding and spawning sites), or to movement of a single individual
between diﬀerent locations which occurs at scale much larger than the usual
movement, or to a general relocation of a spatially distributed population (e.g.
human migrations); it may even refer to the locomotory act itself. Historically.
Migration has been addressed, as many subjects in life sciences, from two ap-
parently contrasting points of view: a behavioural perspective where the focus
is on the individual and migration behaviours are seen as the consequence of
a genetic evolution, and from an ecological perspective, and thus seeing it as a
phenomenon acting on populations rather than on individuals.
Indeed the term migration is used to refer to a variety of diﬀerent behaviours
which require diﬀerent modelling schemes.
A general deﬁnition of migration has been attempted by diﬀerent authors but
still there is not always consensus on it, since much depend on the focus on the
study; for our scope however we can employ the deﬁnition used in []:
Migration is a movement away from the home range that do not cease,
at least initially, when suitable resources or home ranges are encountered.
This deﬁnition, indeed, helps to discriminate betweenmigration and other be-
haviours involving movement of groups of animals: foraging when movement is
usually limited in the home range or stops as soon as an adequate food source is
found and ranging which is an exploratory movement away from home range.
We have to note that, albeit relevant from a conceptual point of view, mech-
anisms underlying migration and those underlying other collective animal
movements may be rather similar.
When speaking about migrations a second relevant distinction is to be made
between periodic and irruptivemigrations.
The former are usually typical of long-lived specie who get an evolutionary
advantage from having a range that encompasses diﬀerent habitats. The latter,
.   ,    
instead, can be found across all taxa but are more frequent among short living
species (e.g in insects) and are usually triggered by a deterioration of the habitat
(this fact has been shown in insects [–], e.g. locusts [])
Another aspect, useful to classify migratory behaviours, is the the structure
of the migratory patterns. In most cases migrations occur between two sites;
but there are cases in which the migration has the structure of a round trip (e.g.
herrings). One-way migrations are also possible for short lived animals. In some
habitats, disordered patterns are also possible; this behaviour is usually called
nomadism).
From a modern perspective, potential migratory behaviour is encoded into
the genotype of an organism: it require the development of suﬃcient locomotory
abilities so as to allow to travel for long distances often through challenging
habitats (deserts, oceans), the ability of gathering information from the environ-
ment. In case of group migrations, it also requires to develop social abilities, of
an eﬃcient way to share information with the other members of the group, and
also some form of memory of the migratory route. This migratory phenotype
(called in []migration symptom), which can be environment-dependent (e.g.
locusts []), will actually generate a migration only if triggered by the environ-
ment (in []migration arena); the mechanisms, by which a population having
a given migratory phenotype will actually undergo a migration, encompass the
study of collective-decision making (see section .), and diﬀerent taxon spe-
ciﬁc aspects (how information is spread, gathered etc.); ﬁnally natural selection
will select genotypes that allow for phenotypes which are better adapted to the
environment. The functions of migration may be multiple. The main advantage
seems to be adaptiveness with respect to unstable habitat: periodic migration
may be seen as an adaptation to habitats that change asynchronously over time
(e.g. wintering strategies with respect to summer-winter cycle at higher latitude),
whereas irruptive or nomadicmigratory behaviour may be seen as an adaptation
to unstable habitats like arid regions where rainfalls are erratic and unpredictable.
In general, migration behaviours seem to allow for some form of pre-emption,
that is the ability to detect the deterioration of an habitat before it reaches a
critical level.
Migratory patterns for species undergoing a periodic migration, are rather
stable and liable. However, there have been observations [–] of abrupt
changes in migratory patterns of species including the removal of entire migrat-
ory routes. Such sudden changes occur on a time scale which is usually too short
to be determined by signiﬁcant changes in the genotype: the mechanism that
undergoes group formation, consensus decision making and collective memory
is likely to be responsible for such abrupt changes.
.. A case study: the Atlantic blueﬁn tuna
TheAtlantic Blueﬁn Tuna (ABFT),ThunnysThynnus (Linnaeus ), is a pelagic
ﬁsh, known for its big size, its rich migratory pattern and for its great economic
importance [–] .
      
Its size can exceed 3 m and it can weight up to 900 km. During migrations
its speed may reach 70 km/h . Its big size, the quality of its ﬂesh and the high
value it can reach on ﬁsh markets (mainly on Tokyo Tsukiji ﬁsh market) have
triggered an excessive ﬁshing eﬀort that have seriously reduced the stock (of
about 70− 80% in  years []); this overexploitation has led IUCN to classify
the ABFT as an endangered species in its red list [].
Habitat
The ABFT is a widely distributed species that live in the pelagic ecosystem of
Northern Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas (Mediterranean Sea and Gulf
of Mexico). It can sustain a large range of sea water temperature (from 3°C
to 30°C) while maintaining a constant body temperature. It usually occupy
surface and subsurface coastal and open sea waters although extensive tagging
experiments [] have shown that diving down to a depth of 500 − 1000 m is
not infrequent.
Migratory pattern
TheABFT exhibits a seasonal south-north groupmigratory behaviour. Spawning
sites are located in temperate-tropical waters (e. g. western Mediterranean Sea,
Gulf of Mexico and historically also Black Sea) [, ]), but feeding sites used
by the largest and oldest individuals are located in northern temperate-boreal
waters (eastern Atlantic: Norwegian and North Seas; western Atlantic: coastal
and shelf waters of New England, Nova Scotia and Newfoundland;). It seems
to exhibit homing behaviour and spawning site ﬁdelity in both the eastern and
western spawning areas [, ].
Tagging studies [, ] also demonstrate that blueﬁn tunas undergo trans-
Atlantic migrations and that a certain degree of mixing between population is
possible.These data also demonstrate that migratory routes of ABFTmay evolve
in time.
The migratory behaviour exhibited by blueﬁn tuna has evolved to allow the
species to beneﬁt from large biomasses of forage species such as herring and
mackerel in these regions []; this evolutionary behaviour is supported by
notable physiological adaptations, including eﬃcient thermal-regulation [].
The disappearance of Norwegian route
Until the late s [, ] landings of large adult ABFT on the coasts of Norway
were frequent(see Figure . (a) ).
Estimating the correct biomass of ABFT on the coast of Norway is a complic-
ated task: ABFT until the beginning of XX century was only a by-catch of other
kinds of ﬁsheries, and reports of landings were not systematic [], however
there are suﬃcient evidences that the ABFT was commonly found in North Sea
and Norwegian Sea. The systematic records of landing of ABFT by ICES started
only in .
The Norwegian blueﬁn tuna ﬁshery started around s as a by-catch or
sport ﬁshery but developed into the most important ABFT ﬁshery in northern
.   ,    
Europe. Fisherman until the s used to consider ABFT almost as nuisance
rather than a resource since the technology available (the main ﬁshery then
was that of herrings) was not adequate for an eﬀective commercial blueﬁn tuna
ﬁshery. Starting from the late s the ﬁshing eﬀort toward ABFT increased:
there was both a development of more eﬃcient catch methods and of the overall
ﬁshing capacity that led to a signiﬁcant increase of the catches. The ABFT by
the s had become one the most relevant ﬁsheries in northern seas. [].
Starting from the mid s the catches and landings of ABFT started to
decrease( [] and Figure .) whereas the ﬁshing eﬀort remained constant; the
decrease was so abrupt that by the beginning of the mid s commercial blueﬁn
tuna ﬁshery was almost abandoned.
Starting from the end of the s only occasional landing of vagrant have been
recorded[]. As Fig . shows this abrupt decrease (in particular in ) did
not correspond to a generalised reduction of spawning site biomass and thus
that particular migratory route has been forgotten by the tuna ﬁsh that used to
migrate in the North sea and on the coast of Norway.
Collective memory of migratory pattern
Understanding what may have induced such a dramatic change in the migratory
habits of ABFT, is indeed not only important from a theoretical point of view,
but has signiﬁcant economic consequences.
Diﬀerent hypotheses have been proposed (degradation of habitat, decrease
of water temperature, overﬁshing)[] but the rather abrupt decline of landing
observed requires a diﬀerent explanation.
In most of the cases, blueﬁn tuna migration are collective. Thus migration
mechanism rely on the ability of the group to reach consensus on one of the
possible destinations. We have to consider, moreover, that the main information
shared by ﬁsh in schools is about speed and direction, thus an eﬀective model
for migration must embody to some extent aspects common to all models of
collective motions (see []).
Indeed the fact that these migrations are a mainly collective is important.
Since the ABFT is an apex predator, grouping behaviour are unlikely to occur
for protection. There have been suggestions that blueﬁn tunas engage in some
form of cooperative hunting and get hydrodynamic beneﬁt from schooling []
but these behaviour have been observed mainly in feeding sites.
Grouping formigration, instead,may have other functions. It has been shown [–
] that grouping may help the ﬁsh in a school to gather information from the
environment in a way that goes beyond the simple correction of errors (the
so called collective sensing). This suggests that individual in a group may have
diﬀerent sensing and cognitive abilities: in particular information about feeding
and spawning sites might be unevenly distributed among given population (i. e.
there might be informed and uninformed individuals): in this perspective, the
memory of the migration route may arise from the interaction of individual and
is thus an example of collective memory [, ].
      
Only recently a completely diﬀerent approach that does not rely on expli-
citly considering the spatial dynamics but uses a dynamic network has been
suggested [].
.  :      -
  
Migration in large groups is a consensus decision-making problem, where
communication is non local, and there might be conﬂict of interests. For group
on themove, collectivemotionmodels are the prototypicalmodels for consensus
decision making; many models that have been developed speciﬁcally to model
migrations [, , , –] have, in fact, been heavily inspired by models for
collective motion.
Collective motion models are usually real space agent based [, ], that rely
on these general assumptions []:
. all agents are similar
. all agents are moving with a nearly constant absolute velocity; however,
each agent can modify its direction of motion;
. all agents interact within a speciﬁc interaction range by changing ; their
direction of motion, in a way favouring alignment;
. all agent might be subject to some noise in its dynamics.
Within this framework, in the last  years a great deal of work has been
done(see [] for a review).
.. Vicsek’s Model
The so called Vicsek’s Model [] is the prototypical model among the class of
models described above. In this model, each particle i is self-propelled, i. e. its
speed is constant vo, and its dynamics, described by positionxi and direction di
is described by the discretised dynamics:
xi(t + Δt) = xi(t) + vodi(t)Δt di(t) =
∑j∈𝒩i(t) dj(t)
󰂌∑j∈𝒩i(t) dj(t)󰂌
+ ξ(t) (.)
where ξ(t) represents a white noise and 𝒩i(t) = {j | |xi(t) − xj(t)| < r}.
This simple dynamics exhibits a phase transition with respect the the intensity
of the noise, between a disordered phase where each ﬁsh moves randomly, and a
ordered phase, where each agent moves toward the same direction.
Beside the fact of being the prototypical model for collective motion, such a
simple model highlights an important fact: the group of agent is able to reach
a global consensus through local interaction, that is global consensus may be
reached, through a self organising mechanism , without assuming global com-
munication within a group.
.  :         
.. Modelling schools of ﬁsh
Vicsek model is indeed too stylised to capture realistic behaviours. During the
last  years, there has been a great deal of work trying to build more realistic
models for collective animal motion. In this contest a great eﬀort has been put
into experimental research trying to model the eﬀective force ﬁeld of each animal.
It is known, in fact, that individuals in a group do not align with all the
individuals within a certain range but they tend to weight more individual
in some speciﬁc positions over other; these choices may be induced by the
environment, and by the cognitive abilities and species dependent limitations
(for ﬁsh see [–]).
Since our case study is the migration of ABFT we shall focus on ﬁsh. An early
attempt to simulate eﬀectively the motion of ﬁsh in a school was done by Huth
and Wissel in  [] and followed Reynolds’ modelling framework []. For
each ﬁsh they identify three zones:
. a zone of avoidance for distances smaller that a certain radius rr , where
ﬁsh will behave escaping from one another ;
. an alignment zone, for distances between rr and rp, where the behaviour
will be similar to Vicsek mode;
. an attraction zone for distances between rp and ra where ﬁsh will tend
to come closer to another. For distances larger that ra there will be no
interaction.
This model captures better the typical behaviours of ﬁsh schools and shoals[]
and is the base of a set of more sophisticated models [, ]. Recently, there
have been also attempts to solve the inverse problem, that is inferring from the
real trajectories of ﬁsh in schools the details of dynamic interaction [].
.. Collective memory and the eﬀective leadership model
Generalmodels for collectivemotion can describe how consensus can be reached
without any prior information.
However, for describing a migration process, there is the need to model how
agents store information about the “right destination”, and possibly encode the
fact that information about the “right destination” may be unevenly distributed.
An general agent model for modelling decision making in a large group with
unevenly distributed information has been built by I. Couzin, J. Krause Guttal
et al. [, ] (see also [, ]).
In this model, as in Vicsek model, there areN agents and the speed is constant
vo. Thus each agent i is characterised by its position xi(t) and by the direction of
motion di(t) . Moreover each agent is characterised by two positive parameters
ω(i)g that measures its gradient detection abilities trait and ω
(i)
s that measure it
social detection abilities trait. The space is assumed to be the square [−1, 1] ×
[−1, 1] with periodic boundary condition.
      
Given a distribution of those traits among a population, and the dynamical
rule described above, the group might or might not reach migrate eﬃciently.
More importantly, it is possible to apply to treat this simulation as a genetic
algorithm, using a simple evolutionary rule [], and see whether there exists a
evolutionary stable solution (ESS).
Rules of Movement
The dynamic of position of is simply deﬁned by
xi(t + Δt) = xi(t) + v0 ̂di(t)Δt (.)
where ̂di(t) represent the unit direction vector.
The upgrade of the directions is more complicated. And can be summarised
as follow:
. Avoid collisions. As in Huth and Wissel model, there exist an avoidance
zone deﬁned by a radius ra. If 𝒩i(t) = {j ∶ 󰂌xi(t) − xj(t)󰂌 < r} is not
empty then the direction is updated to avoid collisions as follow:
di(t + Δt) = −
∑j∈𝒩i(t)(xj(t) − xj(t))
󰂌∑j∈𝒩i(t)(di(t) − dj(t))󰂌
(.)
. If the zone of avoidance is empty, the direction shall be updated as follow:
di(t + Δt) =
ω(i)s ̂d
(i)
g (t + Δt) + ω
(i)
g
̂d(i)s (t + Δt) + σr ̂d
(i)
r (t + Δt)
󰂌d
(i)
g (t + Δt) + ω
(i)
g
̂d(i)s (t + Δt) + σr ̂d
(i)
r (t + Δt)󰂌
. (.)
In this formula the term d(i)r represents a random direction inR
2, model-
ling noise and intrinsic random motion; σr measures the intensity of this
noise.
The term d(i)s represent the direction update due to social interaction. It is
assumed that there is a social interaction radius rs such that:
d(i)s (t + Δt) =
∑j∈𝒮i(t)(xj(t) − xj(t))
󰂌∑j∈𝒮i(t)(di(t) − dj(t))󰂌
+
∑j∈𝒮i(t) di(t)
󰂌∑j∈𝒮i(t) di(t)󰂌
(.)
where 𝒮i(t) = {j | ra < 󰂌xi(t) − xj(t)󰂌 < rs}.
Finally, the term d(i)g represent the direction update due to information.
In [] this was a constant whereas in [] this is assumed to be of the
form:
dig(t + Δt) = (cos(θ), sin(θ)) (.)
where θ satisﬁes the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck stochastic diﬀerential equation:
dθ = −ω(i)g θ dt + σg dWr . (.)
With this notation it is assumed that there is an environmental gradient along x
axis, the goal of migration being to reach x = 1.
.        
Fitness and evolutionary algorithm
In order to implement an evolutionary algorithm approach, a proper deﬁnition
of pay-oﬀs for a given set of traits is needed. Such a ﬁtness function can be
obtained by subtracting to the beneﬁt of migration for agent i, b(i) deﬁned as
being the distance travelled on x axis the coasts of developing the social traits
cs(i) = ps(e
ω
(i)
s
κs − 1) and gradient detection traits cg(i) = pg(e
ω
(i)
g
κg − 1).
The evolutionary policy is a proportional reproduction [], where each
individual reproduces asexually with a frequency in the next generation propor-
tional to its relative ﬁtness. The oﬀspring has the same traits of the parents plus
some random mutation.
Evolutionary Stable Solution
Of course, there are somehidden assumption in thesemodels. In particular social
abilities and information gathering abilities are not completely independent:
however, a great insight is obtained.
First [], it shows that a small number of informed individuals can eﬀectively
polarise a school without the need of signalling or of a speciﬁc hierarchical
structure.More importantly, the relative number of informed individuals needed
to polarise a school seems to decrease with the number of individuals.
An major result which is obtained in [] using this approach, is the fact that
the ESS is characterised by a population where a small amount of individuals
have strong information gathering abilities and weak social abilities (the leaders),
and a vast majority of the population instead has a strong social interaction
abilities and weak information gathering ability (the followers).
This suggests that groupmigration evolved, as for collective sensing, as a global
property and memory of migratory routes is likely to be a shared knowledge.
.       -

If the models previously described can eﬀectively give great insight about the
migration mechanism, they cannot be solved analytically.
In a real-space agent model the adaptivity stems from the fact that the neigh-
bourhood of an agent changes over time due to to positions and velocities of
the other agents; position and velocities are, on the other hand, inﬂuenced by
the neighbourhood of the agents.
Since, at the end, what is important in the system is who is interacting with
whom, it is natural to attempt a simpliﬁcation of these models using a dynamic
network model (Figure .).
Adaptive network
The idea of applying adaptive network models to get intuition about collective
decisionmaking in animals has been suggested byGross and Blasius in  [].
      
Figure .: An illustration relating real space agent based models and network based
models
Later, a particular ﬂavour of an adaptive voter model have been proposed in []
and [] to address the problem of collective decision making.
Let us focus on the model described in []. In this work the aim is to de-
scribe density triggered transition in locusts from a disordered phase where
each individual moves almost independently from the others to an ordered
one when all individuals move together. In locusts, these transition is not only
behavioural (collective motion vs. independent motion) but it correspond to a
well known cases of polyphenism (environmental induced changed in pheno-
types on a genetically similar individuals); it has been suggested [] that this
behaviour might be induced by cannibalistic behaviour that can be observed,
when densities are high, in otherwise herbivores locusts [].
This work is related to an experiment done by Buhl et. al. []. In this ex-
periment locusts where put in a annulus and left free to move: the experiment
showed that below a certain critical density of individuals, the movement was
disordered, whereas above that threshold, the locusts started moving coherently
either clockwise or counter clockwise.
The model studied in [] modelled the individuals locusts as nodes in a
network that have two state, left goer L or right goer R. The meeting of opposite
going individuals is modelled by a Poissonian R − Llink creation process with a
per node link ao, and a per R− L edge link destruction rate of do.The equal-goers
R−R andR− L per node link creation rate is ae and the per edge link destruction
rate de. The intrinsic opinion dynamics is modelled through a random opinion
switch occurring with a rate q whereas the induced opinion change is modelled
as a voter model like update is with a w2 probability per R− L link plus a  node
update (i. e. a process that sends LRL to LLL) occurring with probability w3 per
triplet.
This model is not exactly solvable but can be tackled using the moment expan-
sion similarly to what happens for the simple adaptive voter model, discussed
.        :  
in section .., and using a moment closure approximation. Because of the 
node process one shall need to consider also second order moments
[ AD CB ] =
1
4N
⟨󰁈󰀽(i, j, k,m) ∈ V × V × V × V ∶ (si = A) ∧ (sj = B) ∧ (sk = C)
∧(sm = D) ∧ (gij = 1) ∧ (gik = 1) ∧ (gim = 1)󰀾󰁈⟩.
(.)
In our case the state can be only {R, L} and thus themoment expansion equations
truncated to ﬁrst, for [R] and [RR] order read :
d
dt
[R] = q([R] − [L]) + w3([RLR] − [LRL]) (.)
and
d
dt
[RR] = q([RL] − 2[RR])w2([RL] + 2[RLR] − [RRL])+
w3(3[ L
R R
R] − [ R
R L
L]) + ae[R]
2 − de[RR].
(.)
The moment closure approximation for ﬁrst order moments as those discussed
for voter model (eq. ?? (with B = L), for the second moments using the same
approach one gets:
[ LR RR] ≃ κ
2
L
[LR]3
6[L]2
, [ RR LL] = κ
2
R
[LR]2[RR]
[R]2
(.)
If there are no equal-goers link creation (ae = de = 0), the system undergoes
a supercritical bifurcation (II order phase transition) between an ordered and
disordered phase. When there is equal-goers link creation/destruction, the
system may undergo a sub-critical bifurcation (I order transition).
In this system there is no information bias and thus it is no suited to model
migrations, but a slight modiﬁcation of this simple model has been proposed by
in [], with information bias. Using the same approximate approach this work
prove that the relative number of informed individuals play an important role
in the establishment of a consensus, and that, at least when individual have only
two alternatives, uniformed individuals promote democratic consensus; this, in
addition to the results previously found in [] suggest that an adaptive network
model for migrations must embody this information bias.
Both the work in [, ] use a voter model approach, with a slight modiﬁc-
ation to encode the non linearity of state update in animals. A more realistic
approach should consider a diﬀerent internal state upgrade that take into con-
sideration all the neighbours of an individual, or at leas a signiﬁcant portion
of them; there are evidences (e. g. see [] ) that animals update their position
using more than one individual at a time.
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
The previous models oﬀer a hint of the possibilities oﬀered by adaptive network
models; however their solution relies on a description which is essentially a
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mean ﬁeld approach, solved using an approximation model that is known to
have issues to correctly describe the system qualitatively. There is, however,
the possibility to build an adaptive network model, similar to those discussed
in [, ] and [, ], which can be exactly solved even with the presence of
information [].
Figure .: Connection between link creation and destruction process and real space
models where η is the link creation rate and λ the link destruction rate.
.. Informal description of the model
Let us consider a groupwithN individuals. In our networkmodel each individual
is represented by a node (thus N is the total number of nodes) and each node i
has an internal dynamical variable ai that can take integer values ranging from
1 to q.
Although the mathematical solution does not depend on the speciﬁc inter-
pretation of the variable ai, in the context of migrating groups, ai might be
considered as the direction taken by a single individual to reach the destination
site.
A state of the system is deﬁned by the symmetric adjacency matrix of the
system gij and by the set of the internal dynamical states variables ai. In our
model, links aremutual and, thus, the adjacency matrix is a symmetric matrix
(i.e. for all i, j we have that gij = gji) such that gij = 1 if there is a link between
the nodes i and j, gij = 0 otherwise. The evolution of the system is governed by
stochastic dynamics in which both the neighbourhood and the values of the
internal dynamical state may vary.
In particular, the choice of the destination ai is inﬂuenced by two factors: i)
pro-social behaviour, by which an individual keeps the same destination of their
neighbours and ii)memory, by which an isolated individual preferentially heads
toward a destination αi that is encoded in itsmemory.Theﬁrst eﬀect is quantiﬁed
by the rate η at which individuals form new links with other individuals, This
rate should encode both evolutionarily selected traits for pro-social behaviour
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and environmental factors, notably the average distance between individuals.
In our model we assume that the interactions between individuals heading
towards diﬀerent directions decay much faster than interactions between close
individuals heading towards the same direction. This is in agreement with
real space dynamical model and is achieved in the network by assuming that
link creation can occur only when individuals have the same internal state ai.
Therefore if ai ≠ aj the link between nodes decays immediately.
On the other hand, memory is quantiﬁed by the strength hαi with which
unlinked individuals adopt their preferred choice αi. The fraction of individuals
with a preferred destination α is nα but we also contemplate a fraction n0 of
“uninformed” individuals, that have no a priori preference for any memorized
destination. In our model, we use the convention that uninformed individuals
have αi = 0 and hαi = 0. Finally, individuals linked and moving in the same
direction can alsomove further apart from each other, which is formally encoded
by assuming that links between nodes decay with a constant rate λ. We note that
this modelling framework allows to treat sociality, information and preference
as independent factors in social animals. Therefore knowledgeable individuals
can still display sociality and conformity to the group.
Network dynamics
We model the dynamics of link creation and destruction with stochastic Poisso-
nian processes. At a rate η each individual can make a connection with another
individual picked up randomly among all the individuals to which it is not
connected. The connection will be established only if the individuals share the
same internal dynamical state, i.e. if ai = aj.
Internal state dynamics
The change of the internal state is a Poissonian process with rate ν. When
an internal state update event occurs the individual has two possibilities. If
an individual is linked to other individuals(s), it will update its internal state
conforming to the state of the majority in its neighbourhood; i.e., the new state
a′i is:
a′i = argmax
x
󰀷∑
j
gijδxaj󰀸 (.)
This assumption is coherent with what is usually done in modelling group
motion that is assuming that an individual tend to ”follow” the its neighbours.
On the other hand, if an individual is not linked, it will pick up an internal
state at random. More precisely, we assume that each individual has a preferred
value of the internal variable, let us call it αi. In the case of an internal state update
event, an unlinked individual will pick up a state according to the following
probability distribution:
Prob(ai = a) =
ehiδaαi
q− 1+ ehi
(.)
      
where hi is a parameter thatmeasures the intensity of the preference.Uninformed
individuals, instead, update their direction at random, which is described by
Eq. (.) with hi = 0.
It is relevant to note that in our model all individuals have a social component.
For example in groups with conﬂicting preferences our model suggests that, for
some range of the parameters, an informed individual can follow the group and
migrate toward a site diﬀerent from its preferred destination. This approach
makes our deﬁnition of leaders not only dependent on the amount of inform-
ation stored but also on the social context in which they live. Therefore, the
interaction between personal information and social eﬀects is explicitly resolved
in our model and we note it has been suggested to operate in living groups [,
].
.. The interpretation of the parameters of the model
The model is described in a formal mathematical way; in this form it can be
applied to a large variety of contexts, as long as the parameters have ameaningful
interpretation. In the perspective of applying it to modelling consensus decision
making in migrating species, we have to give a clearer interpretation in terms of
realistic parameters.
As already discussed, migratory behaviours require that an individual or
a species has evolved speciﬁc locomotory and cognitive abilities that would
enable it to undertake a migration. These genetic factors evolve on a time scale
much slower than the lifespan of each individuals. On the other hand, there are
experiential factorsmainly linked to the environment (e. g. density of ﬁsh, habitat
quality) and the cognitive elaboration (e. g. memory, learning ). These aspects
evolve on a signiﬁcantly slower time scale and can vary during the lifespan of
an individual.
The link dynamics
It is rather obvious that the value of ηmust have a dependence on the density of
individuals; most of the real space models, in fact, assume that each individual
interacts only with “close” individuals (e.g. closer than a certain radius) which
is a reasonable description of the natural behaviour of schooling ﬁshes; thus if
the local density of individuals is too low the probability of being close enough
to interact with one another is small and thus the link creation rate must also be
small; on the contrary the higher the density, the higher the number of “close”
individuals and the higher the creation rate must be. Moreover we know that
there are physical constraints to the density of ﬁsh which mean that the shape
of the density induced variation of η has an upper bound. Moreover, social
individuals (species) have developed speciﬁc social abilities which are encoded
in their genetic make-up and thus a social ﬁsh is expected to be able to interact
with other individuals of its species more eﬀectively than a ﬁsh of a non social
species: by the rules of our model, this means that at a given local density of
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individuals the social species will have a signiﬁcantly higher link creation rate
and lower link destruction rate. We can write:
η = ηsηe(ρ) (.)
In this case, a variation of local density may induce an even signiﬁcant variation
of η(i) . The range of these variations, however, may be seen as a genetically
determined quantity.
We could take into account genetic variability in the population assuming the
each individual has its own link update rate η(i) but in general these variation
should be of limited range, at least for less cognitively advanced species, thus we
shall consider them uniform across the population.
Memory of migrating sites and preference parameter
In our model the memory is encoded in two parameters, the αi and hi.
We ﬁrst have to take into account the fact that the ability to remember a
migration route as well as gathering information from the environment must
be genetically determined, we can assume that individual with no or low in-
formation gathering abilities shall have hi ∼ 0 whereas individuals with higher
information gathering abilities will have and higher value of the In addition to
that we have to consider the experiential factor. If, in some species, the memory
of an migration route is innate, in most social species, on the contrary, the
migration routes are learned; thus a juvenile individual shall have little or no
experience, an thus a low hi whereas experienced individuals shall have a higher
hi. An additional aspect that inﬂuence hi is the quality of habitat. In fact, an
experienced individual may be less willing to reach a destination αi if, in previ-
ous migrations, it has proven to be unﬁt (low density preys, overﬁshing, etc. ).
We can assume, in principle, that the value of h across the population is noisy.
Putting things together:
hi = hg(i)ha(i)hh(i, αi) + ξ (.)
where hs(i) is the social genetic determined factor, where as ha(i) is the factor
linked to age and learning and he(i) accounts for the other habitat quality and ξ
is a noise factor accounting for genetic and habitat variability.As for the link cre-
ation rate the product accounts for the fact that these factors are not independent
(e. g. there cannot be diﬀerence between juvenile of experienced individuals if
there is not a genetic predisposition to remember and gather information about
migration routes).
Noise in most cases is irrelevant.
In fact one can assume that thewhole population is fractioned in sub-populations,
according to their value of hi.
Firstly, we can use the results of Guttal’s and Couzin’s work [] which states
that there should be only two sub-population with respect to the factor hg : an
 The product accounts for the fact that is an individual is no social η(i) ∼ 0 independently on the
density
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information able population, having roughly the same hs(i) = Hs, and a purely
social component with hs(i) = 0.
Secondly, we might divide the information able sub population according to
experience. This is a species dependent factor but it is reasonable to assume that
there are a few stages of experience; in particular, we can assume that the juvenile
have no information bias ha(i) = 0 whereas all the experienced individuals will
have the same experienced induced preference ha(i) = Ha.
Finally, we can assume that the habitat induced change preference is a reas-
onably fair measure of habitat quality and thus, it must depend only on the
migration site, that is hh(i, αi) = Hαδααi .
Putting evertithing together we have:
hi =
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
0, if (hs(i) = 0) ∨ (hs(i) = 0) (uninformed individuals)
hαδααi , otherwise (informed individuals).
(.)
.. Formal description of the model
The intuitive description of the model given in the previous section can be
formalised in a precise mathematical way.
The processes described above are Continuous TimeMarkov Chain described
on an articulate state space.
The state space
To describe the network structure we have to precisely deﬁne the underling
graph structure. Since we are not assuming any node volatility we deﬁne a set of
nodes V such that |V| = N , where N is the number of individuals (agents, ﬁsh)
in the group;, up to isomorphisms we can assume that V = {i ∈N ∶ i ≤ N}.
We shall assume that each agent has a discrete but ﬁnite number of internal
states q. We can assume, up to isomorphisms, that set of possible internal state
of a node is S = {i ∈N ∶ 0 < i ≤ q}. We deﬁne for each node i, a parameter
αi ∈ S that represent the preferred state, and a real number hi which represents
the strength of that preference. Let, ﬁnally, Γ(V) be the set of all undirected
graphs on the node space V .
A state of the system ω will be deﬁned by :
. A graph 𝒢ω ∈ Γ(V), that is a couple 𝒢ω = (V , 𝖦(ω)) where G(ω) is the
adjacency matrix of the graph in the state ω. To refer to the ij element of
the matrix 𝖦(ω) we shall use gij(ω). Since the interaction is mutual, we
shall use a undirected graph model and thus 𝖦(ω) shall be symmetric, i. e.
gij(ω) = gij(ω), ∀ (i, j) ∈ V × V ;
. A orderedN-tuple a(ω) ∈ SN whose i-th element, that we shall write ai(ω),
represents the internal state of the i-th node; we shall—improperly— refer
to it a the state vector.
Thus a state ω can be deﬁned by the ordered couple (𝒢 (ω), a) but since the nodes
are ﬁxed, one can just deﬁne the state ω as the tuple formed by the elements of
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the adjacency matrix gij(ω) and the elements of the state vector. Finally let 𝒮
denote the set of all the states.
The description of the process and the master equation
By the intuitive description we have given in section .. it is clear the the
system can be describe by a Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC; for a
general introduction see []).
LetΩt be the random variable describing the state of the system at time t; Due
to Markov property all the properties of the system are completely determined
by the transition probabilities:
P(ω′, t|ω, s) = Prob(Ωt = ω
′|Ωs = ω) (.)
and the probability P(ω′, s) = Prob(Ωs = ω); for convenience we may collect all
the transition probabilities in a single matrix valued function 𝖯(t, s) such that
𝖯ωω′(s, t) = P(ω
′, t|ω, s).
More precisely in a CTMC the probability must satisfy, for all ω,ω′:
P(ω′, t + δt|ω, t) = δωω′ +𝖰ωω′δt + o(δt
2). (.)
The non diagonal elements of theQmatrix (or transitionmatrix), since the prob-
abilities are positive numbers, must be positive 𝖰ωω′ ≥ 0. Due to conservation
of probability, moreover, it is easy to check that :
∑
ω′
𝖰ωω′ = 0 (.)
which implies that 𝖰ωω = −∑ω′≠ω 𝖰ω,ω′ .
By deﬁnition the transition probabilities satisfy the so called Kolmogorov
forward and backward equations:
𝜕t𝖯(s, t) = 𝖯(s, t)𝖰 (.)
𝜕s𝖯(s, t) = −𝖰𝖯(s, t). (.)
with the initial condition 𝖯(t, t) = 𝖨.
Since the system is, by deﬁnition, translationally invariant (the Qmatrix is a
constant) we can simply set s = 0 and use only Kolmogorov forward equation.
It is thus straightforward to see that:
𝖯(t) = 𝖯(0, t) = e𝖰t . (.)
Kolmogorov equations has the advantage to describe the system independently
of the initial state of the system; however, one is generally interested in the
quantities P(ω, t) = Prob(Ωt = ω). The equation for P(ω, t) can be easily ob-
tained. Let p(t) be the column vector of probabilities such that pω(t) = P(ω, t),
and let p(0) be the column vector of initial probability distribution, deﬁned
as pω(0) = P(ω, 0). Clearly, p(t) = 𝖯
T(t)p(0). Rewriting the Kolmogorov for-
ward equation in terms of probabilities instead of the transition probabilities we
obtain themaster equation usually used in natural sciences :
𝜕tp(t) = 𝖰
Tp(t). (.)
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To describe the system in the long run one looks at the stationary distribution π
which is deﬁned by:
π = 𝖯T(s, t)π. (.)
This immediately implies, using equation (??), that the stationary state is deﬁned
by:
𝖰Tπ = 0 (.)
It can be shown [] that, if the state space has a ﬁnite cardinality, a CTMC has
always at least one stationary distribution. The study of CTMC amounts to the
study of the structure of the matrix Q and of the state space.
The form of Qmatrix
In our case, there are  main processes that are involved in the deﬁnition of the
Qmatrix.
link creation With a rate η each node i can establish a link with another node
j picked up randomly among the others. The link is established only if
the nodes share the same internal state. This process can connect only
a state to another state that diﬀer by the fact of having an additional an
edge between node in the same internal state, i. e. two states ω and ω′
such that ∃(i, j) ∈ V × V ∶ (gij(ω) = gji(ω) = 0) ∧ (gij(ω
′) = gji(ω
′) =
1) ∧ (∀ (h, k) ∈ V × V ∶ (h ≠ i) ∧ (k ≠ j), ghk(ω) = ghk(ω
′) = gkh(ω) =
gkh(ω
′)) and a(ω) = a(ω′). The transition rate is clearly:
𝖰ωω′ =
2η
N − 1
δai(ω′)ai(ω′)j (.)
link destruction Each link has a destruction rate λ.
This process can connect a state only to another state that diﬀer from it
by the fact of having removed an edge between node in the same internal
state,i. e. two states ω and ω′ such that ∃(i, j) ∈ V × V ∶ (gij(ω) =
gji(ω) = 1) ∧ (gij(ω
′) = gji(ω
′) = 0) ∧ (∀ (h, k) ∈ V × V ∶ (h ≠ i) ∧ (k ≠
j), ghk(ω) = ghk(ω
′) = gkh(ω) = gkh(ω
′)) and a(ω) = a(ω′). The transition
rate is clearly:
𝖰ωω′ = λ (.)
internal state update Each node can update its internal state at a rate ν.
If the node is linked when an internal state upgrade event occurs, it will
conform to its neighbourhood. When an internal state upgrade event oc-
curs for a linked individual i, thus, the new internal state of that individual
a′i is chosen using amajority rule, that is :
a′i ∈ argmax
x
󰀷∑
j
gijδxaj󰀸 (.)
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Thus this process can only link to states that diﬀer by the value of the
internal variable of a linked node,i. e. two states ω,ω′ such that: ∃(i, j) ∈
V × V ∶ (gij(ω) = 1) ∧ (ai(ω
′) ≠ ai(ω)j), and 𝖦(ω) = 𝖦(ω
′)
We thus have:
𝖰ωω′ = ν
χ
argmax
x
󰀷∑j∈V gij(ω)δxaj(ω)󰀸
(ai(ω
′))
󰂼
argmax
x
󰀷∑j∈V gij(ω)δxaj(ω)󰀸󰂼
(.)
where χA(x) is the indicator function of the set A.
When, instead, a node is not linked, at a rate ν it will undergo a random
transition to a state a; with the probability:
Prob(a) =
ehiδaαi
q− 1+ ehi
(.)
where αi ∈ S is a parameter measuring the state in which the node iwould
like to update whereas the hi ∈ Rmeasure the strength of this bias.
This update rule can allow for transitions between two states that diﬀer
by the value of an internal state of an unlinked node, i. e. two states ω
and ω′ such that ∃i ∈ V ∶ ∀j ∈ V , gij(ω) = 0 ∧ ai(ω) ≠ ai(ω
′) and
𝖦(ω) = 𝖦(ω′) and thus:
𝖰ωω′ = ν
ehiδai(ω′)iαi
q− 1+ ehi
(.)
All other non diagonal transition rates are zero.
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 
We know that a ﬁnite state CTMC has always a stationary distribution. However,
according the the structure of the process the might be more than one stationary
state. To understand how many stationary states this system admits and their
properties we have ﬁrst to analyse the class structure of the state space.
.. The class structure of the state space
Let us denote by:
ℰ = {ω ∈ 𝒮 ∶ ∀(i, j) ∈ V ×V ∶ (gij(ω) = 1), (ai(ω)i = aj(ω))} (.)
that is the subset of state space that encompasses all the states that do not have
links between nodes in a diﬀerent internal state.
 In principle this rule allows for transition between ω to ω itself, but in CTMC 𝖰ωω′ is determined
by normalisation
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Let us denote by 𝒯 = 𝒮 ⧵ ℰ the set of states that have links between nodes in
a diﬀerent internal state. By deﬁnition 𝒮 = ℰ⊕𝒯 .
The ﬁrst step to characterise the behaviour of the system is to describe the
structure of the state space with respect to the dynamics. We shall show:
. First, we prove that ℰ is closed, that means that, starting from a state in
ℰ, it is impossible to reach any state of 𝒯
. Then we prove that the dynamics is irreducible on ℰ, i.e. that it is possible
to reach any state in ℰ starting from any state in ℰ; this is enough in this
system to prove that the dynamics is ergodic when restricted to ℰ.
. We prove that the states of𝒯 are transient,i. e. that from any state in𝒯 we
can reach a state in ℰ in a ﬁnite time. Thus any state in 𝒯 is not relevant
in the long run, i. e. for any ω ∈ 𝒯 , limt→∞ P(ω, t) = 0.
We know, since the state space is ﬁnite, that this system admits at least one
stationary distribution. The fact that the state space admits a unique ergodic
subspace ensures that the stationary distribution is unique.
P .. ℰ is closed
Proof. Let ω ∈ ℰ . By deﬁnition,
gij(ω) ≠ 0 ⟹ ai(ω) = aj(ω
′); (.)
in order to generate a transition to a state ω′ ∈ 𝒯 , one should either create a
link between two nodes h, k such that ah(ω
′) ≠ ak(ω
′) and ghk(ω) = 0, but this
is clearly prohibited by eq. (.) since δak(ω′)ak(ω′) = 0; or change the internal
state of a node i such that ∃j ∈ V ∶ gij(ω) = 1 which is impossible because of
eq. (.) (the upgrade process following (.) will not change the state of that
node since its neighbours have share al the same internal states). This proves
the thesis, since, for state that diﬀer by more than a link or by the value of more
than one internal state, 𝖰ωω′ = 0.
P . (E    ℰ). The system is ergodic
when restricted to ℰ
In order to prove this proposition we need ﬁrst to prove this technical lemma
L .. Given an arbitrary state ω ∈ ℰ, there exists a ﬁnite sequence of states
SL = {ω}
L
0 in ℰ such that:
i. ω0 = ω;
ii. ωL is a statewith empty network and all internal states equal to , i. e. (G)(ωL) =
0 and ai(ωL) = 1 ∀i ∈ V ;
iii. 𝖰ωnωn+1 > 0 and 𝖰ωn+1ωn > 0 for all ωn ∈ SL.
.        :   
Proof. For any state ξ, letMξ indicate the number of edges of the network in the
state ξ (i. e.Mξ =
1
2
∑i,j∈V gij(ξ)).
Let us ﬁrst deﬁne recursively a sequence of states {βn}
L1
0 in in ℰ, such that
β0 = ω and, for any βn:
(a-) ∃(a, b) ∈ V × V , such that gab(βn) = 1 and gab(βn+1) = gba(βn+1) = 0 ;
(a-) ∀(i, j) ∈ V × V ∶ (i, j) ∉ {(a, b), (b, a)}, gij(βn+1) = gij(βn);
(a-) a(βn) = a(βn+1).
Clearly, because of equations (.) (.) and (.), 𝖰βnβn+1 = λ > 0 and,
𝖰βn+1βn =
2η
N−1
> 0 since βn ∈ ℰ by construction.
Moreover, because of property (a-), we have thatMβn+1 = Mβn − 1, and, since,
Mβ0 = Mω > 0, the sequence is ﬁnite and of length L1 = Mω. Thus βMω is a state
with no edges and all the internal variables equal to those of ω.
Let us deﬁne recursively another sequence {γn}
L2
0 such that γ0 = βMω γL2 = ωL
and for all γn and γn+1 with n < L2 it is true that:
(b-) ∃k ∈ V such that ak(γn)k ≠ 1;
(b-) ak(γn+1) = 1;
(b-) ∀i ∈ V ∶ (i ≠ k), ai(βn+1)i = ai(γn).
Let Jω = ∑i(1 − δai(ω)1) be the number of nodes having an internal state
diﬀerent from 1. Clearly, because of property (b-), Jγn−1 = Jγn − 1. Moreover
because of equation (.), 𝖰γn,γn+1 = ν
e
hkδ1αk
q−1+ehk
> 0 and 𝖰γn+1,γn = ν
e
hkδak(ω)αk
q−1+ehk
. The
length of the sequence is L2 = Jγ0 ≤ N and thus the sequence is ﬁnite. Thus the
sequence:
ωn =
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
βn if n ≤ Mω
γn−Mω if n > Mω
(.)
of length L = Mω + Jγ0 satisﬁes the conditions of the thesis.
Proof of proposition .. We only need to show that the system dynamics can
link, in a ﬁnite time, any two states inℰ (i.e. that𝖰 is irreducible when restricted
to ℰ, see [, p. ]). Since the number of states is ﬁnite, this immediately
implies that that all the states in ℰ are positive recurrent, i. e. have a ﬁnite the
average recurrence time.
To prove this, it is suﬃcient to show that, given and two states ω,ω′ ∈ ℰ,
there is a positive integer L < ∞ such that there exists a ﬁnite sequence of states
{ωn} that satisﬁes:
(a-) ω0 = ω
(a-) ωL = ω
′
(a-) 𝖰ωnωn+1 > 0 and 𝖰ωn+1ωn > 0
      
Let ̄ω be the state such that ∀i, j ∈ V ×V , gij( ̄ω) = 0 and ∀i ∈ V ∶ ai( ̄ω)i = 1.
By applying Lemma . ﬁrst to ω and ̄ω,then to ω′ and ̄ω and ﬁnally merging
the two sequences of states obtained, we obtain a sequence satisfying properties
a. This proves the thesis.
P .. If ω ∈ 𝒯 , then ω is transient.
Proof. Let ω ∈ 𝒯 , letMω > 0 be the number of edges of the network in the state
ω . Let ̄ω be the state such that 𝖦(ω̄) = 0 and a(ω̄) = a(ω). By construction, thus,
̄ω ∈ ℰ. Since ℰ is closed, to prove the proposition it is suﬃcient the prove that
any state ω communicates with ̄ω on the jump process induced by the stochastic
dynamics of our system (see [, p. , p. ]); this amounts to prove that there
exists a ﬁnite sequence of states SL = {ωn}
L
0 such that:
(a-) ω0 = ω;
(a-) ωL = ̄ω;
(a-) 𝖰ωnωn+1 > 0 ∀ωn ∈ SL;
Let us construct such a sequence. Let ωn , 0 < n < L, be deﬁned as follow:
(b-) ∃a, b such that gab(ωn) = 1 and gab(ωn+1) = 0;
(b-) ∀(i, j) ∈ V × V ∶ (i, j) ∉ {(a, b), (b, a)}, gij(ωn+1) = gij(ωn);
(b-) a(ωn) = a(ωn+1).
Since ω0 = ω and ω ∈ 𝒯 , the network in ω0 must have at least one edge.
Let Mω0 be the number of edges in the network of state ω0. If Mω0 = 1 the
sequence consists only of two states and ω1 = ̄ω. If Mω0 > 1 then there shall
be exactly L = Mω0 + 1 states in SL (due to property (b-)). Clearly 𝖰ωnωn+1 = λ
(due to (.)) which proves the the thesis
.. Stationary distribution and detailed balance solution
Once we have proved that the stationary distribution is unique, we can attempt
to obtain the stationary distribution.
The stationary π satisﬁes by deﬁnition
𝖯(s, t)π = π (.)
and:
π(ω) = lim
t→∞
P(ω, t) (.)
In [] one can ﬁnd the proof that, on an ergodic subspace (like ℰ), indeed,
for a ﬁnite size CTMC the system will eventually converge to the stationary
distribution for any given initial condition.
.        :   
Derivation of detailed balance distribution
We look for distribution that satisfy detailed balance (DB), which means that,
for any couple of states ω,ω′, we must have:
π(ω)𝖰ωω′ = π(ω
′)𝖰ωω′ (.)
Clearly any distribution satisfying detailed balance is in particular stationary .
To obtain explicitly such distribution, let us assume that DB apply, we obtain
π by repeatedly applying (DB) starting from a state with non empty network.
LetMω =
1
2
∑i,j∈V gij(ω) be the number of edges of the graph in the state ω.
Let ω and ω′ in ℰ be such thatMω = Mω′ + 1, and they diﬀer only by an edge
between the nodes i, j. In this case only link creation/destruction processes may
occur and we get:
π(ω) =
𝖰ω′ω)
𝖰ωω′)
π(ω′) =
󰃚
2ηδai(ω)aj(ω)
λ(N − 1) 󰃛
gij(ω)
π(ω′) (.)
Applying recursively the previous equation one gets, for any ωinℰ:
π(ω′) = π(ω̄) ∏
i,j∈V , i<j󰃚
2ηδai(ω)aj(ω)
λ(N − 1) 󰃛
gij(ω)
(.)
where ̄ω) is such that 𝖦( ̄ω) = 0 and a( ̄ω) = a(ω), i. e. the probability measure of
a state with an empty network and all the internal states equal to those in ω.
   π( ̄ω) Let us deﬁne α the vector of the values αi in equa-
tion (.). Let ω0 be such that (G)(ω0) = 0 and a(ω) = α, that is the state in
which the network has no edges and all internal states equal to the preferred
ones. Let us deﬁne a vector s(i) as
s(i)j =
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
αj if j > i
aj(ω) if j ≤ i
(.)
Clearly α = s(0) and a( ̄ω) = s(N) = a(ω) . If we deﬁne the state ωi as being the
state with 𝖦(ωi) = 0 and a(ωi) = s
(i) The transition rate between ωi+1 and ωi
correspond to a spin ﬂip of the i-th ai(ωi+1) to αi we have:
𝖰ωiωi+1 = ν
ehiδai(ω)αi
q− 1+ ehi
(.)
and thus applying recursively DB we get:
π(ωi+1) =
𝖰ωiωi+1
𝖰ωi+1ωi
= eh(δai(ω)αi−1)π(ωi) (.)
The complete invariant measure becomes:
π(ω) = π(ω0)e
−∑i hi
∏
i,j∈V ,j<i
e∑i hiδai(ω)αi
󰃚
2ηδai(ω)aj(ω
λ(N − 1) 󰃛
gij(ω)
(.)
      
where π(ω) represents the probability for state characterized by an empty net-
work and each of the internal states equal to the preferred state to occur. Nev-
ertheless the quantity π(ω0)e
−∑i hi does not depend on ω and can thus be de-
termined by normalization and then the invariant measure (.) can be written
as:
π(ω) =
1
𝒵 ∏j<i
e∑i hiδai(ω)αi
󰃚
2ηδai(ω)aj(ω)
λ(N − 1) 󰃛
gij(ω)
(.)
where𝒵 is the normalization constant (the partition function in the language
of statistical physics).
A formal proof that the system satisﬁes detailed balance
To prove that our system satisfy detailed balance one should check that there
are no unbalanced loops in the system. However, to explicitly carry on this
calculation is cumbersome.
In the previous section we have derived the detailed balance invariant dis-
tribution. It should be clear we have indeed exploited all non zero transition
rates to obtain it. Moreover π in equation (.) is positive, ﬁnite for any ω and
normalisable, since∑ω π(ω) ≤ |Ω|π(ω
∗) where ω∗ is a state on which π(ω∗) is
maximal (since the Ω is ﬁnite such state must exists). This proves, since our sys-
tem admits a unique invariant distribution, that the systemmust satisfy detailed
balance (and in particular all cycles must be balanced).
We can, redundantly, write a properly formalised proof, and the simplest way
to do it, is to assume that one has guessed the form of the distribution (.) and
verify that the distribution (.) satisﬁes detailed balance. The uninterested
reader can jump directly to next section.
T .. The system admits a unique invariant distribution:
π(ω) =
1
𝒵 ∏j<i
e∑i hiδai(ω)αi
󰃚
2ηδai(ω)aj(ω)
λ(N − 1) 󰃛
gij(ω)
(.)
that satisﬁes detailed balance.
Proof. Since the states are ﬁnite, the system always have at least one invariant
distribution π (see [, p. ] and [, p. ]). Moreover since 𝒯 is transient,
π ∣𝒯 = 0. We have proven that the system is ergodic on ℰ, this implies (see [,
p. ] ) that π ∣ℰ= 0 is unique.
The function π(ω) written (.) is positive and ﬁnite on any state ω and since
Ω is ﬁnite, normalisable; thus it deﬁnes a distribution on the state space.
To prove the thesis, since detailed balance implies stationarity, and we have
already proven the stationary distribution in this system is unique, we only need
to check that π(ω) satisﬁes detailed balance on all couple of states ω and ω′ for
which either 𝖰ωω′ > 0 or 𝖰ω′ω > 0 or both (if both 𝖰ωω′ = 0 and 𝖰ω′ω = 0
detailed balance is trivially satisﬁed).
There are three diﬀerent situations to take into account:
.        :   
(a-) ω,ω′ ∈ 𝒯 ;
(a-) ω ∈ 𝒯 ,ω′ ∈ ℰ (or symmetrically ω′ ∈ 𝒯 ,ω ∈ ℰ) ;
(a-) ω,ω′ ∈ ℰ.
In case (a-) detailed balance is trivially satisﬁed because π(ω) = 0 . In fact, since
ω ∈ 𝒯 , in the state ω ∃i, j ∶ gij = 1 and δaiaj = 0 thus at least one of the factor
in eq (.) is zero.
In case (a-) we have that 𝖰ωω′ > 0 but 𝖰ω′ω = 0 detailed balance is satisﬁed
for any value of π(ω′), because π(ω) = 0 (since ω ∈ 𝒯 ).
In case (a-), there are only two classes of states that for which either𝖰ωω′ > 0
or 𝖰ω′ω > 0:
(b-) ω and ω′ diﬀers at most by an edge that is ∃a, b ∈ V ×V ∶ gab(ω) = 1 ∧
gab(ω
′) = 0 in ω′, and ∀(i, j) ∈ V × V ∶ (i, j) ∉ {(a, b), (b, a)}, gij(ω) =
gij(ω
′) and a(ω) = a(ω′): ω′;
(b-) ω and ω′ diﬀer only by the value of the internal state of one node, that is
∀i, j ∈ V × V gij(ω) = gij(ω
′) and ∃n ∈ V , an(ω) ≠ a(ω
′) and ∀i ∈ V ∶
i ≠ nai(ω) = ai(ω
′).
In case (b-) we have that π(ω) = 2η
λ(N−1)
π(ω′) thus
π(ω)𝖰ωω′ =
2η
λ(N − 1)
π(ω′) ⋅ λ =
2η
(N − 1)
π(ω′) = 𝖰ω′ωπ(ω
′). (.)
In case (b-) we have that π(ω) = ehn(δαnan(ω)−δαnan(ω′))π(ω′) and thus
π(ω)𝖰ωω′ = e
hn(δαnan(ω)−δαnan(ω′))π(ω′)ehnδαnan(ω′) = ehnδαnan(ω)π(ω′) = π(ω′)𝖰ω′ω.
(.)
The theorem is proven.
.. Describing the system in terms of populations
In the previous sections we derived the form of the stationary distribution.
However we need to express it in another form to be able to treat it analytically.
Moreover, in the perspective of applying it to the description of migration
in a group of animal, we would like to be able to obtain information about
migrating population, since, in principle, they are the measurable quantities
(the network structure itself, is still hard to deduce, even though there have
been attempts, in some context to use tagging methods to experimentally study
network dynamics []).
As discussed in the previous section, there is a natural sub-population struc-
ture deﬁne by how able the individuals are to gather information ( the hi para-
meter). A description of the system in terms of these sub-population instead
that in term of network is a natural step. Moreover, such a description allows us
to take the thermodynamic limit more easily.
      
The distribution of node and edges population
To proceed further we make some simpliﬁcation. In particular we assume that
hi = hαi for the informed individuals and that hi = 0 for the uninformed ones.
The rationale for this choice has been already discussed in section ...
With this choice it is possible to naturally partition the entire population
N = |V| in sub-populations. In particular let us deﬁne
̂Nαa (ω) = ∑
i∈V
δai(ω)aδαiα (.)
i. e. the number of nodes that have an internal state a while they would prefer it
to be α, and
̂N0a =∑
i∈V
δai(ω)aδhi0 (.)
the population of uninformed individuals that have an internal state α.
Since hi and αi are parameters of the system, thus ﬁxed at the beginning this
partition must satisfy the following constraints:
∑
a
̂Nαa (ω) = N
α, (.)
where Nα is the number of individuals in the whole population that have in-
formation about directionα
∑
a
̂N0a(ω) = N
0 (.)
where N0 is the number of individuals that have no information. Clearly:
N0 +∑
α∈S
Nα = N (.)
For sake of simpliﬁcation we shall use the following notation: ̂Na(ω) = ̂N
0
a(ω) +
∑α ̂N
α
a (ω) which denotes the number of nodes in state which have and internal
state a.
Let also deﬁne a partition of the edges of the system, in particular let
Mab =
1
1+ δab ∑(i,j)∈V×V
gij(ω)δai(ω)aδaj(ω)b (.)
be the number of edges between nodes of type a and b. Clearly, ̂Mab(ω) = ̂Mba(ω)
due to the symmetry of 𝖦.
The stochastic dynamics of our system deﬁnes an induced process on the sub
populations ̂Nαa,t = hatN
α
a (Ωt) and ̂Mab,t = ̂Mab(Ωt) which can be studied using
the knowledge we have on process Ωt .
A state of this induced process is characterised by a sequence of positive
integers {Nαa }a∈S,α∈S∪{0} satisfying ∑a N
α
a = N
α and a sequence of positive
integers {Mab}a∈S,b∈S,b≥a such that Mab ≤ NaNb if, a ≠ b and Maa ≤
Na(Na−1)
2
.
We can deﬁne the probabilities for the induced process easily; but since we have
derived the invariant distribution π(ω) in eq.(.) we shall restrict to that case.
.        :   
If ω ∈ ℰ, it is easy to check, using, the deﬁnition, that ∀ (a, b) ∈ V ×V ∶ a ≠
b, ̂Mab(ω) = 0; since π(ω) = 0, if ω ∈ 𝒯 . Without loss of generality we shall
restrict ourselves to ℰ and thus we shall assume that al non diagonalMab are
zero. We shall use the short-cut notation N to refer to all Nαa andM to refer to
all diagonal elementsMaa . The induced stationary distribution reads:
π(N) = ∑
ω∈ℰ
π(ω)∏
a∈S
δ( ̂N0a(ω) −N
0
a)δ( ̂Maa(ω) −Maa)∏
α∈S
δ( ̂N0a(ω) −N
0
a). (.)
To calculate it let us deﬁne a subspace of ℰ as follow:
Ω(N ,M) = {ω ∈ ℰ ∶ ∀a ∈ S, α ∈ S ∪ {0}, ( ̂Nαa (ω) = N
α
a )
∧ ( ̂Maa(ω) = Maa)}
(.)
It is easy to check that π(ω) is the same for all states inΩ(N ,M); to see it, we note
that each link carries a weight of 2η
λ(N−1)
and thus, since all states inΩ(N ,M) have
the same edge population they must all have the same network contribution:
∏
a∈S
󰂫
2η
λ(N − 1)󰂬
Maa
(.)
Moreover, noting that:
∑
i
hiδai(ω)αi =∑
j
hα∑
aα
δai(ω)aδaαδααi =∑
aα
hαδaα∑
i
δai(ω)aδααi
=∑
a,α
hαδaαN
α
a (ω)
(.)
we can directly rewrite that weight as :
π(N ,M) =
|Ω(N ,M)|
𝒵
e∑a haN
a
a
∏
a∈S
󰂫
2η
λ(N − 1)󰂬
Maa
. (.)
It is easy also easy to calculate the number of states in Ω(N ,M); for a given
distribution of ai (and thus Na nodes in state a) the number of possible diﬀerent
choices for the network withMaa edges a− a corresponds to the ways that one
can extractMaa edges out of themaximal possible number of a− a edges
Na(Na−1)
2
which is 󰀷
Na(Na−1)
2
Maa
󰀸; the possible choices of distributions of ai corresponding to
a given distribution N are also easy to obtain and correspond to: N!
∏a N
0
a!∏aα N
α
a !
.
Thus we have:
|Ω(N ,M)| =
N!
∏a N
0
a!∏aα N
α
a !
∏
a∈S 󰃚
Na(Na−1)
2
Maa 󰃛
(.)
and thus the population stationary distribution reads:
π(N ,M) =
1
𝒵
N!
∏a N
0
a!∏aα N
α
a !
e∑a haN
a
a
∏
a∈S 󰃚
Na(Na−1)
2
Maa 󰃛
󰂫
2η
λ(N − 1)󰂬
Maa
.
(.)
      
The node population distribution
We can sum in eq.(.) over M and obtain the stationary node population
distribution, π(N), that we shall call simply population distribution:
π(N) =
1
𝒲
N!
∏a N
0
a!∏aα N
α
a !
e∑ hαN
α
a δaα
∏
a
󰂮
1+
2η
λ(N − 1)󰂯
Na
2
(Na−1)
(.)
Where𝒲 is the normalization constant.
The measure is deﬁned over the multisymplex deﬁned by:
0 ≤ Nαa ≤ N
α (.)
and
∑N
α
a = N
α (.)
.. The free energy of the system and the thermodynamic limit
The π(N ,M) and π(N) describe the system at ﬁniteN ; however since we are inter-
ested in properties of migration of large groups we can use the thermodynamic
description of this system (i. e. the N → ∞ limit).
Let us denote the densities with nαa =
Nαa
N
and consequently na = ∑α n
α
a and
nα = ∑a n
α
a . We want, ﬁrst, to address the problem whether there is a function
F(n; η
λ
, h), that plays the role played by the free energy in usual statistical physics,
such that:
π(N) =
1
𝒵
e
−N󰁾F(n;
η
λ
,h)+O(1/N)󰁿. (.)
Todo so,we expandπ(N) in a largeN limit, using Stirling approximation(log(N! ) ≃
N log(N) −N , log(1+ x) ≃ x for small x and normalization :
∑
a
nαa = n
α. (.)
We then obtain :
log(π(N)) = N log(N) −N −∑
aα
(Nnαa log(N) +Nn
α
a log(n
α
a) −Nn
α
a)
+N∑
aα
hαδaαn
α
a +N
η
λ ∑a
󰁻
N
N − 1
(na)
2 +
N
N − 1
1
N
na󰁼
= −N
󰃝∑aα
(nαa log(n
α
a) −∑
aα
hαn
α
aδaα −
η
λ ∑a
(na)
2 +O(1/N)
󰃞
=F(n, h)
(.)
Thus in the thermodynamic limit the invariant measure will converge to a sum
of Dirac delta measures centred in the global minimum (or minima) of the
free energy (because of normalization all other minima will be exponentially
depressed).
.        :   
.. Edge distribution and average degree
In order to obtain the edge distribution, one has to sumoverN in equation (.),
but the calculation is not easy. However, on can take advantage of the fact that
the probability measure that describes the system is concentrated on its minima
for simplifying the joint probability (.).
In fact, when the system is in one of these minima N∗, we can consider the
node population variables to be frozen around N∗ and thus instead of the joint
probability distribution (.) one can consider the conditional probability
π(M|N) to calculate the relevant quantities.
The conditional probability may be calculated as follow:
π(M|N∗) =
π(,N∗,M)
∑M π(,N
∗,M)
=
∏
q
α=1 󰀷
N∗a
2
(N∗a−1)
Maa
󰀸 󰁻
2η
λ(N−1)󰁼
Maa
∏
q
a=1 󰁾1+
2η
λ(N−1)󰁿
N∗a
2
(N∗a−1)
(.)
.. Average Degree
The ﬁrst and most important quantity that can be calculated from the degree
distribution is the average degree.
By deﬁnition the average degree is equal to ⟨k⟩ =
2⟨∑s Maa⟩
N
where the numer-
ator is the average number of edges.
We can easily calculate :
⟨Maa ∣N
∗⟩ =
2
N∗a ∑M
Maaπ(M|N
∗) =
∑Maa Maa󰀷
N∗a
2
(N∗a−1)
Maa
󰀸 󰁾
2η
λ(N−1)󰁿
Maa
󰁾1+
2η
λ(N−1)󰁿
N∗a
2
(N∗a−1)
=
η
λ(N − 1)
N∗a (N
∗
a − 1)
1
1− 2η
λ(N−1)
(.)
The total average degree reads:
⟨k⟩ ≃ ⟨k ∣ N∗⟩ =
2⟨∑aMaa⟩
N
=
2
N ∑a
η
λ(N − 1)
N∗a (N
∗
a − 1)
1
1− η
λ(N−1)
=
2η
λ ∑a
(n∗a)
2 +O(1/N) ≃ z∑
a
(n∗a)
2
(.)
As we immediately note, for a given value of z due to normalisation constraints
we have that z
q
≤ ⟨k⟩ ≤ z. It is clear that, in ﬁnite systems, the previous result
is true only for z ≪ N : the degree of a node in a ﬁnite graph, in fact, cannot
exceed N − 1; when doing simulations with ﬁnite N , one should expect to see,
as z approaches N relevant ﬁnite size eﬀects: i. e. the average degree reaches a
plateau.
      
.        : 
   
As we mentioned in the previous sections, the invariant distribution is peaked
around the minima of the free energy, thus, in order to analyse the system we
proceed to minimise the Free Energy of the system:
F(n;
η
λ
, h) = ∑
a
n0a log n
0
a +∑
aα
nαa log(n
α
a) −∑
aα
hαn
α
aδαa −
η
λ ∑a
(na)
2 (.)
subject to the constraints:
nα =∑
a
nαa (.)
and
n0 =∑
a
n0a (.)
We introduce then Lagrange multiplier βα − 1 for the ﬁrst constraints and β0 − 1
the second one and impose the First Order Condition (FOC):
∇
󰃠
F(n;
η
λ
, h) −∑
α
(βα − 1) 󰃝
−nα +∑
a
nαa󰃞
− (β0 − 1)(n
0 −∑
a
n0a)󰃡
= 0
(.)
obtaining
log(n0a) −
2η
λ
na − β0 = 0 (.)
and
log(nαa) − hαδaα −
2η
λ
na − βα = 0 (.)
and thus
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
n0a = e
2η
λ
naeβ0
nαa = e
hαδaα+
2η
λ
naeβα
(.)
If we deﬁne :
Q =∑
a
ezna (.)
we can write
n0 = eβ0Q (.)
and
nα = eβαe
2η
λ
nα(ehα − 1) + eβαQ (.)
.        :      
Equation (.) allows us to eliminate one Lagrangian multiplier:
eβ0 =
n0
Q
(.)
Equation (.) instead allows us to eliminate the quantity
eβα =
nα
(ehα − 1)e
2η
λ
nα +Q
(.)
We then have also the normalization constraint:
∑
i>0
ni = 1− n0. (.)
We can then write the FOC for our system in the following way
na = e
2η
λ
na
󰃝
n0
Q
+W +
(eh − 1)na
(eh − 1)e
2η
λ
na +Q󰃞
(.)
where
Q =
q
∑
i=1
e
2η
λ
ni (.)
and
W =
q
∑
i=1
ni
(ehi − 1)e
2η
λ
ni +Q
(.)
.. Stable states without information: collective movement
When no information is available in the group, the system reduces to an adaptive
network model in which group coordination only depends on the rates at which
links are created or destroyed [, ].
In this case, only n0a are present in the FOC (.) and thus na = n
0
a. The Free
Energy now is completely symmetric with respect to the change of colourZq
symmetry.
Solution of First Order condizion
To simplify the notation, we call z = 2η
λ
and xa = zna, the FOC can be put in
the form:
xae
−xa =
z
Q
, (.)
and the normalisation constraint becomes:
∑
a
xa = z. (.)
      
Equation (.) has to possible solutions in term of the W Lambert function
(see appendix B. for the details).
x− = −W0(−zQ
−1) (.)
and
x+ = −W−1(−zQ
−1). (.)
It is easy to show that x− < 1 and x+ > 1 andQ is a parameter to be determined
auto-consistently using normalisation constraint.
Since all xa satisfy the same equation, a general solution of the ﬁrst order
equation shall be obtained by specifying the number L+ colours that are in
the + solution and the number L− of colours that are in − solution. Of course
L+ + L− = qThe normalisation will enforce:
L+x+ + L−x− = z (.)
and thus, using normalisation, we can eliminate the Q constant from equations
and reduce the FOC to:
x−e
−x− =
z − L−x−
q− L−
e
−
z−L−x−
q−L− . (.)
According to the value of z this equation shall have one or more solutions.
It is easy to check that the solution where all xa =
z
q
always exists (and
corresponds to L− = q for z < q and to L+ = q otherwise). It is possible to prove
(see [, ] for the complete details) that it is a minimum of the free energy
only for z < q.
It is possible to prove that the the solution with L+ = 1 is the only other
minimum of the free energy (see [, ] for the complete details).
The average degree of the system can be obtained from the population distri-
bution using equation (.). Another quantity which is:
σ =
q∑i∈S ni − 1
q− 1
(.)
whichwe call school eﬃciency. Itmeasures howpolarised is the population toward
one direction and, thus, how eﬀectively the group is able to reach consensus: if
the group is uncoordinated than σ = 0, if all individuals share the same internal
state σ = 1. Because of (.) these two quantities are linked ⟨k⟩ = zσ + (1− σ) z
q
.
Such kind of relations are the hallmark of adaptive networks and derive directly
from state topology co-evolution typical of these systems. This also clariﬁes the
characteristics of this system. Low or non extant coordination is linked to a
network structure with a low density and no giant component. High σ ,if z > 1,
is linked to the emergence of a giant component, and a higher network density.
The behaviour of the system in absence of information may be summarised
as follow. Below a certain threshold ̌z only one local minimum exists which
corresponds to a symmetric solution σ = 0 (Figure . a); there the network has
a low density a no giant component with ⟨k⟩ < 1. In this case the group does
.        :      
not reaches consensus (in the context of migration problem, the group does not
migrate). At ̌z, a new bundle of q local minima appears with σ > 0. There the
network has a higher density, ⟨k⟩ > 1, and a giant component emerges. In this
case a large portion of the population succeeds in reaching consensus (in the
context of migration problem, the group start migrating).
Between ̌z and ̂z both solutions coexist and individuals can coordinate with
one another or not. Above ̂z the only local minima are for σ > 0 while the low
density solution σ = 0 becomes unstable. There is an intermediate point z∗
below which global minimum of the free energy is the low density solution,
and above which the system has q global minima corresponding to high density
solutions. At this point, in the thermodynamic limit, the system undergoes a
ﬁrst order transition, whereas for ﬁnite N there system is bistable between [ ̌z, ̂z].
Figure .: Critical group dynamic: school eﬃciency, σ as function of the social para-
meter z in (a) non informed group n1 = 0 and (b) informed group n1 = 0.05,
h = 0.5. The dotted lines correspond to all the stable solutions of (??), the
shadowed areas identify the coexistence region whereas the solid lines cor-
responds the equilibrium solution.
      
.. Stable state with information with n1 = 1− n0: migration without conﬂict
of interests
The ﬁrst generalisation is to study the problem of consensus decision making
without conﬂict of interest. We study the case with q destinations, a density
of informed individual n1 = 1 − n0 and a preference h about destination 1.
The equation (.) again can be solved numerically to obtain prediction on
collective behaviour.
In this case equation (.) take the simpliﬁed form:
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
xe−x = z n
0
Q
+ zeh 1−n
0
(eh−1)ex+Q
yie
−yi = zP = z n
0
Q
+ z 1−n
0
(eh−1)ex+Q
q- times
(.)
with the conditions
x +
q−1
∑
i=0
yi = z (.)
Q = ex +
q−1
∑
i=0
e
y
i (.)
and
P =
n0
Q
+W =
n0
Q
+
1− n0
(eh − 1)ex +Q
. (.)
Numerical solution of this system using naively the standard methods is prob-
lematic; however it is possible to reduce the system to a one dimensional equation
which can be solved numerically (the details of the this calculation can be found
in appendix B.). The stability as well cannot be addressed exactly as in the
case in with no information, however it is possible to check the stability of the
numerical solutions using standard methods (see appendix B.).
Phase diagram
Information has two main eﬀects on the system (Figure . b). Firstly, it breaks
the symmetry between the q high density stable solutions found in the n0 = 1
case, by selecting the solution with the preferred destination α = 1 as the most
likely (the globalminimumof the free energy).The q− 1 solutions corresponding
to migration toward other destinations remain stable, but are much less likely to
be selected by the population. In the thermodynamic limit, only the solution
with α = 1 will occur.
Secondly, the coexistence region between high and low density solutions [ ̌z, ̂z]
is reduced in the case of informed migration (Figure .). In fact this region
becomes smaller as the number of informed individuals increases (Figure .).
Eventually, there exists a critical value of n1c at which the region collapses into
a point and the phase transition becomes of second order. Above that critical
.        :      
value the system has a smooth crossover between low and high density states,
as z increases, and a single solution is found. We can, thus, plot an exact phase
diagram for this region for the two parameter z and n1 .. As one notice the
shape of the coexistence region varies with h.
The edges of coexistence region
Even though solving equation (B.) allows us to calculate all the solutions of
the FOC and obtain an exact phase diagram„ this process can be quite computa-
tionally intense (especially as q increases). We can however attempt to calculate
the boundaries of the coexistence region in more eﬀective way.
Let specialise to the case when all yi = y, since we know from solution of (B.)
that these are the solution relevant to the description of the system. If we use
the same notation used in section . and me do some algebraic manipulation
on equation (B.) we can reduce the system to the solution of two equations:
z = x + (q− 1)y (.)
n1 =
󰀷e
h + (q− 1)e−x+y − q󰀸 󰀷x − e
−x+yy󰀸
󰀷−1+ eh󰀸 (x + (−1+ q)y)
. (.)
The edge of the coexistence region corresponds to the birth (or death) of two
new branches of solutions. In particular for the lower edge ̌z corresponds to the
birth of two high density branches x+(z, n
1, h) (stable) and ̂x+(z, n
1, h) (unstable)
such that x+( ̌z, n
1, h) = ̂x+( ̌z, n
1, h) whereas the high edge of the coexistence
region corresponds to the death of the stable low density branch x+( ̌z, n
1, h) and
of the unstable high density branch ̂x+( ̌z, n
1, h).
However we now think to z in equation (.) as a dependent variable z =
z(x, y(x)) = z(x) where y(x) is implicitly deﬁned by equation (.) ; it is easy to
Figure .: Phase diagram of the system with q = 4 possible directions. The grey area
corresponds to a preference parameter h = 0 (no preferences) and the
dashed line is the critical line. The blue area corresponds to h = 0.5 and
the thick blue line represents the corresponding critical line. The red area
corresponds to h = 1 and the thick red line represents the corresponding
critical line as well.
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Figure .: In this ﬁgure we check our theoretical result with a simulation using Gillespie
Algorithm []. The red triangle are the simulated data. Simulations are
done with q = 4, N = 5000, ν = 30 and λ = 10. We ﬁrst let the system
thermalise, at z = 2.75, and then increase z by 0.01, take data forΔT = 250,
and repeat until we z = 4.01. At this point we decrease z by 0.01 and repeat
the procedure until we return to z = 2.75.
understand that ̌z and ̂z correspond to a stationary points of z(x) and we can
take advantage of this intuition to ﬁnd them.
We thus impose the ﬁrst order condition for z
d
dx
z = 1+ (q− 1)
d
dx
y = 1− (q− 1)
𝜕y ̂n
1(x, y)
𝜕x ̂n1(x, y)
= 0 (.)
where ̂n1(x, y) is deﬁned as the right side and y is such that ̂n1(x, y) − n1 = 0.
Equation (.) does not depend explicitly on n1 and z (but it depends on h);
To solve this equation we impose normalisation y = z−x
q−1
. If for some z equa-
tion (.) admits a set of solutions labelled by z (x(z), z−x(z)
q−1
), by construction,
must lie on the edge for some value of n1. Sincewe have assumed ̂n1(x, y)−n1 = 0
we easily derive that n1 = n̂1(x(z), z−x(z)
q−1
) = n1(z), which deﬁnes parametrically
the edges of the coexistence region (z, n1(z)) (cf. ﬁgure .).
 To visualise it better one can think to y = √x. The point x = 0, y = 0 corresponds to the birth
of the two branches of the square root function, but it can also be seen as the minimum of the
function x = y2
.        :      
The critical point
We can expand further the previous reasoning to get the critical point, that is the
point in which the transition becomes of second order, it is easy to visualise that
this happens when d
2
dx2
z = 0. In our case this correspond to the condition where
the unstable high density branch ̂x+ vanishes and thus the two stable branches
x+ = x− join.
In addition to equations (.), (.) and (.), one gets an additional equa-
tion form the requirement that the second derivative of z vanishes, i.e..
1
q− 1
d2
dx2
z = −
d2
dx2
y =
𝜕2x ̂n
1(x, y) + 2𝜕2xy ̂n
1(x, y) d
dx
y + 𝜕2y ̂n
1(x, y) 󰁻
d
dx
y󰁼
𝜕y ̂n1(x, y)
= 0.
(.)
We can use (.) and set d
dx
y = − 1
q−1
in equation (.). Solving (.) and
substituting in equation (.) we obtain an equation that does not depend
neither on h nor on n1. As before, we can use normalisation and solve; for the
value of z for which equation (.) admits, a solution, and curve parametrized
by z (z, n1(z), h(z)) (cf. ﬁgure .).
Figure .:  dimensional phase diagram obtained solving numerically equa-
tions (.), (.) and (.), for z ∈ [2.9, 4] with a minimal step Δz =
0.0001; h ∈ [0.1, 2] and a resolution Δh = 0.05 (higher resolution are pos-
sible but the resulting graph becomes diﬃcult to handle using standard
methods. ). The red line is the line representing II order critical points line
numerically obtained solving, in addition to the previous equations, also
equation (.), in this case h is parametrically determines, whereas we
have used Δz = 0.00001.
      
Such curve, for q = 4, starts at hc ≃ 0.0986122 and n
1 ≃ 1 ; this means that
the if the strength of preference is low, the system will always have a coexistence
region. On the other limit, the curve approaches asymptotically z ≃ 3.0986122;
the value of n1 from the numerical solution seams to decreases slowly to 0 when
h → ∞.
Hysteretic cycles
From the tridimensional phase diagram in ﬁgure . we get another important
feature of these system: when z is below the value at which the system has a ﬁrst
order transition when n0 = 1, the system may show a n1-h hysteretic cycle.
The behaviour of the solution as the parameters h and n1 = 1 − n0 vary, at
ﬁxed z, is depicted in Figure .. For low values of z (Figure .a) we observe
a smooth crossover from low to high density solutions as h and/or n1 increase
whereas when z is in a critical region .b). The presence of a sharp transition
with coexistence in a broad range of parameters is a robust feature of this model.
This provides us with a vivid picture of howwe expect the collective behaviour
of the population to change when the parameters z, h and n0 change. Adapting
this picture to the observed behaviour of populations (e. g. of migrating ﬁsh)
provides hints on the likely underlying causal eﬀects. In brief, when z is large, i.e.
for individuals with a marked pro-social behaviour, we expect abrupt transitions
when either the density nα of individuals with a given preference, or the intensity
hα of that preference varies in such a way as to cross the boundaries in the phase
diagram (Figure .).
When both preference and information are decreased in the informed migra-
tion problem, abrupt transition from eﬃcient group formation to collapse of
migration eﬃciency are visible. We note that this hysteresis cycle is consistent
with observed stock collapses of migratory ﬁsh populations []. When the
migratory population is described using a social parameter z close to the critical
point, then the interplay between the memory for a given destination, h, and
the fraction of the individuals informed, n1 about this destination can produce
an abrupt transition in the migration of the species.
In the case of a school migrating in direction 1, a decrease of the value of h
and n1 over years e.g. due for example to overﬁshing of both individuals and
prey in the migration site, can force the system to cross the critical line reaching
eventually low values of both h and n1. When in this condition, an increase
in the value of hmight occur due for example to better habitat conditions or
food availability, for those few vagrant ﬁsh that might still be present in the
area. However this increase alone cannot bring the system back to the original
state because the system may not cross again the critical line. Thus the group
may not migrate in direction 1 even though previous habitat conditions are
re-established.
.. Stable state with information and conﬂict of interests
Conﬂict of interests, in our model, is characterised by the presence of more
than one group of informed individuals: the simplest case being, a fraction n1 of
.        :      
Figure .: School eﬃciency σ as function of the fraction of informed individuals n1
and strength of the preference h when the social parameter z is (a) in a non
critical region z = 2.5 and (b) in a critical region z = 3.1 The white line
in panel (b) is a schematic illustration of the hysteresis mechanism for a
blueﬁn tuna population starting with high n1 and h, then decreasing n1 and
h (overﬁshing of both preys and predators) and subsequently increasing h
(increase of population of preys).
      
the individuals willing to reach location 1 and a fraction of n2 willing to reach
location 2.
Alas solving numerically the FOC, in this case, proved to be harder than
the previous case: the numerical methods (multidimensional Newton method,
Iterative method) have show instability for large range of z.
To get some insight on the behaviour of the system in this case, we can look at
the behaviour of the system in two limiting cases z → 0 and z → ∞. In the ﬁrst
case we can do a perturbative expansion in z (see Appendix B. for the details).
At z = 0 the solution is determined only by the update process, and thus, will
be essentially given by the average of population with respect to eq. (.):
na,0 =
n0
q
+∑
α
nαehαδaα
ehα − 1+ q
. (.)
The higher order of perturbative expansion do not give any insight except for
the fact that they are ﬁnite.This assures that at least in a neighbourhood of z = 0
this solution should exists. When n0 → 1 this solution tend to the symmetric
solution and for z small enough the it corresponds to a low density network
conﬁguration.
For the other limiting case the calculation are cumbersome (see Appendix B.
for the details). It is easy to convince oneself, from the structure of the free
energy, that the stationary points around which expanding are those of the
quadratic part. And thus the minimum around which to expand is one of those
having the form:
na,∞ = δa,α (.)
Expanding asymptotically the free energy around those points one gets
F ≃ −
z
2
−nαhα+󰃝
n0 log(n0) +∑
i≠0
ni log(ni)
󰃞
+ ze−z󰀷−n
αhαe
hα +∑
i
nihie
hi󰀸+ o(e
−z)
(.)
From this expansion we get that for large z the group prevailing should be the
one with higher nαhα.
.. Intermediate region
To describe what happens in between, we can only rely on simulations. Because
of the presence of various local minima, the system shall have many metastable
states, especially when more than two population have the comparable values
of nihi. It may be necessary to do simulation with networks with a large number
of vertices which may take long time to equilibrate.
If we restrict to the case with two informed subpopulations we have essentially
three cases to check:
. n1 < n2 and h1 < h2;
. n1 < n2 and h1 > h2 but n
1h1 < n
2h2
.        :      
. n1 < n2 and h1 > h2 but n
1h1 > n
2h2
In in the ﬁrst case we are considering an less strongly opinionated minority; in
the second case a minority with a stronger preference than the majority, in the
third case we are considering a strongly opinionated minority versus a weakly
opinionated majority.
We know from the expansions, that for large z we should expect the group
with higher hαn
α to prevail but we cannot blindly use this result for intermediate
values of z. Another aspect that we would like to check is what is the role of
n0. In [] it is suggested, in the case with q = 2 that higher value of n0 should
enforce democratic decision i.e. the group prevailing should always be the one
with higher nα irrespectively of the strength of hα. Numerical evidences (see
Figure . and .) seem to suggest that, for q > 2 even for intermediate values
z the group with the higher value of naha dominates.
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Figure .: Bottom panel: On the y-axis the value of n1 averaged on  realisation.
on x-axis 1 − n0. Simulation parameters: N = 1000 n1/n2 = 1.5,h1 = 0.5,
h2 = 1.5 z = 3.4 and ν = 30 Each run lasts T = 1000. Top panels: two
D histograms with the distribution of values of n1 and n2 in the diﬀerent
realisations. In this case n1 > n2 but h1 < h2 and n
1h1 < n2h2. The system is
in a frustrated state and the group prevailing it 2 as we expect. The presence
of other (meta)stable where one of the other group is prevailing is the origin
of the noise (top panels).
As already mentioned, when there are two or more classes have values of hαn
α
close to the maximum, the system has long lasting metastable states that make
the numerical investigation complicated. This is particularly true when n0 is
high, i.e. when the number of uninformed individuals is high; in this case the
      
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Figure .: Bottom Panel: on the y-axis the value of n1 averaged on  realisation.
On x-axis 1 − n0. Simulation parameters: N = 1000 n1/n2 = 4,h1 = 0.5,
h2 = 1.5 z = 3.4 and ν = 30 Each run lasts T = 1000. Top panels: two
D histograms with the distribution of values of n1 and n2 in the diﬀerent
realisations. In this case n1 > n2 but h1 < h2 and n
1h1 > n2h2. The system is
in a frustrated state and the group prevailing it 1 as we expect. The presence
of other (meta)stable where one of the other group is prevailing is the origin
of the (large noise).
state with maximal ni, has a long survival time, especially for small values of the
preference parameters.
The inﬁnitely strongly opinionated minorities
The results of our expansions should be used with caution if strength of prefer-
ences becomes inﬁnite. In fact, when hα → ∞ we have that the ergodic subspace
is reduced to the state having at least nα ≥ n
α and in particular , nαa = n
α, since
the state update process becomes deterministic.
In particular, if the system has no uninformed individuals, the node dynamics
will be frozen and the systemwill be become fragmented in asmany independent
subgroups as the non-zero nα.
On the other hand, if there are uninformed individuals, the system restricted
to them behaves as in [, ] but, the dense solution will always favour the
majority. It is easy to rewrite the free energy of the system in this case:
F =∑
a∈S
n0a log(n
0
a) − z∑
a∈S
nan0a −
z
2∑a∈S
(n0a)
2. (.)
.        :    
It is clear that the FOC are of the same form of those with n0 = 1 except for the
fact that the normalisation constant reads:
∑
a∈S
n0a = n
0 = 1−∑
a∈S
ni < 1. (.)
It is also clear, form the form of the free energy, that the in the thermodynamic
limit, the high density solution corresponding to the internal state with higher
nα is global minimum of the free energy . In this sense uninformed individuals
favour democratic consensus decision making as stated in [].
.        : 
 
To get a better insight on the behaviour of the system we can can use the mean
ﬁeld dynamics.
Mean Field Dynamics is an approximation method to treat stochastic pro-
cesses in the limit in which ﬂuctuations are depressed (in our case N → ∞,
which is similar to a non homogeneous moment expansion. As for moment
expansion it consists in writing down a set of ordinary diﬀerential equations for
the averages of some stochastic variables, in our case :
d
dt
⟨ ̂Nαa,t⟩ = limΔt→0
⟨ ̂Nαa,t+Δt − ̂N
α
a,t⟩
Δt
(.)
.. Notation
Let us the following notation
Nαak(t) = ⟨
̂Nαakt⟩ (.)
to denote the average number of nodes in state a having preference α and degree
k, where:
̂Nαakt =
̂Nαk (Ωt) = ∑
i∈S
δk,∑j gij(ω). (.)
In the following we shall also write
nαak(t) =
Nαak(t)
N
(.)
When t is not explicitly written, t = ∞, is to be understood. We shall also say
an (a, α)-node to refer to a node with internal state a and preference α.
.. Derivation
Let’s analyse the the possible contribution to the Mean Field Equation First for
k > 0.
      
Case ΔNαak,t = +2
This situation can be realized only if two (a, α)-nodes in with degree k − 1 are
selected to form a link or a link between two nodes (a, α)-node with degree k+ 1
decays. This happens with probability:
p(+2) = ηNαak−1,t
Nαak−1,t
N − 1
+ λLa,k+1 = Nη(n
α
a,k−1(t))
2(1+
1
N − 1
) + λ
Laα,k+1
N
(.)
where Laα,k represents the number of edges between (a, α) nodes with degree
k + 1
Case ΔNαak,t = +1
This situation can be realised when:
. an (a, α)-node of degree k − 1 and one with degree k′ ≠ k, k − 1 are
selected to form a link;
. an (a, α)-node of degree k − 1 and a node with internal state a but prefer-
ence diﬀerent form α is selected to form a link;
. when an link, incident on (a, α)-node degree k + 1 and an (a, α)-node of
degree k ≠ k + 1’ decays.
This happens with probability:
p(+1) = 2ηNαak−1,t
󰁻∑β≠α∑k N
β
k󰁼 + 󰁻∑k′≠k−1,k N
α
ak′,t󰁼
N − 1
+λ(Nαa,k+1(k + 1) − 2Laα,k+1) = N 󰁾ηn
α
a,k−1(t) 󰁻(na(t) − n
α
a,k−1(t)
−nαa,k(t)󰁼 (1+
1
N − 1
) + λ(k + 1)nαa,k+1(t)󰁿 − 2λ
Laα,k+1
N
(.)
where we have used the fact that (k + 1)Nαak+1 = 2La,α,k+1+ number of edges
only one end of which is incident in a (a, α)-node of degree k + 1.
Case ΔNαak,t = −1
. an (a, α)-node of degree k and one with degree k′ ≠ k, k − 1 are selected
to form a link;
. an (a, α)-node of degree k and a node with internal state a but preference
diﬀerent form α is selected to form a link;
. when an link, incident on (a, α)-node degree k and an (a, α)-node of
degree k ≠ k decays.
.        :    
This happens with probability:
p(−1) =2ηNαak,t
󰁻∑β≠α∑k N
β
k󰁼 + 󰁻∑k′≠k−1,k N
α
ak′,t󰁼
N − 1
+λ(Nαa,k(k) − 2Laα,k) = N 󰁾ηn
α
a,k(t) 󰁻na(t) − n
α
a,k−1(t)
−nαa,k(t)󰁼 (1+
1
N − 1
) + λknαa,k(t)󰁿 − 2λ
Laα,k
N
(.)
where Laα,k represents the number of edges incident between (a, α)-nodes with
degree k and we have used the fact that kNαak = 2La,α,k+ the number of edges
only one end of which is incident in a (a, α)-node of degree k.
Case ΔNαak,t = −2
This situation can be realized only if two (a, α)-node of degree k are selected to
form a link of if one edge incident on two (a, α)-node of degree k decays. This
happens with probability:
p(+2) = ηNαak,t
Nak,t
N − 1
+ λLaα,k = Nη(n
α
a,k(t))
2(1+
1
N − 1
) + λ
Laα,k
N
(.)
Case k = 0
In this case besides the graph dynamics which accounted in the previous contri-
bution we have to consider the colour dynamics too.
 Δnαa0,t = 1     Now according to (.)
the probability that a class gains one element due to colour dynamics is simply :
pcol(+1) =
ν
ehα + q− 1∑b≠a
ehαδaαNαb0,t = N
ν
ehα + q− 1
ehαδaα ∑
b≠a
nαb0(t) (.)
 Δnαa0,t = −1     Now according to (.)
the probability that a class gains one element due to colour dynamics is simply :
pcol(−1) =
ν
ehα + q− 1
Nαa0,t∑
b≠a
ehαδbα = Nnαa0(t)
ν
ehα + q− 1∑b≠a
ehαδbα (.)
The complete equations for k > 0
Putting everything together we obtain the following inﬁnite set of Ordinary
Diﬀerential Equation (all n are here functions of the time)
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
̇nαa,k = λ(k + 1)n
α
ak+1(t) − (2ηna(t) + λk)n
α
ak(t) + 2ηna(t)n
α
ak−1(t)
̇nαa,0 = λn
α
a1(t) − 2ηna(t)n
α
a0(t) +
ν
ehα+q−1 󰀺e
hαδaα ∑b n
α
b0(t) − n
α
a0(t)∑b e
hαδbα󰀻
(.)
where na = ∑α∈S∪{0} n
α
a and we assume that h0 = 0. In particular the contribu-
tion coming from Laα,k erases out.
      
Summing over k one immediately gets the equations for the population dens-
ities:
̇nka(t) =
ν
ehα + q− 1 󰃝
ehαδaα ∑
b
nαb0(t) − n
α
a0(t)∑
b
ehαδbα .
󰃞
(.)
The structure of equations (.) makes clear that in this case the network
dynamics depends only on the state and not on the parameter α.
.. Stationary degree distribution
We study the stationary state of the system. Solving the recurrence equation can
be done using a simple ansatz, i. e. that nαa,k = C
α
a
󰀷μ
α
a󰀸
k
k!
.
By direct substitution one gets:
nαa,k = n
α
a,0
󰁻
2ηna
λ 󰁼
k
k!
(.)
where nαa = limt→∞ n
α
a(t) and na = limt→∞ na(t).
Summing over k and solving for nαa we get n
α
a,0 = n
α
ae
−
2ηna
λ and thus substituting
in (.) we get:
nαa,k = n
α
a
󰁻
2ηna
λ 󰁼
k
k!
e−
2ηna
λ . (.)
Summing over α we obtain ﬁnally:
na,k = na
󰁻
2ηna
λ 󰁼
k
k!
e−
2ηna
λ (.)
which is the degree distribution within a sub-population of nodes in a state.
Where na and n
α
a are quantity that need to be found self-consistently.
To do that we ﬁrst used eq (.). If nα0 = ∑b∈S n
α
b,0 immediately obtain:
nαa,0 =
ehaδaα
eha + q− 1
nα0 . (.)
Substituting in equation (.), summing over k and α, and using normalisation
constraints, we obtain:
nαo =
nα(ehα + q− 1)
(ehα − 1)e−
2ηna
λ − ̂Q
(.)
where ̂Q = ∑b∈S e
−
2ηna
λ . Thus, substituting ﬁrst in (.) then in (.) and
summing over k we get:
nαa = e
2ηna
λ
ehaδaαnα
(ehα − 1)e
2ηna
λ − ̂Q
(.)
.        :        
These equation are formally equivalent to the ﬁrst order conditions in equa-
tion (.), thus the quantities nαa corresponding to the stationary solution of
MFD satisfy the same equations than the extremal points of the free energy.
This of course had to be expected, and it is a check that the MFD is a good
description of the system for large N .
This allows us to write degree distribution pk for this system as:
pk =∑
a
na
󰁻
2ηna
λ 󰁼
k
k!
e−
2ηna
λ . (.)
As a check we can calculate immediately the average degree and trivially retrieve
the expression of equation (.).
We know that the system has a stationary distribution, and it is known that, in
the largeN limit, deterministicMFD equations describes correctly the stochastic
system[]; yet, we should be cautioned that only the asymptotically stables
solution of MFD oﬀer a good approximation of the system; however we can use
our knowledge obtained solving the stochastic dynamics to select the solutions
of (.) that give rise to a stable state.
Having the exact formof the degree distribution enables us to investigatemany
of the properties of the system (such as giant component, small components, etc.).
However, the degree distribution depends on the values of na which are available
only numerically, and the general study is indeed quite articulated. Nonetheless,
it should come with no surprise that for strongly polarised solutions of the
FOC—i. e. nα ≃ 1, ni≠α ≃ 0—the system has a giant component; in this case,
in fact, we have that the degree distribution is almost Poissonian with average
2η
λ
nα > 1. On the other hand we the stable symmetric solution corresponds
to a disordered phase when almost all nodes are disconnected, or in small
components. In Figure . we provide two snapshot of the system in these
situation.
.        : 
     
In ourmodel we havemade strong assumptions about the segregation policy and
the internal state update rule. One may wonder to what extend the behaviours
of our system are dependent on these assumptions.
.. The role of segregation
We want here to discuss what happens when we allow link creation between
individuals in a diﬀerent internal states to occur with probability ε ≠ 0, i. e. to
relax the strict segregation policy of our model.
When this happens, the system is no longer exactly solvable, at least using
the methods we have used here; Even an mean ﬁeld approach is hard. In fact,
if the network dynamics is only marginally touched, the internal update using
majority rule becomes relevant, and describing it in mean ﬁeld is complicated.
      
(a) (b)
Figure .: Snapshots of the network of the system for two diﬀerent values of z = 2η
λ
.
Simulations are done with N = 1000, n0 = 0.99, n1 = 0.01, h1 = 1 ν = 0,
λ = 10 and are run for T = 1000. Panel (a) corresponds to η = 10 and thus
z = 2, and shows the typical “low density” disordered phase corresponding
to a nonmigrating phase. Panel (b) correspond to η = 20 and thus z = 4; in
this case the system is polarised in direction ( α1, red color in the plot) and
there exists a giant component which corresponds to the group migrating.
We can however get some insight noting that when ε = 1 the network dy-
namics decouples from the dynamics of the internal states of the nodes. In this
case we could write directly the mean ﬁeld equation for the network dynamic
ignoring the internal state of the system,i. e. for the quantities Nk = ∑a,α N
α
a,k
and obtain a Poissonian degree distribution:
pk = e
−
2η
λ
󰁻
2η
λ 󰁼
k
k!
. (.)
The system would thus has an average degree ⟨k⟩ = z and at ⟨k⟩ = 1 a giant
component emerges. In the giant component, due to themajority rule, the nodes
will soon reach consensus and thus the system will exhibit a non zero value
of σ . From this, we can get a intuitive and clear picture of what happens. The
probability ε interpolates between a regime in which there is a ﬁrst order phase
transition for the average degree and σ and a regime where the average degree is
smooth whereas σ undergoes a second order phase transition. This means think
that the coexistence region between a low and high density phase that exists at
ε = 0 shall shrink increasing the value of η until, for some ε < 1, it vanishes.
From that point onward the system shall approach smoothly the Erdős-Rényi
like regime. Of course if the value of n1 and h do not permit the presence of
a coexistence region, the system will undergo a smooth transition. Numerical
simulations support the qualitative picture we described above.
.    
.. The role of the upgrade policy
One may also wonder what happens when another internal state update policy
is used (i. e. vote model like). Indeed as long as the segregation policy is the same
of our model, any update rule that enforce local homogeneity shall lead to the
same results: the structure of the state space is, in fact, the same.Nevertheless,
we might expect that the non equilibrium properties of the system shall depend
on the chosen policy; and that a majority rule should lead to equilibrium faster
that other rules (such as voter model like rules).
If we allow for link creation between nodes in diﬀerent internal states, we may
expect to see diﬀerences between models with diﬀerent update rules; however
all these rules behaves similarly for states in which the neighbourhood of a node
is homogeneous; one expects that these states are the only stable states for these
system and thus qualitatively we should not see much diﬀerence with respect to
the system using majority rules.
.   
The solvable model that has been discussed provide simple yet suﬃciently de-
scriptive framework to address consensus decision making and in particular it
oﬀer a new insight on the migration process.
The migration game
Themigration process can be described as an emergent property of the popu-
lation undertaking a group formation game: when the spatial density of indi-
viduals is locally low, each individual moves independently, and the system is
in a sparse network conﬁguration with a value of z below the lower edge of the
coexistence region. In this state uninformed individuals cannot migrate whereas
informed individuals can undertake a solitary migration towards their preferred
destination. Due to external stimuli the density may increase and so does the
value of z, driving the system toward the coexistence region. In this region even
though the local density of individuals high, a sparse network conﬁguration
with individuals moving independently is still stable but an alternative denser
and stable network conﬁguration also appears. When the system reaches the
upper edge of this region, further increasing the density, the sparse network
state becomes unstable, the system then undergoes a transition toward the high
density network state and the group starts a migration toward the preferred
destination. When the local density of individuals decreases in the group, also
z decreases and the system is driven back to the coexistence region. The the
denser conﬁguration remains stable until the system reaches the lower edge of
the coexistence region: at this point, individuals stop migrating and the system
switches back into the sparse conﬁguration.
      
Migration without information: the locusts case
When in the group there not any informed individual, once the group is formed,
it will go in a randomdirection (among the q possible ones). A nice illustration of
this behaviour is oﬀered by desert locust Schistocerca gregaria Forsskål . This
locust is known as one of the most destructive animal pests, and desert locusts
swarms (which can cover hundreds of square kilometres and contain billions of
individuals) exhibit triggered transition between a disordered phase where each
individual moves independently from the others to and ordered phase where
individuals swarm. Swarms of locusts are known for the unpredictability of
their directions, and for their sudden change of directions, consistent with the
presence of bi-stability region and several equally probable directions . These
facts have been illustrated in a nice experiment [], where these three regions
have been clearly identiﬁed.
The repeated migration game and seasonal migrations
The group formation game described above repeated each year, oﬀer a possible
interpretative framework for seasonal migrations. One can think that each year
individuals, repeat this migration game, with, however, diﬀerent parameters. In
particular experience of the previous year(s) may drive changes in the preference
term h, hence in the memory of migratory species. Likewise changes in this or
in the relative density of informed individuals can occur when the migratory
population is aﬀected by external stimulus , e.g., overﬁshing, habitat degradation,
demographic ﬂuctuations.
In particular, because of the presence of (h, n1)- hysteretic cycle, concurring
overﬁshing and habitat degradationmay prevent a group to successfully migrate,
even if the habitat quality is re-established.
Conﬂicting Preferences
In the case with conﬂicting preferences the situation is more complicated. We
know that, for large value of z, the group shall migrate toward the direction α for
which the product nαhα is maximal, whereas in the limit of small z, the sparse
conﬁguration is the only stable one.
As numerical evidences suggest, this should hold true also for smaller value z
and oﬀer us a nice picture: when for some reason either ni or hi of the dominant
group are reduced to a point where nihi is no longer maximal the system, dur-
ing next year shall undergo a migration toward another site. This mechanism
might be a strong asset for a group having diﬀerent feeding sites since it allows
the group to respond rapidly to a deterioration of one of them. This is the so
called pre-emption often observed in animal migrations: the ability to change a
migration pattern in response to habitat degradation prior that the quality of
the habitat becomes not compatible with the needs of an individuals any more.
In our model we did not consider neither the demography nor the discovery of
new routes. In normal condition demography equilibrates, whereas the discovery
of new routes is an uncommon event in most of the species.
.    
Collective memo ry and breakdown of social traditions
Breakdown of social traditions, due to selected ﬁshing on older informed indi-
viduals, has been hypothesized to have contributed to stock collapses in several
large commercially important ﬁsh populations [, ].
Our sketch of the migration game suggests that social dynamics may lead to
such collapses and that the integrity of migration pathways and spatial distribu-
tions of migratory predators might be particularly vulnerable to perturbations
such as ﬁshing or habitat degradation. Fishing out informed individuals and
their prey can exacerbate the loss of collective memory up to the point where a
migratory pathway is suddenly interrupted.
We can assume that each year young individuals join the group: among them
a fraction is able to gather information and remember amigratory route whereas
the rest has a purely social behaviour. The “information-gathering-able” indi-
viduals behave as uninformed individuals (h = 0) but can learn a newmigratory
route during the ﬁrst migration(s). If the group does not succeed in starting
migration, or migrates toward a diﬀerent location, the young “information-
gathering-able” individuals will not learn the traditional migration route of
the group and the social traditions of the group will not be transmitted to the
new generations. The loss of collective memory in the group will then force the
system to cross the critical line and the migration toward the destination site
will stop.
.. The Atlantic Blueﬁn tuna case
Overﬁshing and habitat degradation, and subsequent interruption of socially
transmitted might oﬀer a plausible explanation for the changes of the migratory
path of ABFT.
The main prey ABFT on the coast of Norway is herring Clupea harengus
Linnaeus . During the s-s they have also been extensively ﬁshed which
resulted in a fast collapse of the stocks( [, , ]. cf. ﬁgure .). Since the
sea temperature has been relatively constant during this period (See ﬁgure .
(c)), is is reasonable to consider the herring biomass in the Norwegian see as
good habitat quality indicator (thus an indirect measure of h). Overﬁshing of
large ABFTs and of their main prey correspond, in the language of our model,
to a reduction of both the relative number of informed individuals and of the
preference parameters.
Since the s, the herring populations have recovered to moderate-high levels
[, ], but blueﬁn tuna are still extremely rare and apparently have notmigrated
to these areas since the disappearance several decades ago [] (ﬁgure . (b)).
These hysteretic dynamics are consistent with a ﬁshing-induced removal of
predators having preference for migration to these regions and a ﬁshing induced
decline in habitat quality which then leads to the collapse of group formation
and a sudden change in migratory path (cf. Figure .).
 Mackerels are also consistently preyed byABFT in northernAtlantic but their numerical relevance
on the Norwegians coast is lesser
      
Figure .: A graph showing Tuna landings on the coast of Norway with respect to the
estimated spawning site biomass (a), with respect to the herrings biomass
in the Norwegian and north sea (b) and with respect to the sea surface
temperature (c)
.    
.. Conclusions
As we have sees, the usual approaches to tackle the decision making in animal
groups rely on real space model and cannot be approached analytically. However
we have illustrated another possible approach to these problems. Instead of de-
scribing all the microscopical details of the system as done in standard real space
models, it is possible to implicitly account for the change of the neighbourhood
of an individual in a group using an adaptive network description.
Early works using this approach have focused on simpliﬁed settings involving
only to possible choices for the individuals in the group and using approximate
methods to get some insights. We discussed at length in this chapter another
model, that with the only simplifying assumption to enforce total segregations,
i. e. the fact that only individuals choosing to go in the same direction can
eﬀectively interact, is analytically solvable.
In particular, it is possible to provide a plausible mechanism for migration
dynamics and to show that partial removal of knowledgeable individuals may be
suﬃcient to interrupt the transmission of social traditions in groups of animals.
The model discussed, however, is very general. In fact, as long as one can
give meaning to the Potts variable and to the update rule of the models the
results can apply. It is possible to envisage diﬀerent generalisation of the model
proposed. One particularly natural one is to study an adaptive version of Axelrod
Model [] for cultural interaction. Preliminary studies seem to suggest that a
phenomenology similar to the one discussed in this chapter can occur in this
context, however in this case it is not possible to apply detailed balance and thus
an analytic solution is much harder to obtain.
Another important generalisation might be to attempt to model the eﬀective
topology of the groups. However, with few exception such as [] or [], empir-
ical studies are still too rare to obtain signiﬁcant data on the topology of animal
groups; the development of tagging experiments in the future might allow us to
have explicit data on the network evolution, enabling us to build more realistic
models.

3
DEC I S ION MAKING OF RAT IONAL AGENTS : THE
SOC IAL CL IMB ING GAME
Societies are changing entities that evolve over time. Explaining their structure
and how social structure change over time ( the so called social change) is one
of the main end of sociology, and an important part of other social sciences (as
anthropology, history and marginally even economics).
As often in social sciences, each discipline, and within each discipline, each
theory stresses diﬀerent characteristic(s) as the most fundamental cause(s) of
social change; it is however commonly accepted that societies are subject to
two kind of forces that generate their change: exogenous forces exerted from the
outside of the society itself— natural events such as famine, epidemics, climatic
change; historical events such as wars, migrations, political instability; and to
some extent economic changes—and endogenous forces that are built within
society itself.
If the former have always been acknowledged to be able to induce social
change, many sociological theories have been more reluctant to recognise the
latter as a relevant or at least independent factor in social change; some theories,
in fact, assume the fact that in the absence of external forces, the society should
remain stable. Nowadays, however, there are empirical evidences that endo-
genous forces play a relevant role in shaping social structure and modelling
endogenous forces is a relevant part of modern sociology.
In modelling animal societies in chapter , we thought the individuals as
simple agents that make choices mainly adapting to their social neighbourhood
and, for informed individuals, taking into account information gathered on one
possible outcome of their decision making problems. The evolutionary pressure
selects the best strategies; thus evolution makes the rational decision.
In modelling human societies, however, assuming simple conformity rules
is reductive. Human societies should be rather thought as the product of the
interaction of many self-interested individuals making rational decisions.
In this chapter we shall focus on one speciﬁc aspect of social structure in
human societies: hierarchy. In particular we want to investigate, with a simple,
stylised, microscopic model, how do social elites emerge in a society of self-
interested rational decision makers.
.    :  
Modelling decision making by self-interested rational has been studied since the
beginning of the XVIII century.
 which is often called, with a lot semantic signiﬁcance, social order in sociological literature.
 A nice illustration of this can be found in Stanley Lieberson empirical theory of taste []

     :    
The ﬁrst to formally tackle the problem using the concept of utility function,
which measures the perceived balance between costs and beneﬁt for a given
choice, has been Daniel Bernoulli in a famous paper in  []. Since then,
the concept has been widely used in economic science. The typical decision
being modelled in economy is the the choice of an agent in a market: given a
commodity c what quantity of this commodity to buy xc at a given price pc (the
problem of the consumer ), or vice-versa how much to produce of commodity c,
xc, and at what price to sell it pc, or at what price pc to sell a given quantity xc (the
problem of the ﬁrm). In neoclassical economics, each agent i is self-interested
and rational andmakes decisions optimising a function ui, called utility function,
deﬁned as the balance of beneﬁts B(xc, pc) and costsC(xc, pc) of buying quantity
xc of commodity c at a price pc (or vice-versa producing xc and selling it at pc).
This utility takes the form:
ui = B(xc, pc) − C(xc, pc) (.)
In this context, this optimisation process will determine a relationship between
price and quantity—the so called (aggregate ) demand and supply curve—and
eventually deﬁne an optimal choice for both consumers and ﬁrms.
The concept of utility, which proved to be an eﬀective framework to study ra-
tional decisionmaking in economics, albeit with some caveats, has subsequently
been adopted to model rational decision making in more general contexts.
In a general probabilistic framework for rational decision making, a utility
function can be seen [] as a map between the diﬀerent alternative choices and
a real numbers that ranks the states of the world with respect of diﬀerent levels
of happiness of the agent.
Although mapping the whole world into a function may seem an extremely
simplifying assumption, it is not. A famous theorem,proven by Von Neumann
and Morgenstern in  [], states that, as long as it is possible to deﬁne a
rational concept of preference between the diﬀerent alternatives, it is possible to
deﬁne an (expected) utility function ui for the agent i whose maximisation shall
single out the best rational choice for agent i.
.. Rational choice in complex environment: random utility model
In many situations, however, agents exhibit some degree of randomness in their
decisions. The same outcome might induce the agent to take diﬀerent choices,
which in principle seem to conﬂict with the assumption of self-interested and
rational agents. However, D. McFadden [] has shown that it is possible to
extend the formalism of utility function in a more general context.
Let us restrict to the case in which the the possible alternatives s1,… , sn are
ﬁnite.
When modelling a decision-making problem in a complex environment one
might not be able to describe the full utility with respect to which and agent
is optimizing; in particular it is not always possible to describe perfectly the
 The most relevant of which is the fact that utility function by itself is not a measurable quantities,
and thus
.    :   
states of the world, or all the possible variables that an agent eﬀectively takes
into account to make its decision.
To model this complexity, thus, we assume that the utility function of the
agent has this form:
Ui(s,ω) = βui(s) + ηi(s,ω), (.)
where ui(s) represent the a priori observable part of the full utility while ηi(s,ω)
is a random function that accounts for the unobservable part of the utility and
ω collectively represent the possible other choices variable on which the agent is
optimising.
The factor β thus measures how well the observed utility captures the decision
making process of the agent. Alternatively, onemaymay think to β as an implicitly
measure of the relative importance the factors that are accounted by ui in the
eﬀective decision making process of agent i i. e. howmuch do agent i cares about
the factors accounted in ui when making its decisions.
In this framework an agent shall still optimisewith respect to the full utilityUi(s,ω,
however the outcome
s∗(ω) ∈ argmax
s
(βui(s) + ηi(s,ω)) (.)
will be stochastic variable.
As a result of this stochasticity, agent i will appear to take decisions with a
probability distribution function Prob(s∗(ω) = s) induced by the distribution of
ηi(s,ω).
To retrieve it one must specify the distribution of ηi(s,ω): let Pηi(s, x) =
Prob(ηi(s,ω) < x), one can write:
P(s∗(ω) = s) = Prob(s∗(ω) = s) =
∫
∞
−∞
dPηi(s, x)∏
r≠s
Pηi(s, x+ Γ(u(s) − u(r)).
(.)
The Probit Model
A ﬁrst simpliﬁcation that one can make is that the ηi(s,ω) are independent
identically distributed variables normally distributed. In this case Pηi(s, x) =
erf(x).
The Logit Model
In McFadden derivation [], instead assumes that ηi(a,ω) are distributed with
a Gumbel distribution Pηi(s)(s, x) = exp(exp(−x)); with this assumption it is
possible to obtain a closed form for P(s∗(ω) = s)
P(s∗(ω) = s) =
eβui(s)
∑s e
βui(s)
. (.)
The assumption that ηi a identical distributed with a Gumbel distribution is
indeed quite general. In fact, it can be proven (see [, p. ] for an explicit
     :    
derivation) that if the agents are optimising with respect to a complex function
Ui(s, b) = ui(s) + vi(b|b) where vi(b|s) is a an unobserved contribution to the
utility that depends on a vector b of unobserved choices, and one assumes that
vi(b|s) are random independent and identically distributed, maxb(Ui(s, b)) =
ui(s) + ηi(ω)/β, where ηi(ω) are i.i.d. with a Gumbel distribution.
.     
The emergence of social elites has interested social scientists ever since Pareto’s
observation of persistent inequalities in our societies []. Inequality is accept-
able if it results from diﬀerences of individuals in terms of their capabilities, but
not if it results, in one way or another, from discrimination. Not only discrim-
ination conﬂicts with ethical principles that all individuals are a priori equal
and should have access to the same opportunities. It also damages societies in
terms of eﬃciency [] as it hampers social mobility, preventing society from
promoting individuals to positions in the social hierarchy that are consistent
with their capabilities.
.. The social climber problem
We want to build a model that accounts for the emergence and persistence of
hierarchies only relying on endogenous forces. In particular, it is a well established
fact that social prominence bears a series of appealing beneﬁts to individuals
(wealth, social inﬂuence, etc.). It is likely that the endogenous force responsible
for the emergence of hierarchies is the desire of each individual in the society to
increase his/her social prominence.
We shall call the agents of this model, who seek to become more important in
the society in which they live, social climbers.
This inner dynamicswhich induces agents to desire to becomemore important
inside a society will manifest itself in a process of adaptive change of each
individual’s neighbourhood. In particular individuals will attempt to connect
themselves to important individuals, and disconnect from unimportant ones.
Moreover this adaptive change of neighbourhoodmust be “local”, in the sense
that we should model the fact that an individuals will be more likely to interact
with other individuals that are close to him, on the social graph.
This deﬁnes the social climber problem, how to improve his/her social prom-
inence through local moves in an optimal way.
 India’s cast system or racial segregation in the US and South Africa in the last century, are
examples of explicit discrimination of underprivileged groups, that in the course of time has come
to be regarded more and more as unacceptable, prompting for explicit measures of aﬃrmative
action (e.g. quotas for lower casts in India).
 The expression social climber is often used as a derogatory term to identify he who seeks to
improve its social position, often with the implication that it does so by being very friendly to
people from a higher social class rather than thanks to its capabilities; however we use the term
in a neutral way
.      
.. Measuring social importance: centrality
Clearly, this requires that the social climber has some sort of metric to meas-
ure social prominence on a social networks. Numerous investigations in social
sciences have since the early years of social network analysis, found that the
importance of an individual within a social network is related to some quantiﬁc-
ation of how central [, ] this agent is. There exist diﬀerent metrics which
measure the centrality of a node (among others: degree, betweenness, closeness,
eigenvector centrality see appendix A. and [] for the deﬁnition), each one
highlighting diﬀerent facets of this generic concept..
Among the empirical analyses, there is a body of literature showing that
centrality explains the role, importance, or pay-oﬀs of the agents constituting
the network: in informal structures within organizations, the importance of
people is related to their betweenness centrality []; students with an higher
centrality in the friendship network were found to perform better in education
tests []. From the theoretical side, Ref. [] shows that in a broad class of
games, player’s pay-oﬀs increase with their (Bonacich) centrality [] in the
network.
Because of this, if individuals can alter their neighbourhood, the myopic best
response strategy is simply to connect to the neighbour who increases their
centrality the most.
Interestingly, König et al. [] have shown that when individuals strive to
be as central as possible, network evolve to a state where the neighbourhood of
any node contains the neighbourhood of the nodes which have a lower degree
(nestedness). In this kind of networks, the ranking of nodes according to their
centrality is the same, regardless of the centrality measure considered [] and
thus the exact measure of centrality is irrelevant.
Remarkably, nested structures have been found in inter-organisational net-
works of research and development (R&D) alliances [, ], in interbank
payment networks [] and in ﬁrm competition under oligopolies []. This
kind of structures will be precisely the ones emerging in the social climbing game.
In this respect, our results confer stability to those of Ref. [] and generalise
them in non-trivial ways.
.     
Let us consider a system composed ofN individuals, who are connected through
a network which consists of exactlyM links.The network is undirected and thus
can be speciﬁed in terms of a symmetric adjacency matrix 𝖦, with elements
gij = gji = 1, if i and j are connected, gij = gji = 0 otherwise. Agents receive
opportunities to use their links in order to get in contact with more “inﬂuential”
members of the society, in brief to climb the social network.
As we have extensively discussed, rational decision making can be modelled
by deﬁning a utility function. To do so, we have to solve the social climber
problem, and chose which centrality deﬁnition to use. We choose, the simplest
 A more comprehensive list can be found in Ref. [].
     :    
one, degree centrality: the measure of the importance of and individual within a
network is given by the number ki of his/her partners
. Degree centrality has
also the advantage of being a a local topological property of the network. As
a measure of the “social capital” of agent i we take the following local utility
function
ui =
N
∑
j,l=1
gijgjl + μ
N
∑
l=1
gil =
N
∑
j=1
gijkj + μ ki, (.)
that depends both on the centrality ki of agent i and on the centrality kj of
his/her neighbours, with μ tuning the relative weight between the two terms
The eﬀorts of agents to climb the social hierarchy can then be formalised in the
maximization of the utility ui.
We then deﬁne the dynamics as follows,
. At any time, an agent i is picked at random together with one of her
neighbours, j. Then, a neighbour l of j is selected at random, l ≠ i.
. If l is already connected to i, nothing happens. Otherwise, with probability
p(i,j)→(i,l) =
eβΔui
1+ eβΔui
, (.)
the link (i, j) is replaced with (or rewired to) link (i, l), where Δui is the
corresponding change in i’s utility.
The step  models random encounters between agents through their network of
interactions. In such an encounter, agent i gets to know a friend l of j, as well as
his/her importance (the number kl of l’s friends).The probabilistic choice rule in
step , as we have discussed in section .. can be derived from a random utility
model where agents maximise a more complex utility function, that accounts
for the fact that the social network aﬀects in complex ways the well being of
individuals and their unobserved choices in other dimensions. In this view, β
plays the role of the relative weight between the observed and the unobserved
part of the utility in the the choice of social contacts and it reﬂects the prevalence
of the quest for social status in their decision behaviour. In particular, in the
limit β → ∞, a move implying a decrease in the utility function is never accepted.
This means that the social status is valued so highly by the agents that everything
 Other measures of centrality can be taken but, as observed in Ref. [], these rank individuals in
the same order in strongly hierarchical networks, that will be stable over time as we shall see later.
Conversely, unstructured networks correspond to random rankings with no stable order, with
respect to all centrality measures.
 As will be clear in the following, the second term in (.) is irrelevant for the dynamics, but not
for the interpretation of the local utility. For example, consider the limit case of a star: while the
central node is connected to N − 1 nodes, all other nodes have only one connection. In this case
the ﬁrst term in (.) is equal to N − 1 for all nodes and only the term proportional to ki removes
this degeneracy. Note that the second term in (.) also describes a linear cost μ < 0 to maintain
links.
 For example, Adam may be reluctant to interrupt his relation with Bob, despite his low rank in
society, because he is his only friend who shares his interest in Japanese paintings.
.     
else is unimportant. On the contrary, for β = 0 the probability of accepting a
move implying a decrease of the utility function is 1/2, meaning that the social
status has negligible importance with respect to the unobserved part of the
utility. The general question addressed is then how strong should the parameter
β be in order for a social hierarchy to form and be maintained in the long run?
It is worth to remark that if the utility of agent i increases when rewiring the
link (i, j) to (i, l), then the utility of agent j decreases, while that of agent l increases.
This embodies the fact that the formation of a new link needs the consent of
both parties, but their removal can be unilateral. Therefore, we can interpret
the rewiring mechanism as a process according to which agent i looks for some
social premium (e.g. knowledge of information, professional expertise) that
agent l can provide more than agent j. Once agent i secures his/her connection
to agent l, agent j essentially represents a redundant, less central source of the
same capital, and this is why the rewiring operation happens at his/her expenses.
Moreover, the rewiring mechanism described above implies that, in their quest
to become central, agents increase the likelihood to be selected by others as new
partners.
Notice ﬁnally that the number of links is conserved in the dynamics. Hence
the density of links is the second important dimension that we shall explore, in
order to understand how the structure of social organization depends on it.
.    
In the dynamics described above, one can think that the internal state of each
agent is deﬁne by his/her utility function, and thus it is a function of the topology.
The state space of the system can be reduced to the set of states ω = (𝖦) deﬁned
by the adjacency matrix of the system.
The dynamics deﬁned on this space is, as in chapter , a Continuous Time
Markov Chain deﬁned on a ﬁnite state space; a stable state must thus exist.
The constraint that∑ij gij = 2M is enforces by the dynamics of the system.
It is easy to see, in fact, that the dynamics of the system preserves connected
components. Indeed, nodes are never disconnected by the dynamics because,
even if they have just one link, this will not be rewired because the neighbour
upstream has no second neighbour where to rewire. Therefore, without loss of
generality, we restrict attention to the case whereM ≥ N − 1 and the network is
composed of a single connected component. Networks composed of disjoint
components remain disjoint under the dynamics above, hence the dynamics of
diﬀerent components can be considered independently. Alternative dynamics
that do not preserve connectedness – e.g. adding the link (i, l) to a neighbour l
of a neighbour j, and removing a link diﬀerent from (i, j) chosen in any way –
would converge to simple structures characterised by cliques of ∼ √M nodes in
a sea of disconnected nodes. Indeed, it is easy to check that such conﬁgurations
correspond to absorbing states of the dynamics for all β. On the other hand, as
we shall discuss in a moment, it is precisely the rewiring procedure we propose
in Section . that produces non-trivial equilibrium states.
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Notice that, since both the number N of nodes andM of edges is conserved
during the evolution of the system, the number of fundamental cycles in the
graph is also conserved. This follows from the fact that the number of fun-
damental cycles in a graph is equal toM − N + K , where K is the number of
connected components (see [, Ch. ], appendix ??). These conservation laws
allow us to simplify our discussion to the case where K = 1
.. Ergodicity of the dynamics
To proceed further we have to prove that the dynamics of the system is ergodic
on the space of adjacency matrices with M edges and one connected component.
To do so we use the same strategy used in chapter , namely show that given
two states ω and ω′ it is always possible to reach one form the other with ﬁnite
number of steps. The states of the system are nothing but the connected graphs
withM edges. It is thus suﬃcient to show that is is possible to pass from one
graph to another doing a ﬁnite number of rewiring.
Let ΓC(N ,M) be the space of connected graphs with N vertices andM edges.
In order to prove ergodicity, we have to show that, with a ﬁnite number of basic
moves, we can reach any connected graph in ΓC(N ,M), starting from another
arbitrary graph in the same set. Before delving into the technical details, we give
a simple intuitive sketch of this proof.
For a ﬁnite value of β, the dynamics consists of reversible moves as the one
depicted in ﬁg. .; such moves can be thought of as a “sliding” of the edge eik
on the path of length one (k, j) from vertex k to vertex j. The key observation to
prove the ergodicity by induction is that, since the graph is ﬁnite and connected,
there always exists a path of minimum length that connects two arbitrarily
chosen vertices in the graph. Then, we can proceed in three steps.
. Let there be two graphs in ΓC(N ,M) which diﬀer from each other only by
an edge incident on the same vertex, vk. We ﬁrst prove that by means of
basic moves, we can transform one into the other. To do so, it suﬃces to
slide the edge along the path that connects the other end of the edge, which
we know to exist because the graph is connected (Prop. ., Prop. ..
. Let there be two graphs in ΓC(N ,M) that diﬀer by an edge with arbitrary
ends. By applying the previous step twice, we show that there exists a
ﬁnite set of moves that allows us to reach one conﬁguration starting from
the other (Prop. .).
. Finally, let there be two arbitrary graphs in ΓC(N ,M). Moving one edge at
time, we show by induction that it is possible to reach one graph starting
from the other with a ﬁnite number of moves. Thus, the ergodicity is
proved (Prop. .).
We now proceed with the detailed proofs of egodicity. The uninterested reader
can jump directly to section ...
D . (c-). Let us choose a labelling for the space of vertices
V = {v1,… , vN} and an induced labelling for the edges E = {eij} where eij =
.     
eji = (vi, vj) denotes the undirected edge between vi and vj. Let us deﬁne a
transformation σ ikij ∶ Γ
C(N ,M) ↦ ΓC(N ,M), called corner swaps (c-swaps), as
following
σ ikij (𝒢 ) = 𝒢
′ = (V , E′) (.)
such that
E′ =
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
󰀷E ⧵ {eik}󰀸 ∪ {eij} if (ekj, eik ∈ E) ∧ (eij ∉ E)
E otherwise
. (.)
Figure .: The rewiring move (c-swap) of the dynamics.
P .. Let 𝒢 = (V , E) and 𝒢 ′ = (V , E′) be two graphs in ΓC(N ,M)
that diﬀer by an edge incident on the same vertex, i.e. |E| = |E′| = M, |E′ ∩ E| =
M − 1, E ⧵ E′ = {eik} and E
′ ⧵ E = {eij}, and such that the shortest path P from vk
to vj does not contain neither vi nor any of its neighbours.
There exists an integer l and a ﬁnite sequence of graphs in ΓC(N ,M), 𝒢 n such
that:
(i) 𝒢 = 𝒢 0 and 𝒢 ′ = 𝒢 l.
(ii) For all 0 ≤ n < l there exist adjacent vertices vkn ,vkn+1 such that 𝒢
n+1 =
σ
ikn
ikn+1
(𝒢 n), where k0 = k and kl = j.
Proof. Let l be the length of P.
Let vk1 be the unique neighbour of vk that lies in P. If we set 𝒢
1 = σ ikik1
(𝒢 ),
the c-swap reduces the distance between vi and vj , since the neighbour of vk
that lies in P must have a distance l − 1 from vj. We reiterate the procedure on
𝒢 1 and obtain in such a way a sequence of graphs that satisﬁes property (ii).
Now, since at any step the length of P diminishes by , after the l-th step, in the
graph 𝒢 l vi and vj will be neighbours. Thus, since no other edge was changed by
applying c-swaps, 𝒢 l = 𝒢 ′ proving property (i).
P .. Let 𝒢 = (V , E) and 𝒢 ′ = (V , E′) be two graphs in ΓC(N ,M)
which diﬀer by an edge incident on the same vertex, i.e. |E| = |E′| = M, |E′ ∩ E| =
M − 1, E ⧵ E′ = {eik} and E
′ ⧵ E = {eij}.
There exists an integer l and a ﬁnite sequence of graphs in ΓC(N ,M), 𝒢 n such
that:
     :    
(i) 𝒢 = 𝒢 0 and 𝒢 ′ = 𝒢 l
(ii) For all 0 ≤ n ≤ l there exist adjacent vertices vkn ,vkn+1 such that 𝒢
n+1 =
σ
ikn
ikn+1
(𝒢 n).
Proof. Let P be the shortest path in 𝒢 from vk to vj that does not contain (vk, vi).
There are four possible cases :
(i) P does not contain neither vi nor any of its neighbours other than vk. The
thesis is proven applying proposition . directly to P.
(ii) P contains vi. Let P1 be the shortest path from vk to vi that does not contain
the edge (vk, vi). letP2 be the shortest path from vi to vj, clearlyP = P1⊕P2,
where ⊕ is the path concatenation. Since by construction there are no
neighbours of vk in P2 (otherwise P would not contain vi) we can apply
proposition . and reach 𝒢 ′′ = (V , (E ⧵ {eki}) ∪ {ekj}); on the other hand
there cannot be neighbours of vj in P1 (otherwise there would be a shortest
path not containing vi) and thus applying again proposition . along P1
we reach 𝒢 ′ proving the thesis.
(iii) P does not contain vi but two of its neighbours, c and f such that c ≠ vk,
f ≠ vk and |c, vk| < |f , vk|, where |⋅, ⋅| represents the graph distance
between two vertices. We ﬁrst note that c and f must be neighbours,
otherwise P should include vi. Then, as in case (ii), by minimality we can
write P = P1 ⊕ (c, f ) ⊕ P2 where P1 is the shortest path from vk to c and
P2 is the shortest path from f to vj. It is easy to see that Q2 = (vi, f ) ⊕ P2
is a shortest path from vi to vj: if it were not so, there would exist a path
Q′2 from vi to vj strictly shorter than Q2, but in that case P1 ⊕ (c, vi) ⊕Q
′
2
would be a shortest path from vk to vj containing vi, in contradiction with
our hypotheses. A similar argument holds for Q1. As before, since, by
minimality, there cannot be neighbours of vk in P2, it is possible to reach
the graph 𝒢 ′′ = (V , (E ⧵ {eki}) ∪ {ekj}) by applying proposition . to Q2;
since by minimality there cannot be neighbours of vj in P1, we can apply
proposition . to 𝒢 ′′ along Q2 and reach 𝒢
′ proving the thesis.
(iv) The shortest path P contains only one neighbour of vi other than vk, let
us call itm. As before, P = P1 ⊕ P2 where P1 is the shortest path from vk
tom and P2 is the shortest path fromm to vj. Since by construction there
cannot be other neighbours of i in P2, we can apply proposition . to P2
and reach the graph 𝒢 ∗ = (V , (E ⧵ {eim}) ∪ {eij}. On the other hand, by
construction there cannot be neighbours of vi in P1 other than vk and
thus we can apply proposition . to P2 and reach 𝒢
′ proving the thesis.
P .. Let 𝒢 = (V , E) and 𝒢 ′ = (V , E′) be two graphs in ΓC(N ,M)
such that |E| = |E′| = M and |E ∩ E′| = M − 1. Let us assume that, in particular,
E = {eij} ∪ (E ∩ E
′) and E′ = {ehk} ∪ (E ∩ E
′).
.     
Thus there exists an integer l and a ﬁnite sequence of graphs in ΓC(N ,M), 𝒢 n
such that:
(i) 𝒢 = 𝒢 0 and 𝒢 ′ = 𝒢 l
(ii) For all 0 ≤ n < l there exist adjacent vertices vkn ,vkn+1 such that 𝒢
n+1 =
σ
ikn
ikn+1
(𝒢 n).
Proof. Let us deﬁne the graph 𝒢 ′′ = (V , E′′) such that E′′ = (E ⧵ {eij}) ∪ {eih}.
Applying proposition . ﬁrst to graphs 𝒢 and 𝒢 ′′ and then to graph 𝒢 ′′ and
𝒢 ′ proves the thesis.
D . (g-). Let 𝒢 = (V , E) and 𝒢 ′ = (V , E′) be two graphs
in ΓC(N ,M) which diﬀer at most by an edge, that is such that |E| = |E′| = M
and |E ∩ E′| = M − 1. Let us assume that, in particular, E = {eij} ∪ (E ∩ E
′) and
E′ = {ehk} ∪ (E ∩ E
′).
We deﬁne a global swap or g-swap of the edge eij to the edge ehk a transformation
such that:
𝒢 ′ = Σhkij (𝒢 ) (.)
Proposition . simply states that any global swap can be obtained as the
composition of a minimal set of corner swaps between adjacent vertices.
P .. Let 𝒢 = (V , E) and 𝒢 = (V , E′) be two graphs in ΓC(N ,M).
There exists an integer d and a sequence of graphs 𝒢 n(V , En) in Γ
C(N ,M) such that:
(i) 𝒢 = 𝒢 0 and 𝒢 ′ = 𝒢 d
(ii) For all 0 ≤ n < d there exist four vertices vi , vj ,vh and vk such that 𝒢
n+1 =
Σhkij (𝒢
n)
Proof. Let 𝒵 = (V ,Z = E ∩ E′), and let us deﬁne δ = |Z|. We proceed by
induction on the number δ.
base case If δ = M − 1, the Thesis is trivially true because of Proposition ..
inductive step Let us assume that the Thesis holds for δ = M − d, we want
to show that this implies that it also holds for δ = M − d − 1, with
d < M − 1. Let us assume that 𝒢 = (V , E) and 𝒢 ′ = (V , E′) are such
that |E′ ∩ E| = M − d − 1. Let eij ∈ E ⧵ (E ∩ E
′) and ehk ∈ E
′ ⧵ (E ∩ E′).
Moreover, let E′′ = (E ⧵ {eij}) ∪ {ehk}. By construction, |E ∩ E
′′| = M − 1
and |E′ ∩ E′′| = M − d. Finally, let 𝒢 ′′ = (V , E′′). Since 𝒢 ′′ and 𝒢 ′
diﬀer byM − d edges, by inductive assumption there exists a sequence 𝒢 i,
with i ∈ [0, d], such that 𝒢 0 = 𝒢 ′ and 𝒢 d = 𝒢 ′′, that satisﬁes the Thesis.
Moreover, by Proposition ., there exists a g-swap such that𝒢 = Σ
ij
hk(𝒢
′′).
Thus, the complete sequence 𝒢 ′ = 𝒢 0, 𝒢 1,⋯ , 𝒢 ′′ = 𝒢 d, 𝒢 = 𝒢 d+1
satisﬁes the Thesis.
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Proposition . and proposition . state simply that any two connected graphs
with the same number of edges can be obtained one from the other applying a
ﬁnite sequence of c-swaps. Moreover, since the number of edges is ﬁnite, then
there must be a minimal sequence of c-swaps that connects any two of such
graphs. Since, for ﬁnite β, all c-swaps are allowed with non-zero probability, this
proves the ergodicity.
.. Potential function and Hamiltonian
The fact that the system is ergodic ensures us that there exist a unique station-
ary distribution. In this case it is possible to obtain the shape of the invariant
distribution directly from the deﬁnition of utility.
The dynamics of the model, in fact, admits a potential which is just the global
utility, i.e. the sum of the utilities U = ∑i ui. Indeed, let us consider the change
Δux in the utility of the agent x when the rewiring (i, j) into (i, l) occurs. De-
pending on the position of x in the network, the following changes are obtained:
Δui = kl − kj + 1 (.a)
Δuj = 1− ki − μ (.b)
Δul = ki − 1+ μ (.c)
Δuh = −1 ∀h ∈ 𝜕j ⧵ {i, l} (.d)
Δug = +1 ∀g ∈ 𝜕l ⧵ {j} (.e)
Δux = +0 ∀x ≠ i, j, l, x ∉ 𝜕j ∪ 𝜕l , (.f)
where 𝜕x is the set of the neighbours of x, before the move.
In the total variation of the utility ΔU = ∑x Δux, the term Δuh appears kj − 2
times, while the term Δug appears kl − 1 times, because kx is the degree of the
node x before the rewiring. Gathering all the contributions one has:
ΔU = Δui + Δuj + Δul + (kj − 2)Δuh + (kl − 1)Δug
= 2(kl − kj + 1) = 2Δui .
(.)
The last point implies that, since the dynamics is ergodic, the system converges
to thermal equilibrium with Hamiltonian
ℋ = −U = −∑
i
k2i − μ∑
i
ki,
and ﬁxed density of links at temperature 2/β. Notice that the second term does
not play any role, being∑i ki a ﬁxed quantity in our case. Indeed the dynamics
in Eq. (.) is equivalent to Metropolis dynamics, and hence it samples the Gibbs
distribution P{â} ∝ eβU(â)/2, which is known in sociology as the -star model.
 The factor  comes from the fact that the variation of the global utility is the double of the variation
of the local utility.
.   
Park and Newman [, ], have shown that the -star model where the density
of links is not ﬁxed, exhibits a sharp phase transition. This result suggests that
there might be a phase transition also in the model we study in this paper. As a
by-product, our discussion also provides a microscopic derivation for the -star
model.
.  
In order to investigate the behaviour of the model, we performed extensive
numerical simulations sampling the Gibbs distribution P{â} ∝ eβU(â)/2 using
the Metropolis algorithm based on the rewiring moves introduced in Sect. ..
All the results to be presented throughout the rest of this section were obtained,
for each value of β, by performingR rewiring proposals per node, andwe checked
that the value R = 5 ⋅ 105 is large enough to always ensure the attainment of an
equilibrium state. Fig. . shows two typical realizations of the social network
for small and large values of β (see caption for more details). Fig. . suggests
that, as anticipated in the previous section, the social climbing model undergoes
a transition from hierarchical to random structures. In the following, we will
show the presence of a phase transition between these two states.
In Fig. . we show the largest degree of the networkΦ = maxi ki as a function
of the inverse temperature β for systems with N = 100 nodes and M = 110,
200, 300, 500 links. As can be seen, in all cases the system actually undergoes a
transition, going from a phase where the largest degree Φ is roughly of order
1− 10 (depending on the relative size of N andM) to a phase where the largest
degree is of orderN . These observations qualitatively match the ﬁndings of [],
where a prediction for the critical temperature Tc = 1/βc characterizing this
phase transition was also derived, from combinatorial arguments, for networks
with average degree ̄k = 2M/N < 2, i.e. for disconnected graphs. The nature
of the phase transition depicted in Fig. . is further investigated in Fig. .. In
the left panel we show the full distribution of Φ/N with respect to ̄k obtained by
binning the results relative to  networks, for β = 0.01 and N = 500. For low
(high) values of ̄k the distribution is sharply concentrated around zero (one)
and a steep transition occurs at a critical value of ̄k, meaning that the average
is representative of the distribution of Φ/N . Completely analogous results are
found for diﬀerent values of β. Therefore, in order to characterise the transition
more precisely, in the right panel of Fig. . we show the relation between the
average of Φ/N over  networks with respect to both ̄k and β.
In Fig. . we analyse the dependence of the critical value of β with respect to
the sizeN of the network, while keeping the average degree ﬁxed, for ̄k = 2.5, 5.0.
Qualitatively it is clear that, increasing N , both the transition becomes sharper
 The case studied in ref. [, ] where the number of links is allowed to change, can be recovered
in a model where, in addition to rewiring steps discussed above, we also allow for link creation
upon random encounters and link obsolescence (i.e. decay). More precisely, consider a model
where each agent receives opportunities i) to rewire his/her links (as above) at rate ν and ii) to
form new links (with randomly chosen agents), with rate η/2. In addition, each link decays with
rate 1. Then, in a time interval Δt, the number of links changes by ΔM = ηNΔt −MΔt, which
means that in the stationary state ⟨M⟩ = ηN .
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(a)
(b)
Figure .: Snapshot of networks of the social climbing game for N = 100,M = 125 for
β = 0.03 (a) and β = 0.1 (b). Size of the nodes is proportional to the degree.
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Figure .: Dependence of the largest degree Φ (divided by N) in the social climbing
network as a function of the inverse temperature (or intensity of choice
parameter) β. The diﬀerent curves refer to N = 100 andM = 110, 200, 300,
500. For each value of β the reported values of Φ are obtained by averaging
over  networks. An abrupt change in is observed in all curves after a
threshold value of β, with Φ/N going from low values to values close to one,
signalling the emergence of a star, i.e. a link with 𝒪(N) links, in the network.
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Figure .: (a) density plot depicting the full distribution of the maximum degree (di-
vided by N) as a function of the average degree obtained by binning the
results relative to  networks, at inverse temperature β = 0.01 and num-
ber of nodes N = 500. High (low) values are darker (lighter). (b) average
maximum degree (divided by N) as a function of the average degree and β
for N = 100; results obtained by averaging over  networks. Clearly, for
low values of ̄k the network is in the disordered phase, while for high values
of β it is in the ordered phase.
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Figure .: (a) Dependence between the maximum degree (divided by N) and β, for
̄k = 2.5 and diﬀerent values of N . Results are averaged over  networks.
The transition become sharper and the critical value of β shifts to the left for
increasing values of N . (b) as in the left panel for ̄k = 5.0.
and the critical value of β shifts to the left. In order to understand if the critical
value in thermodynamic limit βc is non-zero, we analyse the ﬁnite-size scaling
behaviour, assuming β∗(N) = βc + aN
−b, where β∗(N) is the critical value at size
N and βc, a and b are free parameters. Since b is expected to be universal (i.e.
not dependent on the other parameters, like ̄k), it is reasonable to choose it by
plotting β∗(N) against N−b until straight lines are obtained. Both a and βc are
then found by a best ﬁt.The value of β∗(N) is obtained by a linear interpolation of
the curves in Fig. . and calculating the value of β such thatΦ/N = 1/2. FromFig.
. it can be clearly seen that for b = 1.25 the assumed functional form is fully
consistent with numerical simulations up the investigated system size.The values
we ﬁnd for βc are soundly diﬀerent from zero within 95% conﬁdence intervals
provided by best ﬁt. In particular we ﬁnd for ̄k = 2.5: βc = (1.1 ± 0.2) ⋅ 10
−2,
while for ̄k = 5.0: βc = (2.6± 0.2) ⋅ 10
−3.
Following [], let us deﬁne a star as a node whose degree is of order N .
Then, it is immediate to ﬁgure out that, depending on the ratioM/N , diﬀerent
number of stars might emerge in the network for temperatures lower than Tc.
Clearly, in the case N = 100, M = 110 (i.e. ̄k only slightly larger than ), the
appearance of a star (Φ ≃ 100 in this case) below the critical temperature leaves
very few links to be distributed amongst the remaining nodes. On the other
hand, increasing the number of links provides enough room for the emergence
of a larger number of stars. In other words, it is intuitively reasonable to expect
a system with an average degree ̄k ≃ 2n to produce, for suﬃciently low temper-
 Inspired by [] we also performed ﬁnite-size scaling analysis according to the functional form:
β∗(N) = βc + a(M/ log(N))
−b, which also gives values of βc soundly above zero and consistent
with the ones discussed in the main text.
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Figure .: Finite-size scaling for determining the critical value in the thermodynamic
limit βc, assuming the functional form β
∗(N) = βc + aN
−1.25, where β∗(N)
is the critical value at size N . By best ﬁtting we ﬁnd: for ̄k = 2.5: βc =
(1.1± 0.2) ⋅ 10−2, while for ̄k = 5.0: βc = (2.6± 0.2) ⋅ 10
−3.
.   
atures, exactly n stars. In order to support such an intuitive line of reasoning,
we computed the inverse participation ratios (IPRs) of the degree sequences
v = (k1, k2,… , kN )/√∑
N
i=1 k
2
i of several networks with diﬀerent numbers of
nodes and links. Given a normalised vector v, its IPR is deﬁned as
I(v) =
󰃚
N
∑
i=1
v4i󰃛
−1
. (.)
The IPR of a completely localised vector, say v = (1, 0,… , 0), is equal to one.
On the other hand, the IPR of a fully de-localised vector, whose components are
all equal to vi ≃ 1/√N , is of order N . In our case I(v) gives an estimate of the
number of dominant nodes in the network. In Fig. . we plot the IPR I(v), as
functions of β, for N = 100 nodes andM = 110, 200, 300. As can be seen, the
IPR of the sparsest network, i.e. the one withM = 110, essentially drops down
to one right below its critical temperature. On the other hand, systems with
a larger number of links undergo a less trivial evolution: after the initial drop
below the critical temperature, the IPR increases and eventually reaches a steady
state. In the example shown in Fig. ., the system withM = 200 links reaches
a steady value I(v) ≃ 2.12 ± 0.03, whereas the system with M = 300 reaches
I(v) ≃ 3.28 ± 0.06 (where the errors represent the 68% conﬁdence intervals
obtained by averaging over  networks), and such values clearly show that
the maximal number of stars allowed by the relative sizes of N andM has been
achieved. Moreover, these observations are consistent with the small temporary
decrease of the largest degree Φ which can be observed in Fig. . for systems
with ̄k > 2 when the inverse temperature is slightly larger than its critical value.
.. Correlations and social mobility
As already explained in Sect. ., one of the goals of the present paper is to
model the positive feedback mechanism between the individuals’ eﬀort to climb
the social hierarchy and the subsequent reinforcement of the social hierarchy
itself. Suppose that a given social network reaches its equilibrium state, at a
certain inverse temperature β, after t0 steps of the social climbing dynamics
described in Sect. .. Let us denote the corresponding graph’s adjacency matrix
as 𝖦(t0). Then, one way of quantitatively describing how mobile or “frozen” a
society is would be to assess the level of correlation, according to some proper
notion, between 𝖦(t0) and a following conﬁgurations 𝖦(t), where t = t0 + Δt for
some positive Δt. We will now measure correlations by means of Kendall’s rank
correlation coeﬃcient. Given the joint set of all matrix entries in 𝖦(t0) and 𝖦(t),
let us focus, for example, on entries (i, j) and (h, l) in both matrices.Then, if both
gij(t0) > ghl(t0) and gij(t) > ghl(t), or if both gij(t0) < ghl(t0) and gij(t) < ghl(t), the
pairs (gij(t0), ghl(t0)) and (gij(t), ghl(t)) are said to be concordant. On the contrary,
if gij(t0) ≷ ghl(t0) and gij(t) ≶ ghl(t) the pairs (gij(t0), ghl(t0)) and (gij(t), ghl(t)) are
said to be discordant. Of course, since the adjacency matrix entries equal zero
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Figure .: Inverse participation ratio of the normalised degree sequence I(v) as a func-
tion of the inverse temperature β. Diﬀerent curves refer to networks with
N = 100 andM = 110, 200, 300. Results obtained by averaging over 
networks. For large enough β one recovers the maximal number of stars.
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or one at each time, ties will often happen either at time t0 or at time t (or at
both times). Kendall’s correlation coeﬃcient τ reads
τ(Δt) =
C −D
√C +D + Tt0√C +D + Tt
, (.)
where C (D) is the numbers of concordant (discordant) pairs, whereas Tt0 (Tt)
denotes the number of time-t0 (time-t) ties. Pairs where ties happen both at t0
and t are not taken into account.
In Fig. . a few examples of Kendall’s τ coeﬃcient’s time evolution are
sketched. All plots refer to networks with N = 100 nodes andM = 300 links.
Here, Δt = t0 = 5 ⋅ 10
6 elementary Monte Carlo moves, i.e. rewiring proposals.
As can be seen, when the social climbing game takes place for temperatures
higher than the critical one, Kendall’s τ quickly starts to ﬂuctuate around zero,
denoting no genuine correlation between conﬁgurations distant (in time). This
we take as indication of a large social mobility. On the other hand, for temperat-
ures slightly lower than the critical one, Kendall’s τ remains signiﬁcantly larger
than zero over several time lags. However, a downward trend is clearly visible
in this case, meaning that for temperatures T ≲ Tc social mobility is recovered
after a suﬃciently long time. On the contrary, for temperatures signiﬁcantly
lower than the critical one Kendall’s τ essentially remains constant and very
large (i.e. close to one) over large time lags, hinting at an extremely reduced
social mobility, possibly preventing the majority of individuals from climbing
the social ladder.
The above considerations on individuals’ mobility in the social climbing game
can be further clariﬁed and understood more deeply. For these purposes, let
us denote as qi the fraction of agents who, at a given time, have a strictly lower
degree than agent i, i.e.
qi =
1
N ∑j≠i
θ(ki − kj), (.)
where θ(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0 and θ(x) = 1 for x > 0. The variable deﬁned in (.)
clearly represents a suitable deﬁnition of the social ranking, hence the social
status, of a given individual in the network. Thus, a reasonable measure of the
individuals’ mobility in the social climbing game is given by the change in the
quantity deﬁned above over a certain time lag Δt, i.e. Δqi(Δt) = qi(t +Δt) − qi(t),
for i = 1,… ,N .
In Fig. . some typical behaviours of the q index deﬁned in (.) are shown.
All examples refer to networks with N = 100 nodes and M = 1000 links. In
such plots, the average of the change Δq is shown as a function of q, in order
to provide information about the typical social mobility over a time lag Δt for
an agent whose social ranking at the beginning of such a time lag is quantiﬁed
by q. As can be seen, depending on the preference for social status, i.e. on the
inverse temperature parameter β, very diﬀerent situations can happen. In a
rather disordered society (low values of β) the relation between q and Δq is
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Figure .: Kendall’s τ coeﬃcient (see (.)) measurements for networks with N =
100 and M = 300. All measurements are performed between an initial
equilibrium conﬁguration 𝖦(t0) and later conﬁgurations 𝖦(t0 + nΔt), with
t0 = Δt = 5 ⋅ 10
6 Monte Carlo steps. The diﬀerent curves refer to inverse
temperatures β = 0.02, 0.04, 0.06, respectively corresponding to values
below, slightly above and well above the critical value for the system under
study (see also Fig. .). Results obtained by averaging over  networks.
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Figure .: Relation between the q index deﬁned in (.) and its variation Δq over a
given time lag Δt = 104 Monte Carlo steps for a network with N = 100
andM = 1000. The diﬀerent curves refer to inverse temperatures β = 0.02,
0.08, 0.16, respectively corresponding to values below, slightly above and
well above the critical value for the system under study. Points refer to the
average variation Δq over an equally spaced grid of q values (going from  to
 in steps of .). Results obtained by averaging over  networks. Shaded
area (for β = 0.02) and error bars (for β = 0.08, 0.16) represent the central
68% of the events. Points and error bars relative to diﬀerent values of β have
been shifted to enhance readability.
     :    
clearly linear, and does not depend strongly on the time lag size Δt. In particular,
it can be seen that, on average, individuals sitting at the bottom of the ranking
typically end up higher in the social ladder after some time, whereas individuals
sitting atop the hierarchy are prevented from keeping their social status intact for
a long time.When the preference for social status crosses its critical value, such a
picture starts changing quite dramatically. For values of β slightly larger than the
critical value βc agents with low degrees still have a chance to climb up the social
ladder, especially over rather long time lags, whereas the dominant individuals
(q ≳ 0.9) typically get to keep their social ranking. It is worth to remark that for
low β the distribution of ki is not very skewed, so changes in social ranking Δqi
are more frequent. In this sense, our notion of social mobility captures aspects
related to social dynamics but it also depends on the stationary distribution
of qi’s, i.e. on the degree of inequality. As β increases, the degree distribution
acquires skewness, with few individuals having many links and reduced social
mobility. For β > βc the population separates into two groups, those with ki
of order N and those with very few links, with suppressed mobility across the
whole social hierarchy. Also, as can be seen from the right plot in Fig. ., when
the critical threshold is crossed the social network becomes “fragmented”, as the
q index is no longer deﬁned over the whole interval [0, 1]. In a strongly ordered
society, i.e. β well above its critical value, agents with low degrees are almost
completely stuck, and all of the social mobility happens in the top half of the
social network, i.e. amongst agents with q > 0.5, and this is precisely due to
the freezing of the dominant individuals inducing social mobility to disappear
completely also amongst nodes with small degrees. These results complement,
at a “microscopic” level, those presented in Fig. ..
. 
In summary, we have discussed a very simple model for the dynamics of a social
network where the agents’ quest for high status in the social hierarchy reinforces
the latter while reducing social mobility. The model is very stylised and far from
a realistic description of social dynamics. Yet, it captures some key ingredients
that are enough to reproduce stylised facts known at least since the work of
Vilfredo Pareto []. Namely, Pareto observed that societies tend to organise
in a hierarchical manner, with the emergence of “social elites”. Our model, as
well as Refs. [, ], provides a formal framework showing that individual
incentives for high social status are enough to confer this property to the social
network, even in the absence of explicit discrimination of particular groups (e.g.
cast system or racial segregation) or preferential biases (e.g. hereditary rules).
This model suggests that the assumption that individual freedom promotes
social mobility is a non-trivial one. This is because the structure of a society,
while constraining the set of opportunities that are available to individuals,
depends on the very incentives of individuals in complex ways.
We have shown, in fact, that the interplay between agents that are free to
modify their neighbourhood in order to increase their centrality can produce
 A similar concept of “power elites” has been discussed in [].
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very “rigid” societies, with extremely low social mobility, characterised by per-
sistent inequalities between a priori equal individuals We ﬁnd, in fact, that the
hierarchical state is remarkably stable, with suppressed social mobility in the up-
per and lower parts of the hierarchy. Furthermore, our model exhibits a negative
dependence between mobility and inequality, in the sense that more hierarchic-
ally structured (i.e. unequal) societies manifest a lower degree of mobility. It is
tempting to relate this to the pervasive empirical observation that more unequal
societies tend to have lower inter-generational mobility [–]. Our model
neglects important dimensions, such as wealth or political power that, however,
likely contribute to reinforce our results.
Another important aspect of the model is the fact that social climbing game
admits a potential function, thereby allowing us to deploy techniques and con-
cepts of statistical mechanics to understand the behaviour of the system.The
understanding of this phenomenon, indeed, hinges on the concept of ergodicity
breaking that occurs in strongly interacting systems, when a symmetry – here
related to the a priori equality among individuals – is spontaneously broken.
This phenomenon, well known in statistical physics, is an emergent collective
property, and it manifests only when the system is large enough. Remarkably,
we ﬁnd that persistent inequality with low mobility occurs precisely when the
quest for “power” – i.e. for occupying the most central or important place in
the social hierarchy – becomes a dominant component of what motivates the
behaviour of individuals.
In words, thus, our model epitomises an apparent positive feedback between
the intensity of the eﬀorts of individuals to “climb” the social hierarchy and
the structure of a society: on the one hand, the more a society is hierarchically
structured, the easier it is for individuals to understand how to climb it. On the
other, the eﬀorts of agents to climb the hierarchy reinforce the social ranking
as individuals rewire their links from less to more inﬂuential individuals. We
discuss this interplay in a highly stylised model of a society, that while being
very far from realistic, serves as a proof of concept and allows us to unveil
the mechanism responsible for the emergence of a persistent inequality in a
transparent manner.
We solved this model mostly through numerical simulations. The mean ﬁeld
approach discussed in Ref. [, ] is not applicable in our case, because the
density of links that plays the role of an order parameter in Ref. [, ] is ﬁxed
in our case. Indeed, the phenomenology we ﬁnd is diﬀerent from that of Ref.
[, ] as we do not ﬁnd evidence of hysteresis phenomena: there is no range
of parameters where the disordered and the ordered societies are both stable.
We speculate that this might be related to the fact that in the social climbing
game there are mechanisms by which a social hierarchy can “nucleate” gradually
in an ordered society, by forming social elites that grow over time.
This and other issues can in principle be addressed within more sophisticated
statistical mechanics approaches. In this respect, it is worth to mention that it is
possible to map the problem into that of an interacting lattice gas that possibly
admits for a full and exact statistical mechanics treatment.
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In this thesis we have focused on modelling decision making in complex social
environments. The two speciﬁc case studies are completely diﬀerent in their
nature: in chapter  we described a model for consensus decision making in
large animal groups, in chapter , instead, we modelled a society of rational
self-interested individuals that strive to enhance their importance inside the
society in which they live.
In both cases, notwithstanding the deep and substantial diﬀerences, we could
use a similar theoretical framework to address the decision problem. This was
made possible by the high degree of abstraction that network models have. As
long as it possible to oﬀer a reasonable deﬁnition of social interaction and as
long as it is reasonable to stylise the behaviour of the individuals interacting in
a society in a simple way, a network approach is viable.
Of course, this abstraction comes with a price: as Ising model is not a good
model to describe quantitatively the details of magnetism in ferromagnetic
metals, it is unlikely that we shall be able to exact quantitative results from
network models, possibly measurable in real experiments; however, as for Ising
model in Statistical Physics, these network models oﬀer us a qualitative picture
of the behaviour of the system that we are modelling, and highlight the possible
mechanisms that originate these behaviour.
In some cases—as the one discussed in chapter — it is possible to attempt a
more realistic microscopic description of the system, at the price,however ,of
loosing any hope for a analytical solution. Still, in most cases we still miss a
more realistic microscopic description and thus the network description is the
best possible one(this is the case discussed in chapter ).
A general feature of adaptive networks is the fact that there is a positive feed-
back between the inner dynamics of the agents and the social one: in chapter,
the adaptive change of the neighbourhood reinforce the decision made by the
individuals, in chapter  the change of the neighbourhood, driven by the desire
of centrality, leads the birth of local hierarchies that reinforce the adaptive dy-
namics; as a result of these positive feedbacks, for some range of the parameters,
the system shows abrupt transition between disordered and ordered phases
(such behaviours have also been found in other adaptive models [, , , ]).
Such abrupt changes are indeed a general feature observed in biology and
sociologywhich has for long puzzled scientist; early attempts to provide a general,
mainly phenomenological, framework to model these phenomena , such as
catastrophe theory [] , essentially failed, and a general microscopic theory for
modelling these phenomena is still missing. Adaptive networks may provide a
possible reasonable microscopic approach able to justify some of these patterns.
Finally, if on the one hand the model we discussed in this thesis provided a
better insight on the two problems we have addressed, they are not perfect and
miss some aspects. A particular relevant one, is the emergence of communities.

 
In chapter  states with more than one community appear as metastable states of
the dynamics, however these states eventually vanish in the long run. Similarly
in the model discussed in  the stable state is either completely disordered or
completely hierarchic. Understanding how to extend the kind of models we
have discussed in this thesis to account for the emergence of stable communities
is a modelling challenge in which is worth investing time
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The mathematical foundation of network science is graph theory, a branch of
combinatorics and topology, with a long tradition []. Its origins are traditionally
tracked back to the famous solution to the problem of the Seven Bridges of
Königsberg that Leonard Euler found in . During its ﬁrst two centuries
of development, graph theory showed strong bonds with other branches of
mathematics such as topology, group theory, number theory, and self organised
in several branches. Combinatorial GraphTheory— the branch of Graph theory
that on counting graphs which given properties— has in particular oﬀered some
of the most relevant result for network science. In particular a paper by Paul
Erdős and Albert Rényi [] and ( independently by Gilbert[] ) focused on
applying the so called probabilistic method to graph theory.
This seminal paper started an entire new line of research in graph theory, the
random graph theory, where rather that looking to the property of a single graph,
one focuses on the average properties of graphs satisfying certain properties.
This random graphs can be seen as a product of some random process that
generates them and ,as such, they oﬀer an ideal modelling framework adapted
to capture the nature of real world networks.
The increase of computational power available to researcher and the devel-
opment of the Internet, which oﬀer a easily accessible experimental set-up,
have boosted the empirical studies of real world networks. Such studies have
made,however, clear that Erdős-Rényi (ER) model was not able to capture the
nature of the real networks. ER model, in fact, completely ignores the correl-
ation between elements in a network and proved to be unable to reproduce
some topological properties of various empirical networks. The mathematical
research in random graphs continued in the attempt to build better models; an
acceleration in this modelling eﬀort occurred at the end of the s when new
empirical results came out and several seminal papers appeared. In particular
we cite here two popular models, Watts and Stogats Small World model [] and
the Barabasi Albert model [] . In the last ﬁfteen years a plethora of network
models has been developed, and network models have been applied to a rich
variety of systems.
In this section we shall review brieﬂy some basic concepts of graph theory
with the end of setting up the notation and nomenclature that we shall use
afterwards.

    
.. Graphs
Given a set V , a graph 𝒢 is deﬁned as an ordered pair of disjointed sets 𝒢(V , E)
where E ⊆ V × V .
The deﬁnition is general but usually V is at least countable. If |V| ≤ ∞, the
graph is said to be ﬁnite. For ﬁnite graphs V it is always possible to map V in the
set formed by the ﬁrst |V| positive integers. If not otherwise speciﬁed, V must
be considered as that subset.
An element v ∈ V is called a vertex or a node; the sets of nodes of a graph
shall be written as V(𝒢 ). A pair e ∈ E is called an edge or a link; the set of
edges of a graph shall written as E(𝒢 ). If we consider E as ordered couples we
obtain a directed graphs , if instead we consider the pairs unordered we obtain
an undirected graph.
Two vertices v and w for which (v,w) ∈ E or (w, v) ∈ E are said to be adjacent
or neighbours. The set 𝒩𝒢 (v) = {w ∈ V(𝒢 ) ∶ (v,w) ∈ E(𝒢 )} is called the
neighbourhood of v. Given an edgeevw = (v,w) we shall also say that the vertices
v and w are incident on the edge e.
A subgraph 𝒢 ′(V ′, E′) is a graph such that V ′ ⊆ V and E′ ⊆ E. We shall
write 𝒢 ′ ⊂ 𝒢
.If no pairs of the form (i, i)(self edges) are permitted, the graph is simple. If
more than one edge is allowed, we refer to it amultigraph.
.. Isomorphism, graph properties and graph invariance
Two graphs 𝒢(V , E) and 𝒢 ′(V ′, E′) are said to be isomorphic, and we shall write
𝒢 ∼ 𝒢 ′ if there exist a function φ ∶ V ↦ V ′ such that ∀(i, j) ∈ V × V , if
inE then (φ(i), φ(j)) ∈ E’.
A class of graphs that is closed under isomorphisms is called a graph property
(e. g. planarity , containing a triangle etc..).
Amap ψ deﬁned on graphs is a graph invariant if ψ(𝒢 ) = ψ(𝒢 ′) for all𝒢 ∼ 𝒢
(e. g. the number of vertices, of edges, the average degree etc.)
.. Degree of a vertex, average degree
Let 𝒢(V , E) be a non empty undirected graph. And let v ∈ V be a node. The
quantity kv = |𝒩𝒢 (v)| is called the degree of vertex v .
The degree of a vertex is not a graph invariant (since it depends on the labelling
of the vertices). However we can construct diﬀerent graph invariants out of
them. In particular we can deﬁne the minimal degree kmin = minv∈V (k(v)), the
maximal degree kmax =v∈V (k(v)) and average degree of 𝒢
̄k =
1
|V| ∑v∈V
kv. (A.)
 If the graph is directed this expression deﬁnes out neighbourhood. A similar expression with w
and v inverted shall deﬁne instead the in neighbourhood
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Since in an undirected graph each edge connects only two vertices on can easily
check that∑v∈V k(v) = 2|E| and thus
̄k =
2|E|
|V|
. (A.)
For undirected graphs another relevant invariant is the degree sequence:
D𝒢 = {di}
|V|
i=1 (A.)
such that
. ai ≤ aj for all i, j ∈ {0,… ,V}
. ∀i ∈ {0,… , |V|}, ∃v ∈ V ∶ ai = kv.
Degree sequence of a graph bears important information about the topology of
the graph and has to satisfy the condition of equation A. and of Erdős-Gallai
theorem []:
k
∑
1
ai ≤ k(k + 1) +
|V|
∑
k+1
min(aj, k). (A.)
.. Adjacency Matrix
The structure of a ﬁnite graph may be described in synthetic way using a matrix,
called the adjacency matrix.
Given an graph 𝒢(V , E) it is possible to deﬁne a V × V matrix, 𝖦 = (gij) as
follow:
gij = 1, if (i, j) ∈ E (A.)
gij = 0, otherwise. (A.)
If the graph is undirected the matrix shall be symmetric with null trace, if the
graph is is directed it might be that gij ≠ gji. Since 𝖦 has the same amount of
information of E we shall often use the notation 𝒢(V , 𝖦) to refer to a graph.
It is straightforward, by deﬁnition, to see that:
ki =∑
j
gij (A.)
and thus
∑
ij
gij = 2|E|. (A.)
In particular the average degree reeds:
̄k =
∑ij gij
|V|
(A.)
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.. Paths, distances connected components
Let V = {v1,… , vn} and E = {(v1, v2),… , (vn−1, vn)}. The graph Pv1,vn(V , E) is
called a path. The length of a l(P) of a path is |E| and, by deﬁnition is equal
|V| − 1.
Let 𝒢(V , E) be a graph and v1, v2 ∈ V . If there exists a path Pvi,v2 which is also
a subgraph of 𝒢 , we say that v1 and v2 are connected (or linked). In this case we
call Pvi,vj a path from vi to vj on the graph 𝒢 .
Let 𝒫vi,vj(𝒢 ) = {Pvi,vj ∶ Pvi,vj ∈ 𝒢}be the set of all the paths from vi to vj. We
can deﬁne a distance between two vertices in a graph d(vi, vj) as follow:
d(vi, vj) =
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
minPvi,vj∈𝒫vi,vj(𝒢 )
l(Pvi,vj) if𝒫vi,vj ≠ ∅
+∞ otherwise.
(A.)
This distance allows us to deﬁne an equivalence relation on the nodes of a
graph as follow. vk ∼ vj if d(vi, vj) < +∞. This relation of equivalence induces
a partition on V1,VK in classes of equivalence. By deﬁnition there cannot be
any edge between vertices in diﬀerent classes. The maximal subgraphs Ki(Vi, Ei)
of 𝒢 are called connected components. Clearly⋃i Ei = E. In particular a graph
which has only one connected components is called connected.
.. Cycles and trees
A path Pvivj such that vi = vj is called a cycle; we shall used the notation Cvi to
refer to it. Let T(V , E) be a connected graph. If, for all vi ∈ V it is not possible
to ﬁnd a cycle Cvi such that Cvi ⊂ T the graph is called a tree. It is easy to check
that if for a tree |E|=|V|-.
If 𝒢(V , E) is a connected graph, there exists at least a subgraph T which is a
tree and such that V(T) = V ; this subgraph is called a spanning tree[].
In particular it given if a graph (not necessarily connected) 𝒢(V , E) is such
that |E| > |V| − 1 the the number of cycle has a lower bound which is given
by the so called cyclomatic number γ = |E| − |V| + K where K is the number of
connected components []. Intuitively one can see it as follow. Let Ki be one K
connected components of the graph; its spanning tree has V(Ki) − 1 edges; thus
any additional edge inKi will generate at least a cycle.There are E(Ki) −V(Ki) + 1
of such edges and thus summing over i one gets the formula for the cyclomatic
number
.. Random graphs, degree distribution and giant component
Networks in real word are dynamic entities; due to this dynamics most of the
properties are not ﬁxed once and for all, but varies and ﬂuctuate. That is why
one is interested to the rather to the typical properties of a set of networks that
on the the properties of one of them. In general from the analysis of a system we
shall obtain a set of graphs Ω and a probability measure deﬁned on Ω: from this
ingredients we can extract the diﬀerent properties to which we are interested.
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To illustrate some of the quantities we are interested in we shall use the famous
Erdős-Rényi model as a example. In the original form discussed by Erdős-Rényi
[, ] Ω was the space Γ(N ,M) of graphs with N vertices and M edges; the
probability measure was the uniform measure π(ω) = 1
|G(N ,M)|
= 1
󰀷
N(N−1)/2
M
󰀸
. This
probability space is usually denoted G(M,N).
In the version given by Gilbert the space Ω is given by Γ(N) that is the set of
graphs with N vertices and the probability measure is constructed assuming
that the probability that an edge occurs between two arbitrary vertices is p. It is
straightforward to see that the probability measure for a graph ω ∈ Ω withm
edges is π(ω) = pm(1− p)
󰀷
N
2
󰀸−m
. This probability space is denoted G(N , p).
Since calculations are easier in Gillert model we shall continue focusing on
that model.
It is easy to get some quantities. By example the average number of edges:
⟨m⟩ = ∑
m 󰃚
N(N−1)
2
m 󰃛
mpm(1− p)
󰀷
N
2
󰀸−m
= p
N
2
(A.)
and thus
⟨k⟩ =
2⟨m⟩
N
= (N − 1)p (A.)
Degree distribution
One of the most important quantity that it is possible to calculate in this frame-
work is the degree distribution which is the probability that a node in a graph
in G(N , p) has degree k.
Let Nk(ω) be the number of vertices of ω with degree k. Clearly Nk(ω) is a
stochastic variable and we can deﬁne the quantity.
pk =
⟨Nk⟩
N
=
1
N ∑
ω∈G(N ,p
Nk(ω).π(ω) (A.)
The quantity pk is the degree distribution of the system.
In the case of G(N , p) we can calculate it easily. In fact, since by construction,
the probability that a link between two nodes is present is p, and since the
maximal degree is limited by N − 1 we get:
pk = 󰃚
N − 1
k 󰃛
pk(1− p)N−1−k. (A.)
One immediately retrieves that ⟨k⟩ = (N − 1)p but one can also calculate addi-
tional moments easily.
Since often we deal with networks with a large number of vertices, we can be
interested to take the limit N → ∞ and with (N − 1)p → c < +∞. It is easy to
do it in this case and we get:
pk =
cke−c
k!
. (A.)
    
Giant component
When p = 0 the typical graph has no edges and thus all nodes are isolated. On
the contrary when p = 1 the typical graph shall be fully connected an thus
there shall be a single connected component of size N which is called Giant
component.
It is convenient to deﬁne the size S of the connected component and its
densitys. The quantity u = 1 − s measures the probability that a vertex in a
typical graph is not in the giant component. If a vertex is not in the giant
component this means that it must not be connected through any other vertex j
to the giant component: and thus either i is not connected to j or i is connected
to j but jis not in the giant component. The probability of not being connected
to the giant component through a vertex j is thus (1− p− pu). Thus we can write
down a consistency equation for u summing over al vertices and obtain
u = (1− p− pu)N−1. (A.)
In the large N limit assuming that c is constant and writing s = 1 − u we
obtain a consistency equation for s
s = 1− e−cs. (A.)
It can be proven that when c ≥ 1 this equation admits a solution with s > 0
which actually corresponds to the relative size of the giant component of the
typical graph.
It can also be proven that the there is only one giant component and that all
small components are tree like in structure.
.. Centrality Indices
A centrality index can be loosely deﬁned as a real valued function C(v) on the
vertices of a graph, such that if Φ ∶ 𝒢 → 𝒢 ′ is a graph isomorphism such that,
for any v ∈ V(𝒢 ) C(v) = C(Φ(v)). All centrality indices fall in this category,
however not all the function deﬁned as above can be meaningfully interpreted
There exists several centrality indices each of which highlight some a diﬀerent
property of the graph.
Here we deﬁne the indices cited in chapter .
Degree centrality
The degree centrality CD(v) is simply given by the degree kv of vertex v. This
quantity measures the local inﬂuence of a node in a graph.
Closeness centrality
Closeness centrality measures how central a node is with respect to the metrics
induced by shortest paths. Let d(v,w) be the graph distance as deﬁned in (A.).
If 𝒢 is a connected undirected graph, the closeness centrality is deﬁne as
CD(v) = N 󰃚 ∑w∈V(𝒢 )
d(v,w)
󰃛
−1
. (A.)
A. :     
Closeness is a geometric measure; and can measure on how fast a signal may
spread from node v to the rest of the graph. If the graph is not connected
closeness of isolated vertices is 0.
Betweenness centrality
Let 𝒢 be a connected graph, For all w, z ∈ V(𝒢 ) let σwz(v) be the number of
shortest path between w and z that pass by v. and let Σwz the the total number
of shortest path from w to z. The betweenness centrality is deﬁned as:
CB(v) = ∑
w,z∈V(𝒢 ),w≠z≠c
σwz(v)
Σwz
(A.)
This indexmeasures the structural importance of a vertex for information spread
in a graph, i. e. how much the can control information spread between vertices
Eigenvector centrality (Bonacich centrality)
Eigenvector centrality for node CE(v) is deﬁned be such that, for all v,w ∈ V(𝒢 )
CE(v) =
1
λ1 ∑w
gvwCE(v) (A.)
where λ1 is the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix.
With respect t degree centrality, which essentially weights all the neighbours
equally, eigenvector centrality weights all the neighbours by their relevance and
thus bears some global information about the entire network
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 
.   ’ w 
Lambert’s function is deﬁned by
W(x)eW(x) = x. (B.)
This function has two real branches, plotted in ﬁgure B. . Using the same
notation as in []) we have the principal branchW0(x) is deﬁned in [e
−1, +∞]
and takes values between in [1,∞], the second branchW−1 which is deﬁned
in[e−1, 0] and takes values in [−∞, 1].
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Figure B.: Plot of LamberW function
The principal branch can be expanded in a convergent power series around
z = 0:
W0 =
∞
∑
n=1
(−n)(n−1)
n!
xn (B.)
which can be extended to deﬁne an holomorphic function on the complex plain
with a branch cut in [−∞, e−1]..
Its derivative satisﬁes:
d
dx
W(x) =
e−W(x)
1+W(x)
=
x≠0
W(x)
x(1+W(x))
. (B.)

    
As for all inverse function, its numerical evaluation can be done with arbitrary
precision using an iterative method; in particular Halley method proves to be
quite eﬀective []. The evolution rule is:
wj+1 = wj −
wje
wj − z
ewj(wj + 1) −
(wj+2)(wje
wj−z)
2wj+2
, (B.)
where, as a starting point of the iterative process, the ﬁrst terms of the power
expansion (or, for the secondary branch, the ﬁrst terms of asymptotic expansion)
are taken.
.       .  n1 = 1− n0
In this section we give the details on how to reduce the FOC to a  dimensional
equation in the case when n1 = 1− n0
When we consider only systems where only one direction is preferred, some
simpliﬁcation can be made.
To ease the notation, as in the previous section, we shall write z = 2η
λ
, x = n1
and yi − 1 = ni for i ∈ {2, .., q}.
In this case equation (.) take the simpliﬁed form:
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
xe−x = z n
0
Q
+ zeh 1−n
0
(eh−1)ex+Q
yie
−yi = zP = z n
0
Q
+ z 1−n
0
(eh−1)ex+Q
q- times
(B.)
with the conditions
x +
q−1
∑
i=0
yi = z (B.)
Q = ex +
q−1
∑
i=0
e
y
i (B.)
and
P =
n0
Q
+W =
n0
Q
+
1− n0
(eh − 1)ex +Q
. (B.)
Solving equation (B.) with respect ex , calling Γ = PQ = n0 +WQ we get:
ex
Q
=
1− Γ
Γ − n0
1
eh − 1
(B.)
and thus, plugging it in the ﬁrst equation of (B.), we obtain:
x =
z
eh − 1
1− Γ
Γ − n0
󰀺(1− e
h)n0 + ehΓ󰀻 (B.)
Plugging the previous result in (B.), we get Q. On the other hand form
equation  in (B.) we obtain
1− n0
(eh − 1)ex +Q
= P −
n0
Q
(B.)
B.       .  n1 = 1− n0 
plugging everything in equation (B.) we obtain the following system of
equations written in term of Γ :
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
xe−x = z
eh−1 󰀺(1− e
h)n0 + ehΓ󰀻
1−Γ
Γ−n0
e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 󰁾(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ󰁿
ye−y = z
eh−1
Γ 1−Γ
Γ−n0
e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 󰁾(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ󰁿 q- times
(B.)
From previous equation (B.) we can infer the structure of the solutions.
Both equations have the same shape:
xe−x = c (B.)
where c is a constant to be determined auto-consistently.
Both equations have the same shape:
xe−x = c (B.)
where c is a constant to be determined auto-consistently.
If c is negative the equation has only one negative (thus unphysical) solution,
if c is greater than e−1 it has no solution otherwise it admits solution which can
be expressed in terms of Lambert W functions []:
x− = −W0(−c) (B.)
and
x+ = −W−1(−c) (B.)
whereW0,W−1 represents the two real branches of Lambert W function (using
the notation of []). It is trivial to check x− < 1 whereas x+ > 1 and that for
small values of c, x+ > z and thus is to be discarded.
In our case c is a complicate function of Γ but, as above, once Γ (and z) is
ﬁxed we know that x and y can take only two values x± and y± as deﬁned above
and thus we can label all the solutions using two integers α which counts the
number of x in + state (which of course is either  or ) and L+ which counts
the number of y in + state.
If we deﬁne, for notational ease:
B(Γ) =
z
eh − 1
Γ
1− Γ
Γ − n0
e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 󰁾(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ󰁿 (B.)
and
A(h, Γ) = 󰀺(1− e
h)n0 + ehΓ󰀻 (B.)
it is easy to check that have the following hierarchy in the admissible range
Γ ∈ [n0, 1]:
y−(A(0, Γ)B(Γ)) ≤ x−(A(h, Γ)B(Γ)) ≤ 1 ≤ x+(A(h, Γ)B(Γ)) ≤ y+(A(0, Γ)B(Γ))
(B.)
    
The normalization equation (B.) will then become, given integers α and L+:
αx+󰁻
z
eh − 1
󰀺(1− e
h)n0 + ehΓ󰀻
1− Γ
Γ − n0
e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 󰁾(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ󰁿
󰁼
+(1− α)x−󰂫
z
eh − 1
󰀺(1− e
h)n0 + ehΓ󰀻
1− Γ
Γ − n0
e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 󰁾(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ󰁿
󰂬
+
L+y+󰁻
z
eh − 1
Γ
1− Γ
Γ − n0
e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 󰁾(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ󰁿
󰁼
+(q− 1− L+)y+󰁻
z
eh − 1
Γ
1− Γ
Γ − n0
e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 󰁾(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ󰁿
󰁼 = z.
(B.)
Its solutions will give the Γ auto-consistently.
Since the previous substitution is valid only when (B.) is assumed we can
rewrite the equation as:
L+y+󰁻
z
eh − 1
Γ
1− Γ
Γ − n0
e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 󰁾(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ󰁿
󰁼
+(q− 1− L+)y+󰁻
z
eh − 1
Γ
1− Γ
Γ − n0
e
− z
eh−1
1−Γ
Γ−n0 󰁾(1−e
h)n0+ehΓ󰁿
󰁼
=z −
z
eh − 1
1− Γ
Γ − n0
󰀺(1− e
h)n0 + ehΓ󰀻
(B.)
.. Stability
Here we detailed how we checked the stability of the numerical solution.
When nα = 1− n0 all the values nαa = 0 for α > 1 because of the normalization
constraints; the Lagrangian function, thus, becomes ( here z = 2 η
λ
):
L(n; z, h) = (β1 − 1) 󰃚
n1 +∑
a
n1a󰃛
− (ζ0 − 1)(n
0 −∑
a
n0a) − h1n
1
1
+∑
a
n0a log(n
0
a) + n
1
a log(n
1
a) −
z
2
(na)
2
(B.)
To check the stability and the nature of these stationary points we have to
check the Hessian 𝖫 of the Lagrangian restricted to the tangent space 𝒯 to the
constraints manifold in the stationary point.
The stationary point will be a (local minimum) if and only if:
yT𝖫y > 0 for any y ∈ 𝒯 (B.)
In our case the constraint are linear; therefore the tangent space 𝒯 is a 2q− 2
dimensional space and it can be easily seen to be spanned by the orthonormal
base:
(ei)j =
1
√2
(δij − 2δ2q+1+j (mod 2),j) (B.)
where i ∈ {1, .., 2q} and j ∈ {1, .., 2q+ 2}. The projection operator then is given
by the matrix
𝖬ij = (ei)j (B.)
B.        z = 0 
Any vector y of 𝒯 can be expressed by a general vector v of R2q as y = 𝖬v.
Equation (B.) can be then expressed as:
vT𝖬T𝖫𝖬v > 0 (B.)
Thus in order to check the stability of a stationary point in the constrained
problem we can simply apply the usual Hessian criteria to the “eﬀective Hessian
𝖧eﬀ = 𝖬
T𝖫𝖬, either through numerical diagonalisation or using Sylvester’s
Criterion.
This method seems to be numerically more eﬃcient than the usual bordered
Hessian Criterion [, p.] in particular since we can take advantage of nu-
merical diagonalisation libraries.
.        z = 0
In this section we give the details of the perturbative expantion around z = 0.
The free energy of the system may be written as:
F(n; z, h) = f(n(z); h) − zg(n(z)) (B.)
where f, g are bounded functions of n(z).
For ﬁnite z we cannot say anything about theminimum, but from the structure
of the free energy we can get the structure of the minimum in the limiting case
when z → 0 and z → ∞.
When z = 0 the the minimum is obtained by minimizing f. It is easy to check
that this solution correspond to the zeroth order of the perturbative expansion
of the solutions of (.).
.. Zeroth order
Let us assume that nαa(z) is analytic around z = 0 (i.e.n
α
a(z) = ∑k ̄n
α
a,kz
k for
k > 0). The zeroth order value can be obtained directly substituting z with 0 in
eq. (.). And, with some algebra we get:
̄n0a,0 =
n0
q
(B.)
and
̄nαa,0 =
nαehαδaα
ehα − 1+ q
(B.)
thus leading to
na,0 = na(0) =
n0
q
+∑
α
nαehαδaα
ehα − 1+ q
=
(eha − 1)n
a
eha + q− 1
+ K (B.)
where K = n
0
q
+∑α
nα
ehα+q−1
and is equal for all
    
.. First order
The ﬁrst order of that expansion can be obtained easily deriving eq. (.) with
respect to z then setting (z = 0).
We have in particular:
Q′(z)󰂌
z=0
=∑
a
na(z)e
zna(z) + o(z)󰂌
z=0
= 1 (B.)
and
W′(z))󰂌
z=0
= −∑
α
nα
󰀺(ehα − 1)ezna(z) +Q(z)󰀻
2 󰀺(e
hα − 1)(na(z) + o(z))e
zna(z)) +Q′(z)󰀻 󰂌
z=0
=−∑
α
nα
󰀺(ehα − 1)e
zn̄a,0 + q󰀻
2 󰀺(e
hα − 1)n̄a,0 + 1󰀻
(B.)
The full equation thus reads:
̄na,1 = n
′
a(z)󰂌
z=0
= (na(z))
2e−zna(z) + o(z) −
n0
Q(z)2
Q′(z) +W′(z)
−
(eha − 1)na
󰀺(eha − 1)ezna(z) +Q(z)󰀻
2 󰀺(e
ha − 1)(na(z) + o(z)) +Q
′(z)󰀻 󰂌
z=0
=n̄2a,0 −
n0
q2
−
(eha − 1)na
󰀺(eha − 1) + q)󰀻
2 󰀺(e
ha − 1)(n̄a,0) + 1󰀻
−∑
α
nα
󰀺(ehα − 1)e
zn̄a,0 + q󰀻
2 󰀺(e
hα − 1)n̄a,0 + 1󰀻
(B.)
For large n0, as it is natural to expect, this solution corresponds to the sparse
network conﬁguration. This is the only solution of eq. (.) at z = 0. Since the
FOC are analytic for z → 0 at least in a neighbourhood ofz = 0 we can state
that the solution obtained perturbatively is the only minimum of the free energy
and that it corresponds to a sparse network conﬁguration (indeed for z = 0 the
network cannot grow at all).
.        z +∞
In this section we carry on the details of asymptotic expansion around z = +∞
In the case of z → ∞ case the minimummust correspond to a maximum of
f(n). In this case we have q degenerate maxima n
eq
i corresponding to ni = 1 and
nb = 0 ∀b ≠ i.
In order to gain some insight on which of these solutions is the true minimum
of the free energy for large but ﬁnite z we have tomake and asymptotic expansion
around z = ∞.
We proceed by steps expanding na(z) in equation (.) for large z around the
solution at z = ∞ nα = 1, na = 0 for a ≠ α.
B.        z +∞ 
If we assume that na(z) has the following form around∞:
na(z) = δaα +
1
z
̂na(z) + e
−z ̄na(z) (B.)
where ̂na(z) and ̄na(z) are meromorphic around z = ∞.
Since the right hand member of equation (.) is o(e−z) whereas, for a ≠ α
the left hand member of the equation is meromorphic, we immediately obtain
that ̂na(z) = 0.
Obtaining the non analytic contribution requires, instead, a harder work. We
shall proceed by steps. We assume, in the following, that ̄na(z) = ∑k≥0 ̄na(k)z
−k.
.. Left hand member of equation (.)
Case a = α
̄nα (z)e
−zn̄α(z) ≃ 󰀺1+ e
−z
󰀷 ̄nα (0) + n̄α (1) z
−1
󰀸󰀻 e
−z
󰀺1− ze
z
󰀷 ̄nα (0) + n̄α (1) z
−1 + n̄α (2) z
−2
󰀸󰀻 =
e−z + e−2z 󰀺−z ̄nα (0) + n̄α (0) − n̄α (1) + 󰀷 ̄nα (1) − n̄α (2)󰀸 z
−1
󰀻
(B.)
Case a ≠ α
̄na (z)e
−zn̄a(z) ≃ e−z 󰀺 ̄na (0) + n̄a (1) z
−1
󰀻 󰀺1− ze
z
󰀷 ̄na (0) + n̄a (1) z
−1 + n̄a (2) z
−2
󰀸󰀻 =
e−z 󰀷 ̄na (0) + n̄a (1) z
−1
󰀸 + e
−2z
󰁾z 󰀷 ̄na (0)󰀸
2 + 2 ̄na (0) ̄na (1) + 󰁻󰀷 ̄na (1)󰀸
2 + n̄a (0) ̄na (2)󰁼 z
−1
󰁿
(B.)
.. Right hand member of equation (.)
Expansion of Q
Q =∑
a
ez ̄na(z) ≃ ez 󰀷1+ e
−z
󰀷z ̄nα (0) + n̄α (1) + n̄α (2) z
−2
󰀸 + e
z
󰀷q− 1󰀸󰀸 e
−z
= ez 󰀺1+ e
−z
󰀷z ̄nα (0) + n̄α (1) + q− 1+ n̄α (2) z
−2
󰀸󰀻
(B.)
Expansion of n0Q−1
n0Q−1 ≃ n0e−z 󰀺1− e
−z
󰀷z ̄nα (0) + n̄α (1) + q− 1+ n̄α (2) z
−1
󰀸󰀻 (B.)
Expansion of ((ehα − 1)ezn̄α +Q)−1
1
󰀷ehα − 1󰀸 ezn̄α +Q
≃ e−hαe−z 󰀺1− e
−z
󰀷z ̄nα (0) + n̄α (1) + e
−hα 󰀷q− 1󰀸 + n̄α (2) z
−1
󰀸󰀻
(B.)
    
Expansion of ((eha − 1)ezn̄a +Q)−1
1
󰀷eha − 1󰀸 ezn̄a +Q
≃ e−z 󰀺1− e
−z
󰀷z ̄nα (0) + n̄α (1) + e
ha + 󰀷q− 2󰀸 + n̄α (2) z
−1
󰀸󰀻
(B.)
Expansion ofW
W =∑
a
na
(eha − 1)ezn̄a +Q
≃ (nαe−hα +∑
a≠α
na)e−z 󰀺1− e
−z
󰀷z ̄nα (0) + n̄α (1) + n̄α (2) z
−1
󰀸󰀻
+e−2z
󰃝
nαe−2hα(q− 1) +∑
a≠α
na 󰀷e
ha + q− 2󰀸
󰃞
(B.)
.. Full Equation
Case a ≠ α
In this case it is suﬃcient to keep items up to order e−z to obtain non trivial
results. The FOC becomes then
e−z 󰀺n̄a (0) + ̄na (1) z
−1
󰀻+ o(e
−2z) = e−z
󰃝
n0 + nαe−hα +∑
a≠α
na + (eha − 1)na
󰃞
+ o(e−2z)
(B.)
and thus equating order by order, and using normalization constraints, we
obtain:
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
na(0) = 󰀺1+ n
a(eha − 1) − nα(1− e−hα)󰀻
na(1) = 0
(B.)
Case a = α
In this case, at order e−z the equation is trivially satisﬁed because of normaliza-
tion constraints; we need thus to keep also the terms of order e−2z .
e−z + e−2z 󰀺−z ̄nα (0) + n̄α (0) − n̄α (1) + 󰀷 ̄nα (1) − n̄α (2)󰀸 z
−1
󰀻 =
e−z
󰃝
n0 + nαe−hα + 󰀷e
hα − 1󰀸 e
−hαnα +∑
a≠α
nα
󰃞
−e−2zn0 󰀷z ̄nα (0) + n̄α (1) + q− 1+ n̄α (2) z
−1
󰀸
−e−2z
󰃚
nαehα +∑
a≠α
na
󰃛
󰀷z ̄nα (0) + n̄α (1) + n̄α (2) z
−1
󰀸
−e−2z 󰀷e
hα − 1󰀸 n
αe−hα 󰀷z ̄nα (0) + n̄α (1) + e
−hα 󰀷q− 1󰀸 + n̄α (2) z
−1
󰀸
−e−2z
󰃝
nαe−2hα 󰀷q− 1󰀸 +∑
a
eha + 󰀷q− 2󰀸∑
a
na
󰃞
B.        z +∞ 
(B.)
The solution can be obtain equating order by order and one gets:
⎧⎪
⎨
⎪⎩
nα(0) = −󰀽(q− 1) 󰀺1+ n
α(e−hα − 1)󰀻 + n
0 + nα − 1+∑i≠α e
hini󰀾
nα(1) = 0
(B.)
It can be easily checked that these solutions are consistent with the normalization
constraint order by order.
.. Asymptotic expansion of nba
We can plug the previous equation in equation (.) and obtain, after a little
algebra, the asymptotic expansion for the nba variables. We have to distinguish
between seven cases. when
Case b = 0
When a ≠ α we have
n0a = e
−zn0 + o(z−1e−z) (B.)
in the other case
n0α = n
0 − e−zn0(q− 1) + o(z−1e−z). (B.)
Case b = α
here we have to distinguish between two cases. When a = α we have:
nαα = n
α − e−znαe−hα(q− 1) + o(z−1e−z) (B.)
when a ≠ α we have instead:
nαa = e
−znαe−hα + o(z−1e−z). (B.)
Case b ≠ α, 0
In this case we have to distinguish among three possibilities. When a = α we
have:
nbα = n
b − e−znb(ehb + q− 2) + o(z−1e−z) (B.)
when a ≠ α and a ≠ b we have:
nba = e
−znb + o(z−1e−z) (B.)
and ﬁnally when a ≠ α and a = b we obtain:
nbb = e
−znbehb + o(z−1e−z). (B.)
    
.. Asymptotic expansion of the Free Energy
We can plug all the equation previously written in the expression of the free
energy and, after some algebra obtain the following asymptotic formula for the
free energy for z → ∞
F ≃ −
z
2
+n0 log(n0)+∑
i≠0
ni log(ni)−nαhα+ ze
−z
󰀷−n
αhαe
hα +∑
i
nihie
hi󰀸+ o(e
−z)
(B.)
As the sub-leading term (the constant term) is enough to determine which is
the global minimum. In fact the solution with the maximum nαhα prevail. In
the case in which two or more direction have the same value of hin
i the solution
with the bigger value of hi will prevail.
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